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ABSTRACT
This is a comparative case study o f public sector hospital mergers in England and 
Ontario in the 1990s. Its purpose is to explore how change evolved and the 
organisational consequences as the hospitals underwent restructuring. The main focus 
is on the consultation process prior to the decision to merge. The objectives of this 
work were to analyse the interaction o f government agencies and key stakeholders (as 
defined) in the period leading up to the merger and to track the restructuring process 
to determine if  a new organisational form emerged. Multiple sources o f data were 
collected and collectively the data spanned 19 years for both cases. The researcher 
conducted 79 interviews in 24 different hospitals and health care organisations over a 
period of 5 years.
The researcher draws on archetype theory and Neil Fligstein’s work on power and the 
social skill o f actors to construct a framework for analysis. Archetype theory focuses 
on intra-organisational dynamics of change and is useful for analysing the emergence 
o f new or hybrid organisational archetypes, but does not focus on the role o f external 
power and politics in the change process. Fligstein’s work emphasises the importance 
of power and how actors may induce co-operation in others to influence and 
manipulate the change process.
The results of this research show that in similar market contexts there were significant 
differences (in the pre-merger review and consultation processes and in the 
organisational outcomes) between change that was ‘stakeholder-led’ and change that 
was led by government agencies. These merger types can be distinguished in terms of 
three distinct but closely related factors: the government’s approach to consultation 
with stakeholders; the power dynamics and interaction between key stakeholders 
during both the consultation process and the post-merger restructuring process; and 
the extent o f manipulation of any of those processes by government agencies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to this Thesis
In many countries in the 1990s, amid widespread concern about the rising costs of 
health care, governments and organisations involved in the delivery o f health care 
services were under severe pressure critically to evaluate their existing systems and to 
find ways o f containing costs without impairing the volume and quality o f provision 
(Wolfe, 1991; Elola, 1996; Glennerster and Matsaganis, 1994; Church and Barker, 
1998; Ferlie et al, 1996). In addition to the problem of rising costs, changing trends in 
health care practices, due to advances in medical technology and other factors, meant 
that needs for new and different treatments and methods of care were arising, and that 
existing acute care hospital facilities were often being used inappropriately and 
therefore inefficiently.
The British government and the provincial governments in Canada embarked on 
radical system-wide health care reform in an attempt to address this crisis. Hospital 
restructuring dominated the reform agenda. Hospital mergers became almost a 
panacea in the governments' thinking, and were assumed to be useful for several 
objectives, including reducing overhead costs, addressing management inefficiencies, 
achieving economies o f scale and improving the quality o f patient care. In Canada 
between 1990 and 1999 the number o f hospitals declined from 1,231 to 929, a drop of 
almost 25 percent (though mergers were certainly not the only factor contributing to 
this change) (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2002). More than 30 major Canadian 
teaching hospitals merged into very large organisations in the 1990s (Canadian Health 
Services Research Foundation, 2000). In the same period, there were 40 mergers of 
NHS Trusts in England (Garside, 1999).
1.2 Aim of the Research
The aim of this research is to explore the dynamics of the interaction between key 
actors in the context o f a merger of public sector teaching hospitals, and how these 
dynamics, as external and internal forces, operate to enable or constrain strategic 
change. The researcher defines key actors to include:
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(a) government agencies;
(b) any review body appointed by or at the behest of the government to make 
recommendations for reform of the hospital services in question;
(c) the hospital organisations involved in the merger;
(d) medical professional groups within the hospitals;
(e) the University medical school affected by the merger;
(e) other hospitals and health services organisations within the community served 
by the merging hospitals; and
(f) community organisations and local authorities.
All actors except government agencies and review bodies are referred to as 
‘stakeholders’. It is important to stress that in this research the term ‘stakeholder’ 
carries no connotation o f stakeholder analysis, which is not used in this research (see 
Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2). Also, since the government only acts through its various 
agencies (such as Departments and Ministries), any references to ‘government’ should 
be construed accordingly.
The objectives of the research are:
(a) to analyse the approach taken by government agencies and independent review
bodies to the merger process;
(b) to analyse the role of the stakeholders in the merger process, including both
their interaction with the government and their interaction with each other;
(c) to identify the key changes in the structure, systems and underlying values of
the hospital organisations;
(d) to develop a hospital merger typology, which identifies key merger
characteristics and different pathways of change; and finally
(e) to highlight the key issues arising, and lessons that can be learnt, from the
cases studied.
To this end the researcher has conducted longitudinal case studies o f two public sector 
teaching hospital mergers in the 1990s, one in Newcastle Upon Tyne, England and the 
other in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
The informants or interviewees selected for this research study will include 
government decision makers, senior executives, lead clinicians and middle managers.
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The purpose o f this sampling approach is to identify those people who are the most 
knowledgeable, have access to specific information about the merger due to their 
position in the organisation or community and who attended meetings which had a 
direct bearing on the outcome of the merger. The decision to use this sampling 
strategy is defined according to the parameters established by the research question 
and is further reinforced by the data collection process which drives informant 
selection through document analysis and interviewing.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
The researcher will draw on the theory of ‘archetypes’ proposed by Hinings and 
Greenwood (1988, 1993, 1996) as a basis for understanding the dynamics of 
organisational change from a neo-institutional perspective. The cases provide a novel 
basis for testing out the value of archetype-based analysis. A significant part of the 
research underpinning those authors’ theory was based on studies of public sector 
organisations (specifically, British local authorities: Hinings and Greenwood 1993). 
However, whilst archetype theory recognises the influence o f contextual forces on 
organisational change, it tends to concentrate attention on intraorganisational 
phenomena. As reflected in the stated aim of this thesis, the researcher wants to 
distribute attention more evenly between the contextual forces and the 
intraorganisational phenomena. This approach is particularly appropriate for research 
in the field o f public sector health care organisations, for two reasons. First, in recent 
years there has been constant tension between the government and the health care 
community in both Britain and Canada. Second, there is a high level of
interdependence between the various health care organisations serving any given 
geographical area. The researcher will therefore also draw on and evaluate Neil 
Fligstein’s (1990, 1998, 2001) work on the role of power and actors, as a potential 
framework for understanding the relationship between the actors in the field in which 
the organisation operates.
1.4 Cross-Case Comparisons
International comparisons o f health care reforms and hospital restructuring can offer 
an opportunity for governments and stakeholders in different countries to leam from 
each other’s experiences. Comparisons between cases can highlight similarities
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and/or provide revealing contrasts. Sometimes meta-theories will emerge that can 
explain the differences between outcomes and process transitions from one event to 
another. The comparing of cases across countries may provide more theoretical and 
practical merit when it comes to exploring and accepting a wider range of possible 
explanations about the outcomes of both cases. McPhee (1995) stated that cross-case 
studies have diagnostic value because they can also reveal some underlying root 
causes of case differences that perhaps the researcher had not considered previously. 
Pettigrew (1990) found it was useful to integrate cross-case data by producing an 
explanatory typology, which he defined as a process map containing alternative paths 
of change leading to the end result.
Having worked for 20 years in the health care field including acute care hospitals in 
both Britain and Canada, the researcher was sceptical about hospital merger as a 
strategy to reduce health care spending and saw the potential advantage o f comparing 
the hospital restructuring process in both countries with a focus on the inter­
relationship between the key actors in that process.
1.5 Review of the Literature on Mergers
The researcher found no studies on the interaction between the government and 
stakeholders in the context of hospital mergers. Those studies that are concerned with 
organisational change resulting from hospital mergers do not address the possible 
significance o f this interaction; and none o f the research concerning the interaction 
between the state and other actors (including stakeholders) relates specifically to 
hospital mergers.
A brief review of the merger literature is included below to provide an insight into the 
contextual difficulties that the key actors, and the emergent organisation, are likely to 
encounter in the course o f the public sector hospital merger process.
Mergers in General
Mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s represented the fifth merger wave of the 21st 
century and their size and number suggests that the decade of the 1990s will be 
remembered for merger mania (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992; Hitt et al, 2001). The 
mergers o f the 1990s differed from previous waves, not only in terms o f increased
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scale and geographical spread but also in terms o f the type o f combinations. Many of 
these mergers were classified as horizontal integration, which can be defined as a 
combination of two similar organisations in the same industry (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). The merger wave o f the 1980s was fuelled by the need to structure 
and focus on core and related businesses, while the merger wave o f the 1990s was 
mostly the result of a desire to achieve economies o f scale (operating efficiently at 
higher rather than lower levels of production) and scope (centralising multiple 
services to ensure critical linkages) and market power, in order to increase 
competitiveness in global markets.
In order to justify a merger in the public sector the magic words, as in the private 
sector, were 'economies of scale' and 'rationalisation'. But the evidence on economies 
of scale in the private sector is far from conclusive (Hitt et al, 2001; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). There is no automatic reason why economies should emerge when 
two companies are brought together, as such economies come from integrated 
production. There may be possible advantages in large-scale operation, but this does 
not mean that large organisations, that are simply aggregations o f formerly 
independent plants, can achieve them. Indeed research evidence has repeatedly 
demonstrated that mergers have had an unfavourable impact on profitability 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1992; Hitt et al, 2001; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; and 
Kitching, 1967) Instead of achieving projected economies o f scale, mergers have 
become associated with lower productivity, worse strike records and higher 
absenteeism (Davy et al, 1988 and Cartwright and Cooper, 1992). It has been 
suggested that in the long term between 50-80 percent of all mergers and takeovers are 
financially unsuccessful and highly unstable (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; British 
Institute o f Management, 1986). Hunt (1988) supported these findings, stating that 
the success rates o f mergers post-acquisition are in the region of only 50 percent.
Synergy is also not guaranteed in a merger. The possibility of such advantage may be 
there, but the success o f the merger depends upon the management's ability to take 
advantage of opportunities (Beenstock, 1995). The key factor in determining success 
in the pre-merger stages is the quality of both the planning and the management of the 
change process itself (Hitt et al, 2001; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). It seems that 
much of the research into post-merger performance emphasises the same factors.
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Negotiation of a merger agreement consumes a considerable amount of managerial 
time and energy. Research suggests that once a potential acquisition target has been 
identified, it could be two years or longer before a bid is made (Hunt, 1988). The 
subsequent negotiations are likely to lengthen the process even further. It is not 
uncommon for negotiation to last several years. During this period, the acquiring 
organisation is likely to have become extremely well informed as to the financial 
health of the acquisition target, but to have learned little beyond that point 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).
Most organisations are ill-prepared for the scale o f problems that they invariably have 
to face. During the initial stage, expectations o f stakeholders are often ambiguous, 
there are usually multiple motives offered and financial issues can be splintered off 
from broader organisational and strategic considerations. In the absence of any 
human merger audit, or careful formulated human merger integration plan, most 
organisations muddle through the merger process, moving from one organisational 
crisis to another, rather than pro-actively managing people and anticipating problems. 
Most merger management is characterised by ad hoc reactive fire-fighting (Cartwright 
and Cooper, 1992).
The importance o f organisational culture has often been over-estimated in the 
managerial literature (the work o f Peters and Waterman (1982) is arguably an example 
of this). However, organisational and cultural issues are important if a successful 
merger is to be achieved and, as was observed by Peters and Waterman (1982), 
outstanding financial performance is often associated with a strong, dominant and 
coherent culture. This link finds an echo in the research of Hinings and Greenwood 
(1989), in which they argue that organisational structures and management systems 
obtain coherence and stability through their underlying values and beliefs or 
interpretive scheme. This does suggest that the type o f culture o f the combining 
organisation, the resultant cultural dynamics and the speed with which unitary and 
coherent culture emerges, play a critical role in determining the eventual outcome of 
the inter-organisational combination.
Existing work on mergers also shows that the merging o f two organisations is 
complicated and requires the co-operation o f many people. An uncooperative climate 
can lead to disastrous results whether during pre-merger negotiations or during post­
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merger integration (Hitt et al, 2001). Resistance to mergers comes in a variety of 
forms and degrees o f intensity. During a public sector merger, one form of resistance 
that may well be encountered is opposition by community stakeholders.
Generally, the overt power relationships between parties in a takeover are likely to 
differ from that between merging partners. In a takeover there is a clear perception of 
winners and losers. In such situations power is not usually regarded as negotiable, but 
is immediately surrendered to the new organisation on completion o f the deal, at least 
by organisational elites. The takeover of another organisation is a visible symbol to 
employees and the community that the acquiring organisation is successful, while 
being acquired is likely to be construed as a symbol o f failure at the organisational 
level and also, for some, the personal level (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992). In a 
hostile takeover there will probably be greater overt conflict and resistance to change 
if the dispute has mobilised the entire workforce. The distinction between friendly 
and hostile acquisitions lies in the attitudes of the stakeholders and the negotiating 
senior management (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hunt, 1988).
The final integration stage in a merger or takeover is one o f the most challenging 
aspects for management (Hitt et al, 2001). The integration process has been defined 
as an interactive and gradual process in which individuals from the two organisations 
learn to work together and co-operate in the transfer o f strategic capabilities. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) describe this integration as a difficult and time- 
consuming exercise fraught with uncertainty and risks, where decisions are often 
made with incomplete and limited information, under pressure. Failure to move the 
company together quickly can destroy the value it hoped to achieve. Kitching (1967) 
concluded that the key to merger success is essentially the way in which the transition 
process is managed and the quality o f the working relationships between the 
partnering organisations. His study found that in 81 percent of failed mergers, 
reporting relationships were said to be either unclear or frequently changed. 
Cartwright and Cooper (1992) identified two important factors for merger success: the 
cultural compatibility o f the combining organisations and resultant cultural dynamics, 
and the way in which the integration process was managed.
Mergers and acquisitions differ from other processes of major organisational change 
in three aspects: the speed o f change, the scale o f change and the uncertainties o f the
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outcome for both parties. The integration process can take from 12 months to 7 years. 
Managerial relationships are well recognised as a major source o f merger problems at 
any point in the merger process. Mergers are about power, differing perceptions of 
culture and how different stakeholders view the proposed organisational outcome 
(Hunt, 1988). Mergers are both a significant event for the organisation and its 
employees, and a major long-term process o f change and integration.
The research on mergers in the private sector shows that they are not easy to 
implement successfully. The merger process in the public sector has the further 
disadvantage that it involves the state and multiple stakeholders with diverse sources 
o f influence, and is therefore more easily politicised. This is especially so in the case 
o f professional service organisations such as hospitals, where the long-established 
behaviour patterns of professionals, who have traditionally had considerable power 
and autonomy, may be disturbed by the merger (Denis et al, 1999).
Hospital Mergers
Most o f the recent literature on hospital mergers relates to research done in the U.S. 
The U.S. health care system differs significantly from the British and Canadian 
systems, so that generalising the results of the research is problematic. Whereas 
discussions o f economies of scale and organisational factors are certainly relevant to 
all three systems, the U.S. system’s concerns with questions o f market share, prices 
and anti-trust laws is not easily transferable to the British and Canadian environments 
(although with the recent advent of NHS foundation trusts, similar concerns may 
begin to emerge in the British system).
Furthermore, most o f the literature has tended to focus more on the results expected 
once the merger is consummated rather than on the merger process itself. In 
particular, the economic aspects of merger and the effect on the quality of patient care 
appear to have been the main concerns of the research.
It is interesting to note that the British Department of Health's guidance (NHS 
Executive, 1994) on the operation of the internal market in 1994 reviewed the 
literature on mergers relating to economies of scale and scope and to quality. It 
concluded that the evidence was at best mixed, that studies were subject to substantial
methodological problems, and that the evidence from the literature could not be used 
alone to justify decisions on reorganising services.
Markham and Lomas (1995) reviewed the literature on ‘multi-hospital arrangements’, 
varying from loosely-structured alliances to fully-fledged mergers, including 
Canadian examples. They examined the evidence for various types of benefits and 
disadvantages, classified into four areas: economic and financial, quality of services, 
human resources and organisational and managerial. Drawing on several case-study 
articles they concluded that the process adopted to implement the merger seems to be 
an important determinant o f the balance between benefits and disadvantages, and that 
it may take up to ten years to achieve full integration.
In his article on teaching hospital mergers Andreopoulos (1997) argued that the 
principal difficulty consists in reconciling the research and teaching role with medical 
practice. The author discusses the dilemmas a teaching hospital has to face to 
preserve teaching and to meet economic constraints. Various modes o f functioning 
after mergers are reviewed, from the maintenance o f separate structures, which 
reduces the possibility of achieving economies o f scale, to the elimination of 
duplication and expansion of the institution to an unmanageable size. The author 
suggests that some research laboratories could be reduced in size and their 
administrative support services bundled together. He also raises the question of the 
separation of clinical and academic activities, emphasising the advantages of co­
operation instead of competition and the need for leadership in the integration of these 
activities.
Colon et al (1999) noted that the traditional rationale for U.S. hospital mergers, based 
on economies o f scale, increased market power, and the ability to increase patient 
flow by providing a fully integrated service, does not take into account local 
conditions. They suggest that each case needs to be considered on its merits and 
provide a framework for assessing the potential for benefit from a merger based on 
two dimensions: structural attractiveness and organisational resistance. Structural 
attractiveness depends on the how close the hospitals are, their relative size and the 
dominance o f managed care. For example, economies of scale are possible for sizes 
of up to 300-400 beds but there may be diseconomies beyond that. Even when 
structural factors are favourable, organisational resistance can prevent the realisation
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of benefits. The authors cite physician relations, the integration of assets and 
leadership, and the pressures for improved performance as factors that may assist or 
hinder merger implementation. In particular, problems can arise in reconciling 
physicians’ interests with those of the new institution. To facilitate change, it also 
appears desirable to replace board members with people who have no affiliation with 
the old institutions.
Similarly with regard to economies o f scale, Posnett (1999) noted that studies in many 
countries have shown that the best size for acute hospitals is actually between 200 and 
400 beds; above that, management and administration costs tend to increase.
A Canadian study by Denis et al (1999) provides a useful insight into the particular 
problems encountered in mergers of public sector hospitals with different cultural 
profiles. The authors described the processes o f implementation of two major 
teaching-hospital mergers (of three hospitals each) in Quebec beginning with the 
negotiations leading to the merger agreement and tracing the early phases of 
implementation for approximately two years. It is important to note that in both cases 
the merger was imposed by the government, as part of Quebec's 1992 health reform.
In one o f the cases, relations between the three nominated hospitals were so highly 
conflictual that a special committee was put in place by the Ministry of Health and 
Social Services to secure agreement among them. In the other case, there was 
resistance to the merger but an implementation committee was formed by the leaders 
of the three hospitals, avoiding the need for further intervention by the Ministry. The 
subsequent processes, as presented by the authors, of leadership development, 
strategic framing and operationalisation followed very different paths, yet in both 
cases the new organisation experienced difficulties in getting operations underway 
successfully. The authors concluded that limited resources, diffuse power and 
divergent cultures were largely responsible for the difficulties experienced. They also 
argued that a ‘bottom-up’ process that ensures active participation o f professionals in 
decisions that concern them is clearly essential; yet if the mergers were to make any 
economic sense, the process must also incorporate some legitimate means o f breaking 
deadlock, evaluating alternative projects, and constructing a form of global rationality. 
This may have to come from the ‘top-down.’ An effective process must somehow 
balance both.
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In a cross sectional study o f nine NHS Trusts in Britain, Fulop et al (2002) found that 
Trusts' larger sizes after mergers had unintended negative consequences, as well as 
predicted advantages. The tendency for one trust's management team to dominate 
over the other resulted in tension. Difficulties in the merger process included 
perceived differences in organisational culture and perceptions of ‘takeover’ which 
limited sharing o f ‘good practice’ across newly merged organisations.
In March 2000 a major two-day conference was held on hospital mergers in Canada in 
the 1990s, for members of the Association of Canadian Teaching Hospitals. No less 
than 24 CEOs of Canadian teaching hospitals, all of whom had been involved in 
mergers, spoke at this conference. The practical experiences emerging from the 
proceedings were as follows.
(a) There had not been nearly enough research or even sharing of information 
across the country on hospital mergers.
(b) Corporate culture is a real issue in hospital amalgamations. The loss of that 
culture is what people mourn in a merger and lack of a common culture can keep a 
new organisation from succeeding.
(c) A new culture cannot begin to develop until workers and professionals from 
the different institutions start working together. Although all employees suffer 
destabilisation in a merger, physicians are the most important group in the integration 
o f cultures.
(d) Even the best-planned mergers can be stymied by the vicissitudes of 
government behaviour. Too often, fear of political repercussions or the loss of 
political will in the face o f an impending election can undermine years of work, while 
a change of government or political interference can derail even mergers that seem to 
be well on track.
(e) The elaborate schemes worked out in many mergers to combine boards 
(usually a set number o f seats apportioned to representatives o f each of the former 
hospital boards) had not served amalgamations well. In an effort to represent all the 
involved parties, they are often too big to function smoothly, and many trustees cling 
to old loyalties as though they are there to protect the interests of their old 
organisation, rather than governing a new one.
(f) The consensus at the conference was that a fresh group of volunteers, ready to 
back the actions o f a CEO who comes from outside any o f the amalgamating 
hospitals, can do much to make a merger work.
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(g) However, thorough negotiations and careful planning, hospitals do not spring 
fully-formed from merger agreements. The real restructuring comes about through a 
series of micromergers: the incremental melding of departments and programs within 
merged hospitals that happens after the formal amalgamation is made official.
(h) It was generally agreed that micromergers need very careful management, but 
in too many cases have been left to manage themselves in the wake of an 
amalgamation.
(i) In the case of Edmonton’s health services, for example, amalgamation worked 
because those negotiations were done by mixed teams of staff from different 
disciplines and different sites working together to plan the micromergers of each 
department or program. Decisions were made by consensus and if a team could not 
reach consensus, it lost the right to make the decision (Canadian Health Services 
Research Foundation, 2000)
It can be seen that although the conference noted the vicissitudes of government 
behaviour and political interference as potential problems for hospital mergers, it did 
not address the interaction between government and stakeholders. Further, the 
conference highlighted the need for leaders and staff in merging hospitals to actually 
start working together to both build a new culture and effect the real restructuring; but 
it did not consider the interaction of the hospitals (and other community stakeholders) 
during the review and consultation process before amalgamation .
1.6 Relevance of this Research
In terms o f hospital merger activity, the health systems in Britain and Canada have 
experienced relative calm in the five years that have passed since the merger mania 
decade o f the 1990s. However, there is among health professionals and academics in 
Canada a sense o f the inevitability o f another policy cycle of mergers (Canadian 
Health Services Research Foundation 2000). In Britain, respected academics have 
attacked politicians’ ‘wheezes’ and ‘smokescreens’ in relation to health service 
reconfigurations, and their use of mergers as:
‘crude methods for disciplining obdurate clinicians, and weak managers who fail 
to control NHS resources efficiently.’ (Sheldon and Maynard, 1999:1762)
A clear indication that further hospital merger activity is to be anticipated in Britain is 
to be found in recent legislation. In the National Health Service and Community Care
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Act 1990, which implemented the internal market reforms, there was not one 
reference to mergers. In sharp contrast, the Health and Social Care (Community 
Health and Standards) Act 2003 contains specific provisions (sections 28 and 29) 
enabling an NHS foundation trust to merge with another trust (subject to regulator 
approval and public consultation). It may well be that the establishment of the 
Independent Regulator, and new financial freedoms for those organisations that 
become NHS foundation trusts, will give rise to merger process dynamics somewhat 
different from those experienced by stakeholders previously. Ultimately however, the 
fundamental dynamic will not change: stakeholders will only be able to proceed with 
a voluntary merger, or avoid involuntary restructuring, through interaction with an 
actor (regulator) appointed and empowered by the government.
Research done on government and stakeholder interaction in public sector hospital 
mergers may also be useful to inform, and/or provide comparisons with, studies of 
restructuring of other public sector services, such as education. It is relevant to note 
that in Britain, from 1993 (when colleges became independent from local authority 
control) to 2003, 37 colleges had been involved in mergers, either with other colleges 
or with higher education institutions (Centre for Education and Industry, University of 
Warwick Research Report No. 459).
As can be seen from the preceding review of published work on mergers, the 
interaction between government and other actors in public sector hospital mergers has 
not received the specific attention of scholars to date. An important feature of this 
research is that it looks closely at the behaviour of the government in each of the two 
cases and does so from an entirely independent perspective. All costs associated with 
this research were borne by the researcher personally, with no funding assistance from 
any governmental or other body. It may be that commissioned research opens up 
possibilities for direct access to actors and organisational environments that are of 
interest but might not otherwise be available. In this case however the researcher had 
no difficulty in gaining such access independently (for further information in this 
regard see Chapter 3). It can be argued that scholarly research should seek to solve 
contemporary problems identified by those who are experiencing the problems; but 
identification of the problem area and independence and impartiality in its study are 
separate issues. Scholars can themselves (i.e. independently) identify, and arguably
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anticipate, those problems through their knowledge of developments in the relevant 
field.
While acknowledging that some research may only be possible through 
commissioning, the researcher believes that commissioning gives rise to three obvious 
and significant concerns. First, the researcher is required to study areas (or problems) 
identified as of relevance and interest by someone else (the commissioner) who may 
not have an interest in contributing to theoretical development. Second, the 
commissioner/funder, or even the organisation/actors studied, may exercise 
inappropriate editorial control over the published research report. Third, being
dependent upon funding for the current and possibly future projects, the 
commissioned researcher may shy away from expressing clearly any observations 
likely to cause controversy or embarrassment to the funder or organisation studied.
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the development o f archetype theory, which the 
researcher will apply in the study o f hospital mergers. The strengths and weaknesses 
o f archetype theory are discussed and critiqued, and it is argued that archetype theory 
has a significant limitation in relation to interaction between organisations, in that its 
focus is on intra-organisational dynamics. In this research therefore archetype theory 
is applied in combination with concepts derived from the work of Neil Fligstein 
exploring the importance of power and the role of actors (including the state) and 
social skill with regard to change and stability within organisational fields. This 
approach will facilitate a more comprehensive analysis of public sector hospital 
mergers.
Chapter 3 on research methods considers the strengths and weaknesses of case study 
methodology and addresses how this approach allows the researcher the flexibility to 
track the change process and collect longitudinal data in real time and retrospectively. 
The chapter describes the case selection criteria and provides details o f the fieldwork 
undertaken in England and Ontario. The research design, data collection and cross 
case analysis is outline.
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When comparing the hospital merger processes in England and Ontario, it is important 
to highlight the similarities and differences between the two healthcare systems. 
Chapter 4 compares and analyses the two health care systems in terms of basic 
principles and service objectives, provision of service, the structure o f the health care 
service, the role of the government and their respective funding systems. The 
discussion o f each country’s health service reform and restructuring agenda sets the 
backdrop for the merger cases.
The English and Ontario case studies are presented in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
Each case study discusses the government reform agenda and how the government 
proposes to restructure acute care hospital services as part o f a system-wide change 
strategy. Key events are identified and discussed in relation to their impact on the 
merger process. The role and social skill of actors, including government agencies, 
and the dynamics of their interactions is explored and, in Chapter 7, compared across 
cases. The pressure o f government reform and the implementation of organisational 
restructuring is considered in terms o f whether or not a new hospital archetype 
emerges. The theoretical framework used in these case studies stems from 
Greenwood and Hinings’ work on archetype theory and the work done by Neil 
Fligstein on the role o f actors and use o f power and social skill to induce co-operation 
with other actors in the field.
The cases are compared and the main findings of the research are discussed in Chapter 
7. A merger typology is developed which highlights the relationship between the 
research findings and the combined theoretical constructs applied in Chapters 5 and 6.
The conclusions o f the research are presented in Chapter 8. The key findings are 
discussed in relation to the aim of the study. The usefulness of archetype theory and 
Fligstein’s work, separately and in combination, is evaluated. Future areas for 
research are identified.
In relation to the hospital organisations studied in this research the term ‘merger’ is 
used in a wide sense, to include not only the amalgamation of distinct legal entities 
(hospital organisations) but also the acquisition of by one organisation o f all or most 
of the hospital services o f another organisation. The expression ‘pre-merger phase’ 
refers to the review, negotiation and consultation processes leading to the decision to
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merge; and ‘post-merger phase’ refers to the processes of organisational restructuring 




A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING ORGANISATIONAL 
CHANGE: ARCHETYPES, POWER AND SOCIAL SKILL
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework chosen for the research presented in 
the thesis. This framework consists of neo-institutionalist concepts of transitions 
between particular or hybrid ‘design archetypes’, integrated with political-cultural 
perspectives on the use of power and social skill by strategic actors. Using this 
framework for analysis, the researcher will seek to elucidate the change processes that 
emerged in the cases and the reasons for the striking difference between them.
Organisational theorists have had great difficulty finding a generic classification 
scheme for organisations and organisational changes (Scott, 1998). There is a 
diversity o f organisation theory perspectives and research designs, and no general 
scheme has won approval from the community of scholars (Aldrich, 1999). What 
attracted the researcher to the institutional perspective generally is that it has a ‘broad 
reach.... making it potentially relevant to all levels of analysis and all spans of time, 
from micro-level interactions to large-scale change in nation-sates.’ (Aldrich, 
1999:52). The strength of new institutional theory is its capability to explain how 
organisations are connected with their institutional surroundings (Beckert, 1999).
Archetype theory (as developed by its leading proponents Ranson et al., 1980; Walsh 
et al., 1981; Greenwood and Hinings, 1988, 1993, 1996; Cooper et al., 1996; Brock et 
al., 1999) suggests that change within organisations is best understood through the 
inclusive analysis of overall patterns of relationships, rather than through the 
consideration of the behaviour of particular groups and their interactions. When, as 
here, the aim is to study the transition of organisation forms as wholes, the approach 
has the virtue of attempting to conceptualise organisational phenomena at the 
appropriate level. Such a holistic perspective is an obvious advantage if the subject in 
hand is the longer term transition of organisational structures and forms. The
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archetype approach allows a clear perception o f the emergent properties of 
organisations, and so makes possible a perception of how effectively an organisation 
is functioning. It is also proposed that using this approach it is possible to be able to 
gauge the scale o f change. The concept of ‘organisational tracks’ is used in this study 
to indicate that in research process the investigator maps what happens to the 
organisation in total and also assesses both the pace and sequence of change.
Archetype theory has been applied in several studies of change in the public health 
sector in both the UK (Ashbumer et al., 1996; Kitchener and Whipp, 1997; Kitchener, 
1998, 1999; Mueller et al., 2003; McNulty and Ferlie, 2004; Dent, 2005) and in 
Canada (Denis et al, 1996, 2001; Reay and Hinings, 2005). Some scholars have 
however argued that archetype theory tends to reify the organisation and belittles the 
role of human agency and too readily makes general assumptions about professional 
organisation and change, especially in the context of public services. In this study, 
however, it is continuously borne in mind that institutions only ever act through their 
agents. In this respect, Neil Fligstein’s more recent work (Fligstein, 1997, 1998, 
2001) focusing on institutional entrepreneurship and the social skill o f individual and 
group (collective) actors is particularly helpful. Fligstein is also well known for his 
earlier work (Fligstein, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1996) at, or more towards, the macro level 
o f organisational analysis, but it is important to appreciate that his more recent work, 
which he describes as a ‘political-cultural perspective’, focuses directly on actors: in 
particular on the role of power, where it derives from and how key actors use it.
The researcher will therefore argue that her chosen theoretical framework overcomes 
the perceived ‘human agency’ problem, and also explicates the variable role and 
influence o f professionals in organisational change. The combination of institutional 
and political-cultural perspectives is supported by DiMaggio’s view that:
‘once institutional and political models are regarded as complementary tools 
for understanding different aspects of institutional phenomena ... the range 
of problems to which institutional insights are relevant is likely to broaden’ 
(DiMaggio, 1988:7)
The researcher begins by reviewing the theory of structure underlying archetype 
theory and how this improves upon contingency theory in regard to recognition of the 
role o f human agency. An argument that archetype theory retains some legacy of
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functionalism is then considered; this leads into a discussion of archetype’s 
perspective on the dynamics of organisational change, which re-conceptualises 
organisational change as institutional change. Particular attention is given to the 
increasingly important concept o f sedimented or hybrid archetypes, and to the 
suggestion made by some scholars that archetype theory generalises uncritically 
across professions. In this research hospitals are viewed as being part o f an 
organisational field and this concept is briefly considered. This leads to a discussion 
of the new institutionalist perspective on organisational change and how various 
authors have attempted to solve the problem of ‘embedded agency’. The researcher 
then explains her use of a combination of archetype theory and Fligstein’s political- 
cultural perspective as the theoretical framework for this research, leading in to a 
detailed discussion of the latter.
2.2 Organisational Structure in Archetype Theory
The foundations of archetype theory are to be found in the works of Ranson et al. 
(1980) and (to select but one of several works in the same vein by the theory’s most 
active proponents) Greenwood and Hinings (1988). The development of the theory 
has also been significantly influenced by the work of Miller and Friesen (1980, 1984) 
relating to configurational theory. The initial concern of the theory, as appears from 
Ranson et al.(1980) was with structure. Greenwood and Hinings (1988) sought to 
expand the theory to cover change and stability in organisations, using the concept of 
archetypes o f organising and organisational tracks o f change. In this section the 
theory o f structure and of archetypes is set out. Subsequent sections of this Chapter 
deal with the tracks of change and the subsequent further developments of the theory 
which also focus on organisational change.
A Theory o f Organisational Structuring
Framework and Interaction
Ranson et al. (1980) elaborate a theoretical model designed to illuminate the social 
mechanisms that determine the process of organisational structuring and shape the 
ensuing structural forms. They seek to overcome the dichotomy within
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organisational studies between the ‘structural’ perspectives of traditional 
bureaucratic theories and the ‘interactionist’ stress on informal organisational 
structures emerging from what people actually do. Explicitly drawing on the works 
ofGiddens (1976, 1977) and Bourdieu (1971, 1977, 1979), they suggest:
‘The unhelpful contrasting of framework and interaction can be overcome by 
conceiving of structure as a complex medium of control which is continually 
produced and recreated in interaction and yet shapes that interaction: 
structures are constituted and constitutive. This suggests a way of 
connecting framework and interaction as mutually embodying common 
categories, a way of seeing structures as a vehicle constructed to reflect and 
facilitate meanings. Structural frameworks systematically embody normative 
expectations and prescriptions for competent operation and satisfactory 
performance’ (1980:3).
Provinces o f Meaning and Power
Ranson et al. (1980) argue that ‘structuring’ o f organisations is typically the 
privilege o f powerful actors, who are able to shape organisations to their own 
purposes. These purposes stem from ‘provinces of meaning’, comprising two 
intersubjective forms: on the one hand, interpretive schemes that enable actors to 
constitute and understand their organisational worlds as meaningful, and on the other 
hand, the intermittent articulation o f elements of interpretive schemes as purposive 
values and interests. Among organisational members, conflict is as common as 
consensus. Citing the work o f Gouldner and Perrow, they argue (1980:7):
‘An organisation is thus better conceived as being composed of a number of 
groups divided by alternative conceptions, value preferences, and sectional 
interests. The analytical focus then becomes the relations of power which enable 
some organisational members to constitute and recreate organisational 
structures according to their provinces of meaning... ’
Walsh et at. (1981), in developing Ranson et al.'s (1980) argument, further elaborate 
the role that power and interests can play in maintaining, as well as changing, the 
structure o f an organisation. They argue that organisation design types establish a 
particular distribution of resources and power that in turn buttresses the coherence of 
that design. This concept of power deals with one o f the major criticisms of 
contingency theory, namely that it did not take into account the political realities of 
organisations (cf. Donaldson, 2001; Mintzberg, 1983). There began to emerge more 
recognition of the need to see organisations as social systems, which included cultural
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aspects and political issues. Thus analysis shifted to make much more central the 
power resources possessed by different groups in the organisation and the way in 
which they would use these resources to shape their own agendas and, through these, 
change the organisational structure. Quantitative methodology was also criticised and 
it was argued that much of the empirical evidence, which would support values and 
conflict between groups, was better collected through qualitative methods (Pettigrew 
et al., 1994).
Agency
From Ranson et al.’s (1980) perspective agency is - even in the case of powerful 
actors - constrained by contextual constraints, with organisational members 
differentially responding to and enacting their contextual conditions according to 
the opportunities provided by infrastructure and time. Such constraints are 
inherent in characteristics o f the organisation itself (scale o f operation, mode o f 
technical production, and resources) and in the characteristics o f the 
environment, particularly the socio-economic infrastructure into which an 
organisation is locked and the institutionalised environment in which organisations 
live. The authors adopt the Weberian notion that the source o f legitimation for an 
organization's structural arrangements and processes lies in its institutional 
environment and, following Meyer and Rowan (1977:343) argue that in order to 
understand why organizational decision makers adopt certain policies, procedures, 
and occupational specialisms, we must look to their institutional reinforcement: 
‘such elements o f formal structure are manifestations o f powerful institutional 
rules which function as highly rationalized myths that are binding upon particular 
organizations.’ Ranson et al. recognise that ‘all organisations are located within a 
broader social structure’ (1980:10). They argue that the influence o f contextual 
constraints upon organizational structuring can be quite independent o f an individual 
actor’s perception o f them; for example, the contraction in financial resources to 
local authorities in England and the impact of demographic decline upon school rolls 
were not dependent upon (enacted by) perceptual processes but nevertheless had 
significant repercussions for structural arrangements. Thus, a distinction needs to be 
made ‘between contextual pressures which have an effect upon structuring
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because o f the ways they are perceived, and those that have an impact in spite o f 
perception’ (1980:11).
Defining A rchetypes
Classification o f Design Types
Greenwood and Hinings (1993:1052) define archetypes in terms of Ranson et al.’s 
(1980) theory of structure and Miller and Friesen’s (1984) idea o f patterns, as follows:
‘... patterns are a function of the ideas, beliefs, and values - the components 
of an ‘interpretive scheme’ (Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980) - that 
underpin and are embodied in organisational structures and systems. An 
archetype is thus a set of structures and systems that reflects a single 
interpretive scheme’.
More concisely, and recognising patterns as constituting coherence and common 
orientation, Hinings and Greenwood (1988:4) define archetypes as:
‘... compositions of structures and (management) systems given coherence 
and orientation by an underlying set of values and beliefs’.
A key point here for the purposes o f this research is that archetype theory’s concept of 
‘coherence’ is used for classifying design types, not for explaining how they are bom 
or change. According to Greenwood and Hinings (1988:299) (researcher’s 
emphasis):
‘The notion of coherence between these beliefs and values, on the one hand, 
and structural arrangements and processes on the other, provides a basis for 
the delineation of organisational design archetypes.’
Distinguishing between Archetype and Contingency Theories
The idea o f an archetype is founded on both the foregoing theory o f organisational 
structure and the notion, usually associated with the work o f Miller and Friesen 
(1984), that organisations operate with a limited number of configurations of 
structure, strategy and environment, so that such configurations (rather than 
separate organisational elements) should be the focus o f analysis:
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‘configurations are composed of tightly interdependent and mutually 
supportive elements such that the importance of each element can best be 
understood by making reference to the whole configuration.’ (Miller and 
Friesen 1984:1)
The gist o f Miller and Friesen’s (1984) argument is that organisational designs 
should be considered in terms o f the patterning, or coherence, o f component 
elements because the structural attributes and processes o f an organisation 
frequently have a coherence or common orientation, and thus form an archetype.
The ‘holistic’ approach o f archetype and configurational theories contrasts with 
mainstream contingency theory to the extent that the latter has a reductionist tendency 
to measure linear relationships between limited sets of structural and environmental 
variables, and so ‘may be missing other important conditions that affect relationships 
among environmental and structural variables’ (Miller and Friesen, 1980:269). More 
specifically, the prevalent econometric methodology used in contingency theory, by 
attempting to isolate the effects of each contingent variable, downplays complex 
forms o f interaction and ignores non-linear relationships (Meyer et al., 1993). 
Contingency theory holds that a particular organisational form (for example, the 
divisionalised form) will be appropriate, with regard to task efficiency, to particular 
combinations o f scale, product diversity, product market, geography and process 
(Donaldson, 1985). M iller and Friesen (1984) and Mintzberg (1979) suggest that 
it is the occurrence o f relationships between structure, strategy and environment 
that forms the basis for establishing organisational coherence. Greenwood and 
Hinings (1988:297) point out that ‘in this, they are following the general thrust of 
contingency theory’. By contrast, archetype theory, whilst adopting configurational 
theory’s broader focus on organisational variables, does not view coherence as 
resulting from relationships between structure, strategy and the environment, but from 
the relationships between an organisation’s prevailing interpretive scheme and its 
structure and systems. In organisational studies the nature of the environment in which 
an organisation is placed is usually ‘conceptualised as something to be adapted to or 
controlled’ (Greenwood and Hinings 1988:298). In this respect archetype theory goes 
some way towards accommodating strategic choice theorists’ criticism of contingency 
theory. They considered that contingency theory had overstated the degree of 
determinism that it is possible to show. Structure may be shaped by contingencies,
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but what is required has to be translated into actions by particular groups: thus it was 
necessary to explore the impact of strategic choice (Child, 1972). The strategic choice 
view argued that the influence of contingency on structure was mediated by human 
actors. Moreover, structure could affect contingency in that changing the contingency 
would not only rectify a misfit between structure and contingency, but also take the 
organisation in new directions, not previously envisaged. In bringing the human actor 
back into organisational theory, Ranson et al., like the choice theorists, brought back 
in the factors that directly shape human choice, such as ideas and interests; they 
moved away from explanation by objective, material factors and emphasised instead 
subjective factors such as ideas, perceptions, beliefs, values and ideologies.
Issues Concerning Structure in Archetype Theory
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that archetype theory can be regarded as a 
distinct improvement on contingency theory. In particular, it recognises and 
accommodates the role o f groups of agents, the problems that organisational conflict 
may introduce and the difficulties of achieving effective organisational change. 
However, it has been argued by Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd (2003) that archetype theory 
retains a significant commitment to a basically functionalist explanation of 
organisational structures. This, they argue, is because although archetype theory 
recognises the existence of conflict within organisations, conflict ‘is thought of as 
necessary only insofar as it is part of the mechanism by which organisations are 
brought into a better alignment with their environments’ (2003:738). From this they 
conclude that (2003:738):
‘....there is no recognition in archetype theory that, because of differences in 
outlook and policy between groups, political instability (or lack of 
coherence) is an ‘in built’ or normal feature of organisations’
Similarly, the authors argue that although archetype theory attempts to analyse 
processes o f interaction within organisational fields, ‘these are seen as being important 
only insofar as they facilitate movement between archetypes that are judged to be 
‘functional’ in new contexts’ (2003:738).
To address this issue (and another issue relating to archetype theory’s perspective on 
professional organisation and change, especially in the context of public services) the
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researcher will consider how archetype theory perceives the dynamics of 
organisational change in the context of institutions. The influence of institutional 
theory has always been apparent in the development of archetype theory (see for 
example the reference to ‘normative expectations and prescriptions’ in the quotation 
from Ranson et al. (1980:3) above). The more recent work o f Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) confirms archetype theory’s ‘reconceptualisation o f organisational 
change as institutional change’ (Weick and Quinn, 1999:364).
2.3 Dynamics of Change in Archetype Theory
Archetypes as Institutionally Derived Templates
The archetype perspective embodies an increasing focus on the institutional origins of 
archetypal templates and on the complexity of political, regulatory and technical 
changes faced by organisations; the theory explains the response of individual 
organisations to pressures in the institutional field as a function of an organisation’s 
internal dynamics (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). It is immediately apparent that 
archetype theory is here focusing on intra-organisational dynamics, rather than on 
interaction within the institutional sphere (or organisational field) or within wider 
social arenas. The researcher has been mindful of this limitation in formulating her 
theoretical framework.
Competing Interpretive Schemes
Archetype theory as originally propounded suggests that organisational coherence will 
not be achieved unless organisational structures and systems are underpinned by a 
single interpretive scheme (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). Mention has already 
been made o f contemporary archetype theory’s recognition that differing sets of 
values, ideas and practices may co-exist in a ‘sedimented’ fashion. However, even 
where only one underlying interpretive scheme is identified in a given scenario, it is 
not necessary that all of the current organisation members be committed to it 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1988); such commitment is not a definitional component 
of an archetype. In fact, the pattern of commitments to one or more interpretive 
schemes is seen as a ‘potential dynamic of change’ (Greenwood and Hinings
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1993:1057). An archetype is identified ‘not by measuring the ideas, beliefs, and 
values o f organisation members, but by comparing the pattern of the organisation’s 
structures and systems, as revealed by empirical investigation, to the pattern of a 
‘previously identified ideal template’ (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993:1069). The 
search for such ideal templates should start within an institutional sphere or industrial 
sector, because it is there that institutional prescriptions and proscriptions (Hinings 
and Greenwood, 1988b), or ‘strategic recipes’ (Child and Smith, 1987) will be found 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). The institutionalist notion that organisations 
conform to sectoral rules and requirements for reasons o f legitimacy and resource 
flows (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983) suggests that:
‘institutionalised belief systems constitute a distinctive class of elements that
can account for the existence and/or elaboration of organisational structure’
(Scott, 1987:497).
Thus, Greenwood and Hinings (1993) argue that analysis is required at two levels. 
The first is the institutional sector, where the research task is to discover which 
organisational forms are legitimated: these legitimated forms are the archetype 
templates. The second level is that o f individual organisations, where the research 
task is to examine the extent to which those organisations do or do not approximate 
their sector's archetype or archetypes.
The Institutional Origins o f Archetypes
Institutional theory posits that regularised organisational behaviours are shaped by 
ideas, values, and beliefs that originate in the institutional context (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Zucker, 1983). Organisations conform to contextual expectations of appropriate 
organisational forms to gain legitimacy and increase their probability of survival, even 
though these expectations may have little or no bearing on technical performance 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1987). Institutionalists thus see organisational 
behaviours as responses not solely to market pressures, but also to institutional 
pressures: for example, pressures from regulatory agencies, such as the state and the 
professions, and pressures from general social expectations and the actions of leading 
organisations (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). These pressures lead organisations in 
the same institutional sector to adopt the same organisational form; that is, the
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institutional context provides ‘templates for organising’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991:27). Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that the concept of archetypes 
provides a robust definition of radical and convergent change: the former occurring 
when an organisation moves from one archetypal template-in-use to another, the latter 
occurring within the parameters of an existing template. They note that using ideas, 
beliefs, and values as the basis for identifying templates of structures and systems is 
not unique to institutional theory; but that the institutionalist perspective differs from 
others because it stresses ideational templates as originating outside of the 
organisation and being relevant to a population of organisations within an 
organisational field. So, institutional theory draws attention to institutionally derived 
and created templates of organising to which organisations converge, rather than to 
the uniqueness of individual organisational cultures.
Inertia
A template rationale for an individual organisation may not be rational for large 
numbers of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985). There is, in 
other words, a normative tone to institutional discussions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Zucker, 1977; Oliver, 1991). Consequently, institutional theorists stress the stability 
o f organisational arrangements and the characteristic of inertia rather than change 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Tolbert, 1985). The prevailing nature o f change is seen by 
institutionalists as one of constant reproduction and reinforcement of existing modes 
o f thought and organisation; that is, change is convergent change (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). Thus, by emphasising archetypes/templates that originate in the 
institutional context and around which networks of organisations converge, 
institutional theorists suggest a likely dynamic of inertia. Radical change is thus 
problematic because of the normative embeddedness of an organisation within its 
institutional context (Baum and Oliver, 1991). Moreover, the greater the extent to 
which organisations are tightly coupled to a prevailing archetypal template within a 
highly structured field, the greater the degree o f instability in the face of external 
shocks (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Thus, the greater the normative embeddedness 
o f an organisation within the institutional context, the greater the likelihood that when 
change does occur it will be revolutionary rather than evolutionary: that is, the pace of
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upheaval will be fast, not gradual, and the scale large, not modest. (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996).
Disturbances and Organisational Tracks o f Change
Disturbances
Organisations’ tendency to orientate to ‘inertia’ rather than change is not an 
exclusively institutionalist concept, and indeed is a common theme in organisational 
theory (Miller and Friesen, 1984). However, when something or someone sparks the 
change process by creating some form of disturbance, the disturbance will ‘track’ its 
way through the organisation (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988:294). O f all the roles 
that the design archetype plays one of key importance is the steering of disturbances 
through the organisation. The track followed is not some predetermined activity but is 
descriptive o f developments over time. The nature of the initial action/response and 
subsequent actions will be related to the structuring and systems of the design 
archetype and this will influence the track that the disturbance will follow; analysing 
the workings o f the design archetype therefore provides a key to understanding 
organisational change (Laughlin, 1991).
Tracks o f Organisational Change
The use o f organisational tracks is an attempt to provide a systematic framework, 
involving the mapping of movements or sequential events as organisations attempted 
to move between archetypes. A movement away from an archetype involves the 
decoupling o f structures and systems from a previous prevailing interpretive scheme. 
Movement into a new archetype involves the recoupling of structures and systems to a 
new set of ideas, beliefs and values (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Greenwood et al.,
1996). Tracks are about the configuration of interpretive decoupling and recoupling 
and whether there was any loss of design coherence and any displacement of 
underpinning interpretive schemes over time. The purpose of looking at 
configurations of interpretive decoupling is to observe whether organisations do or do 
not move between archetypes and at what pace.
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Configurations o f  Interpretive Decoupling
When an organisation undergoes major transformational change, the pathway or track 
of change will not be a linear progression moving from one organisational design type 
to another. The process of change involves a pattern of cultural and structural 
detachment. As the organisation moves along this continuum of change between the 
two archetype designs, there will be various non-coherent positions of change along 
the way. Hinings and Greenwood (1988) develop four prototypical tracks: inertia, 
aborted excursions, reorientations (transformations) and unresolved excursions.
Inertia Track
In this track, organisations gravitate towards a design archetype and remain there for a 
lengthy period. Structural arrangements develop a consistency and coherence that is 
given meaning by a common interpretive scheme. Any changes that take place would 
still conform to the prevailing meanings, and be elaborations o f the same basic design. 
The organisation would demonstrate consistent and sustained attachment to one 
interpretive scheme. Therefore it could be said that, over time, inertia exists. This 
track involves one design archetype.
Aborted Excursions
This second track involves a temporary deviation of the initial structural design o f the 
organisation. One or more part(s) of the structure or systems would become 
decoupled from the prevailing interpretive scheme. If the organisation were to 
experiment with a new structure, which proved to weaken internal coherence and 
produced declining performance, this embryonic archetype might be aborted. The 
organisation would probably return to the original archetype. This track would be 
called the aborted or discontinued excursion.
Reorientations or Transformations
When an organisation leaves one archetype design and moves to another, a design 
transformation occurs. In this situation the prevailing values and ideas would lose 
legitimacy and an alternative interpretive scheme, carrying a different pattern of
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structural arrangements, would emerge. The organisational structures become 
decoupled from the old legitimating interpretive scheme, and recoupled to a new one. 
A new design archetype is established. This would rarely be a smooth process and 
transition from archetype to another along this track could take several forms such as 
temporary reversals, long delays and incompatible and conflicting structures and 
values, which could force the organisation into a schizoid position.
Unresolved Excursions
All the previously mentioned tracks work on the assumption that the archetype moved 
toward structural and processual coherence. But there could be situations where the 
organisation became locked between the pulls of competing interpretive schemes 
articulated within the organisation. The failure to obtain coherence would mean that 
the organisation would actively move away from its coherent archetype but be unable 
to complete the change process. This track represents failed or resisted attempts at 
reorientation.
Transformational Change: Process Mapping in Archetype Theory
The analysis o f transformational change suggests that it is a complex process. Hinings 
and Greenwood (1988) consider it important to develop an organisational 
biography/history through process mapping which would allow the pace and linearity 
of change, and the sequence of events, to be analysed.
Pace o f Change
The pace of change focuses upon the speed at which transformations occur: whether 
radical change occurs incrementally over a period of time, or is revolutionary and 
concentrated within a short time period, affecting virtually all parts of the organisation 
simultaneously (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). According to Hinings and 
Greenwood (1988), the pace o f change can influence the success of a reorientation 
track; successful reorientations usually follow a significant and considerable change 
effort, which establishes a sustainable momentum. The pace of change is an
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important aspect of merger, and a much-debated area regarding merger success 
(Samuels, 1971).
Linearity o f Change
The linearity o f change focuses on the extent of directional consistency. There may 
be a cumulative momentum from one archetype to another. Alternatively the 
organisation may be pulled between competing interests, with the result that the 
change process will be characterised by disjunctions, oscillations and temporary 
reversals or delays in the overall movement toward a different archetype (Hinings and 
Greenwood, 1988).
Sequence o f Events
Another important aspect of understanding the tracking process o f decoupling from 
one interpretive scheme to another is the analysis of the sequence o f events. The 
possible sequences that might exist in the various tracks cannot be anticipated, and 
their mapping has to be a matter of empirical observation and analysis. The sequence 
o f change depends on the dynamics of interpretive decoupling and recoupling and of 
prescribed restructuring and emergent practices. A movement away from an 
archetype involves the total or partial decoupling of structures and systems from a 
previously prevailing interpretive scheme. Movement into a new archetype involves 
the re-coupling of structures and systems to a new set o f values, beliefs and ideas. 
The initial effort at reorientation is often at the emergent level, and is consolidated by 
prescribed arrangements (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). Its success may depend on 
the emphasis given to the transformation of certain elements of the organisational 
structures and systems, the relative importance o f which can vary across 
organisations. Successful reorientations tend to have an early focus on ‘high impact’ 
systems, i.e. those that particularly mark the difference between the old and the new 
archetypes, such as the appointment of a new senior management team (Kanter, 
1983).
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Understanding the Dynamics o f Change in Archetype Theory
Hinings and Greenwood (1988) emphasise three concepts as being important for 
understanding the dynamics of change. First, the constraints that are derived from the 
situational context. Second, the patterns of value commitments and the degree to 
which actors in the organisation are satisfied or dissatisfied with the existing 
accommodation of their interests. These two concepts {precipitating factors) identify 
points of pressure on an organisation for change or for inertia. Third, enabling factors 
that could facilitate or impede the scale of change. This concept looks at the structure 
of power dependencies and the presence or absence of organisational capacities for 
change.
A basic idea of archetype theory is that there will be identifiable movement along an 
organisational track, as a process of constrained choice. Although external pressures 
could act as constraints and produce pressures, members of the organisation are 
responsible for interpreting and giving meaning to these situations and challenges.
Situational Constraints
Control is a major factor to be considered when discussing organisational design 
choices. Government-funded organisations, such as hospitals, would have a different 
internal authority system than a private sector company (Hinings et al., 1988). 
Organisations that are regulated by the state will be constrained by the ideas and rules 
sanctioned by that body. Public sector hospitals, as state institutions, are forced to 
adapt and incorporate these prescribed and legitimated ideas about appropriate ways 
of operating (Scott and Meyer, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977 and Zucker, 1984).
Similarly, a key constraining element in any organisational environment is the relative 
scarcity o f resources. All organisations require a flow of money, people and 
equipment. The source and relative importance of these resources varies across 
organisations and each could place pressure on the organisation. Health care is no 
stranger to these pressures. As a knowledge-based service sector, it must have the 
people (workers) to provide the patient care and without adequate resources and 
medical technology its performance o f its functions would be greatly jeopardised.
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Value Commitments
Values are prevailing conceptions of what an organisation should be doing, how it 
should be doing it and how it should be judged (Greenwood and Hinings 1988). 
Correlated values shape the interpretive scheme underlying an organisational design 
archetype.
One of the bases on which responses to external pressures may be predicted is the 
pattern o f commitments by members of an organisation to prevailing and alternative 
correlated values. Four generic patterns of value commitment can be identified 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1988, 1996): (1) status quo commitment: a widespread 
commitment to the organisation’s existing interpretive scheme; problems are solved 
through existing routines (2) indifferent commitment: groups are neither committed 
nor opposed to prevailing or alternative ideas (3) competitive commitment: some 
groups support the existing interpretive scheme while others advocate an alternative 
scheme and (4) reformative commitment: widespread commitment to an alternative 
organisational orientation and opposition to the existing one.
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996): (i) a prevailing competitive or 
reformative value commitment makes the organisation open to radical change; (ii) 
interest dissatisfaction leads to radical change only if  value commitments are 
competitive or reformative; otherwise, interest dissatisfaction leads to a convergent 
change; (iii) reformative commitment will be associated with revolutionary change; 
(iv) competitive commitment will be associated with evolutionary change; (v) radical 
change will not occur without an enabling pattern of power dependencies combined 
with either a reformative or competitive pattern of value commitments; (vi) radical 
change will not occur without a sufficient enabling capacity for action combined with 
either a reformative or competitive pattern of value commitments; (vii) high capacity 
for action will be associated with revolutionary change.
Value commitments and interests are internal factors precipitating change. They are 
necessary but not sufficient, to implement change; power and capabilities (enabling 
dynamics) are also required (Greenwood and Hinings 1996).
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Power
The role of power dependencies depends upon the pattern of commitment within the 
organisation. A concentrated power structure can facilitate imposed change or 
obstruct change: the result is dependent upon the commitment of the elite to particular 
interpretive schemes. A dispersed power structure does not facilitate change, 
especially in a situation of competitive commitments.
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1988), the way in which power can be used as 
a dynamic of change rests upon the distinction between dispersed and concentrated 
power. Power is concentrated when access to resources, key decision processes and 
information is restricted to a few groups or an elite. In a concentrated power structure, 
commitment of the elite to a particular interpretive scheme is needed in order to 
facilitate imposed change or to obstruct change. Power is dispersed when access to 
decision processes, information and resources is open and distributed among various 
groups, who may be able to effect or to obstruct change. The two power structures do 
not have to have opposite consequences.
Different groups in the organisation have differential power and some have more 
influence than others. It is particularly important to question whether archetype 
theory adequately recognises the impact of competing groups in organisations and 
their political interaction. Such phenomena are usually explored in good case study 
work on organisations, such as that produced by Andrew Pettigrew and William 
Starbuck. Pettigrew (1985:27) stated that:
‘the possibilities and limitations of change in any organisation are influenced 
by the history of attitudes and relationships between interest groups...and by 
the mobilisation of support for a change within the power structure at any 
point in time.’
Starbuck et al. (1978) found that existing powerful groups were frequently tied to 
prevailing ideas and structural arrangements because these were the basis o f their 
power. Power could be seen as the capacity to determine outcomes, and structures 
that were used to obtain and utilise that power.
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Organisational Capacity fo r  Change
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996), the capacity for action necessary to 
implement change is determined by a combination of the following capabilities:
(1) clear understanding of the new interpretive scheme and related systems and tools;
(2) skills and competencies to design new organisational structures and routines; and
(3) ability to achieve goals.
These capabilities can be concentrated in leaders or dominant groups, or diffused 
throughout the organisation. The first two capabilities refer to technical and 
professional expertise in designing and understanding an archetype, and can belong to 
multiple actors in the organisation. The ability to achieve goals is concerned primarily 
with the leadership or managerial attitude of the sponsors of change.
Some authors have suggested that managerial capabilities and leadership play an 
essential role in change processes: see for example Peters and Waterman (1982), 
Tushman and Romanelli (1985), Pettigrew (1985). The ability to manage the process 
is crucial in organisational transformations, because they involve restating values, 
direction and organisational forms.
In their study on leadership and strategic change in Canadian health care organisations 
Denis et al. (2001) found that the ability to achieve transformational change could be 
influenced by the capabilities and competencies of the organisation, which included 
both the leadership to drive the change and the expertise in developing a new 
organisational archetype. The leadership in the organisation has to have the power 
and articulated vision in order to mobilise strategic groups into effective coalitions. 
Leadership in an organisation may not always refer to one person but dominant 
coalitions that are structures of leadership (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). A similar 
view was taken by Kanter (1983), who used the term ‘prime movers’ to describe 
senior people who took responsibility for the change, built the coalitions and 
mechanisms necessary for successful outcomes and at the same time demonstrated the 
commitment o f the organisation to that particular change process.
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The Concept o f Sedimentation
Organisational change is increasingly seen not so much as a shift from one archetype 
to another, but a layering o f one archetype on another (‘sedimentation’), in which 
values, ideas and practices persist even where the formal structures and processes 
seem to change, and despite incoherence. The idea o f sedimentation within 
organisational structure dates back to Clegg’s (1979) work on organisations as 
complex structures-in-motion that control the labour process through historically 
structured principles o f organisation called ‘rules’ (1979:551-2):
‘Within the organisation, different control rules evolve at different times and 
at different stages of functional complexity. Earlier rules may persist at 
different levels in the organisation, despite the later development of more 
complex rules. These rules may be represented as a superimposed
series The layers of rules exist in a dynamic relationship with each other.
The metaphor most apt for representing this layering is drawn from geology: 
sedimentation’
This concept is potentially useful for present purposes, because health care is a classic 
pluralist domain involving divergent objectives (population health, cost control, 
patient care) and multiple actors (professionals, administrators, community and 
government groups, and politicians) linked together in shifting and ambiguous power 
relationships. The public sector has become more complex and dynamic in recent 
years with multiple level changes and constant tension between the government and 
the health care community, and hospitals are an integral part of this interrelated 
pluralist network (Denis et al., 2001; Ashbumer et al., 1996 and Kitchener and Whipp,
1997).
Some scholars have taken the view that ‘sedimentation presupposes that a transition 
has already taken place’ (Mueller et al., 2003:1992) whereas others see sedimentation 
as suggesting that ‘organisations are constantly in flux, and different archetypes can 
dominate in different parts of the organisation’ (Cooper et al., 1996:635). Similarly 
Flood (1999:155) argues that organisational change is best understood as the layering 
of one archetype on another because ‘firms are products of histories, ideologies, 
cognitive scripts and reclaimed narratives that persist through time’. A further, rather 
dynamic interpretation is that sedimentation refers to the layering, erosion, conflicts 
and discontinuities (or eruptions) that can arise when multiple management systems
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and traditions confront one another (Cooper and Ezzamel, 2005). In terms o f wider 
issues in the study of organisational change, it has been argued that the concept of 
sedimentation ‘has the advantage of side-stepping what is increasingly seen as a sterile 
debate about transformational and incremental change (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
Oliver 1992)’ (Cooper et al., 1996:624). This is consistent with the views o f Weick 
and Quinn (1999:382):
‘Recent work also suggests that change is not an on-off phenomenon nor is 
its effectiveness contingent on the degree to which it is planned. 
Furthermore, the trajectory of change is more often spiral or open-ended than 
linear. All of these insights are more likely to be kept in play if researchers 
focus on ‘changing’ rather than ‘change’.’
When applied in studies of change in hospitals and other health care organisations, 
archetype theory’s concepts of design archetype has lead to an informative variety o f 
findings.
Denis et al (1996) studied the processes of leadership development and strategic 
change in a large public hospital in Canada, using the archetype concept to define 
change in the organisation as it shifted from an ‘Introverted General Hospital’ 
(archetype 1) to a more ‘Extroverted University Hospital’ (archetype 2). The 
researchers identified shifts in the organisational design and its strategic framework.
Ashbumer et al (1996) studied ‘organisational transformation’ and public sector 
restructuring in the UK during the 1990s. This study was primarily interested in 
looking at change across the whole NHS and is thus not directly comparable to the 
research in this thesis, but their theoretical findings are nevertheless useful. The 
authors thought they could not place the NHS currently within any of Hinings and 
Greenwood’s (1988) four prototype tracks of change since what they had observed 
was the emergence of a new dominant subculture, influenced by private sector 
concepts and values but also retaining aspects of the old public administrative culture. 
Rather than Hinings and Greenwood’s (1988) ‘schizoid’ model, they had observed a 
different model o f ‘hybrid change’. In this respect Hinings and Greenwood’s model 
of prototypical tracks appeared rather linear and rigid, and insensitive to the 
complexity o f change dynamics in the health care sector. The researchers felt unable 
to determine whether the process of organisational transformation to a hybrid model
37
of management seen in the study represented the final recoupling or was no more than 
a transitional phase towards a different destination (whether forward to a full 
organisational transformation or back to an aborted excursion).
Kitchener and Whipp (1997) investigated the ‘process of change’ or ‘tracks o f change’ 
in NHS hospitals after the 1990 reforms. Their theoretical framework incorporated 
concepts from both the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ thesis of Tushman and Romanelli 
(1993) and Hinings and Greenwood’s (1988) ‘archetypes’ and ‘tracks o f change’. 
They identified two forms of hospital sector development -  adjustment and 
transformation. Their account of hospital archetype development led to the 
identification of an additional track of change that described the long-term evolution 
of hospitals. The track, labelled ‘structural adjustment’, was introduced to describe 
the pattern of minor and often structural alterations (such as the introduction of a 
clinical directorate structure in the hospital) that characterise hospital change prior to 
the introduction of transformational change.
Ashbumer et al. (1996) and Kitchener and Whipp (1997) questioned the 
generalisability of Hinings and Greenwood’s (1988) prototypical ‘tracks o f change’ in 
more pluralist complex settings like the NHS.
A study o f change in UK hospitals by Kitchener (1999) showed that as these hospitals 
were being persuaded by institutional factors to move from the professional 
bureaucracy archetype to a quasi-market archetype, what emerged was a hybrid 
structure with characteristics of the new quasi market archetype but with power 
relations, values and beliefs that had for the most part endured from the old 
professional bureaucracy archetype. The author observed that there was both 
continuity and change as the old and new forms of organisation and ideology 
coexisted so that archetypal change was ‘sedimented’.
Exworthy et al. (1999) argue that the UK NHS shows characteristics of quasi-market, 
quasi-bureaucracy and quasi-networks all at the same time. They suggest a research 
agenda might ‘embrace the changing mix across sectors, time and space. For 
example...How quickly do local organisations respond to policy shifts?’ (1999:20).
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Taken together, these findings may appear to imply some rigidity in archetype theory 
with regard to notions of a dominant interpretive scheme and prototypical tracks of 
change. However, it is important to keep in mind archetype theory’s long-standing 
recognition o f hybrid or sedimented forms. Also, one o f the fundamental tenets of 
archetype theory is that change may follow a number of different tracks (ranging from 
transformatory to aborted) and, in most cases, occurs over time. The importance of 
the time factor is apparent from the following passage from Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996:1030-1031):
‘........  we admit to the possibility and even the likelihood of alternative
templates within an institutional context............ The central point is that
organisations are recipients of prescribed ideas about appropriate templates 
of organizing whose relative salience and clarity may change over time. 
Particular organisations do not respond to a template of organizing, but they 
do respond over time to evolving and competing prescriptions’.
Similarly, in the context of professions, Scott et al (2000) observed that changes in 
governance structures (such as professional regulatory arrangements) ‘tend to lag’ 
(2000:175) the development of new ideas and build up of political will. The 
researcher would acknowledge that archetype theory leaves open the question of how 
long an organisation can accommodate hybrid or sedimented forms of organising, but 
sees this as a matter for empirical investigation and inductive analysis.
An interesting pointer for possible future research with regard to sedimented 
arrangements can be found in McNulty and Ferlie’s (2004) recent study of the 
implementation of business process reengineering (BPR) in a UK NHS hospital. The 
authors found a counterintuitive pattern o f collaboration between clinicians and local 
managers against senior management and external change agents. The ‘sedimented’ 
arrangements observable within this UK hospital thus showed unexpected resilience. 
The authors argue that the stability and durability of the clinical/managerial hybrid 
form helps to explain why clinicians and managers were able to ‘fend o ff  the prospect 
of process-based organising arrangements. The resilience of these sedimented 
arrangements is of theoretical and practical significance for several reasons 
(2004:1408):
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‘First, sedimented conditions have previously been theorized as schizoid and 
insecure forms (Cooper et al. 1996). Second, sedimented conditions in 
healthcare (Kitchener 1999) exhibit an unforeseen coherence more 
supportive of functional rather than process organisation. Third, the unlikely 
collaboration between managers and professionals found in this instance 
suggests that managerial-professional relations are more nuanced and 
contingent than some earlier literature suggests’
The authors suggest (2004:1408) that research and debate about sedimentation needs 
to progress beyond an interest in explaining the creation of sedimented conditions as 
an outcome of institutional pressures for change,
‘..to an interest in understanding sedimentation as a critical condition of 
dynamic professional service contexts that shapes the process and 
possibilities of further organisational change.’
Thus, contemporary archetype theory is moving away from a perception of hybrid 
conditions as schizoid and unstable. Further, whilst hybrid conditions may still be 
viewed as ‘transient’ (Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 2003:734), this can be interpreted as a 
dynamic o f further organisational change toward an end point that is not 
predetermined (Laughlin, 1991), and in the meantime the hybrid may exhibit 
resilience and unforeseen coherence. The researcher would argue that this 
contemporary perspective adequately addresses Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd’s (2003) 
critique (see above): hybrid forms are no longer viewed as being necessarily unstable 
or abnormal. It is noted that Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd’s critique pre-dates these 
important findings of McNulty and Ferlie (2004).
Professional Groups in Organisations
Much of the literature dealing with sedimented or hybrid archetypes concerns the 
conflict and tensions between professional elites (e.g. medical professionals) on the 
one hand and managers on the other arising from their differing provinces o f meaning, 
usually exacerbated by the ‘colonisation’ (Laughlin, 1991) of the public sector by 
New Public Managerialism since the mid-1980s.
With regard to professional groups themselves, Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd (2003) argue 
that archetype theory is weakened by what Pinnington and Morris (2002:195) describe 
as its ‘uncritical generalisation across different professions’. Based primarily on
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studies of law and accountancy firms, archetype theory views professional 
organisations as semi-autonomous entities guided by professional interests and 
concerns embodied in a unified interpretive scheme. Against this the authors argue 
that professional groups operating in organisations in the public domain such as 
hospitals, local authorities and schools are not autonomous but, to a greater or lesser 
extent, ‘structurally subordinated’ with only limited freedom to ‘pursue their own 
distinct interests’ (Brint and Karabel, 1991:353). The ability of professionals to 
regulate and shape practice is also heavily circumscribed by national legislation, 
policy guidelines, administrative hierarchies and cash limits. Managers impose non­
technical or non-clinical criteria on service provision, which constrain professionals. 
The ability of professional groups to negotiate degrees of de facto control over service 
provision at operational levels is limited by an overall structure that circumscribes 
their power to self-regulate. Thus, Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd argue, it is not correct to 
describe organisations in the public domain as autonomous or as entirely shaped or 
dominated by professional concerns and interests. Also, and following on from that 
criticism, the authors argue that archetype theory appears to make the generalised 
assertion that professional groups play a key ‘entrepreneurial role’ in processes of 
negotiation within fields (Hinings et al., 1999; Powell et al., 1999). However, in 
public services especially, the suggestion that professional groups have driven change 
is difficult to sustain. Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd (2003), citing recent literature, note 
that a variety of coercive top-down mechanisms have been used by governments to 
impose change including central performance targets for health, education and social 
care, league tables and even threats of direct intervention in the case of ‘failing’ 
services. They argue that in archetype theory, these dynamics o f more coercive 
change are rarely discussed or fully explained.
There is certainly some support for Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd’s view. In the UK, at 
least, from the early 1980s governments were less than willing to involve professions 
in the development of new policy. For example, the NHS review of 1988 (leading to 
the Working for Patients reforms,) was ‘conducted informally, largely in secret and 
uninformed by expert opinion from the field’ (Harrison and Wood, 1999:757). In this 
research, the researcher’s case studies will reveal empirically the extent to which the 
professional groups were able to act autonomously in Newcastle upon Tyne, England 
and in Hamilton, Ontario. However, the researcher will not be relying on archetype
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theory to analyse the interaction of professional groups with managers or other actors 
in the pre-merger change process (she will be drawing on Fligstein’s work to analyse 
the dynamics of such interaction). In the pre-merger phase of the cases, it may be 
expected that the primary preoccupation of medical and nursing professionals will not 
be on internal professionalism -  managerialism issues, but, rather, on how the merger 
restructuring will affect their patients and themselves personally (possible job losses, 
increased workload and so on). In the post-merger phase in each case (i.e. the period 
immediately following the decision to merge, in which the new entity formed by the 
merger seeks to implement the merger changes) the organisational focus shifts from 
the plural merging hospitals to a single hospital (the new entity formed by the 
merger); archetype theory will be used to analyse the nature of the emerging 
organisational design (archetype or hybrid, as the case may be) of this entity.
The researcher’s approach is consistent with that taken by Mueller et al. (2003) who 
employed archetype theory and action strategy in their study o f the aftermath of the 
creation o f a new governance structure in the UK NHS. The authors suggest that it is 
important to differentiate between the debate concerning the sedimentation o f 
bureaucratic and professional values in professional (including health) organisations, 
and the debate concerning the introduction of NPM. The authors note that whilst 
doctors can accept management as a technical necessity, they have found it harder to 
accept NPM’s challenge to their values (Exworthy and Halford, 1999:12), which 
questions, for example, the legitimacy o f traditional professional bodies (Exworthy 
and Halford, 1999:9). Indeed, the authors suggest, the changing political climate will 
not affect every organisational context in the same way. In order to appreciate how 
the dynamics of management - professional conflict is ‘regulated through the 
deployment of various negotiating processes’ (Reed, 1996:584) in differing 
organisational contexts, Mueller et al.(2003) employed ‘two related concepts: action 
strategy (or scripts), and archetype (transition)’ (2003:1974). Based on their findings, 
they argued that (especially but not only) in pluralistic organisations one should not be 
too surprised to find an ongoing contest between interpretive schemes, and between 
processes associated with conflicting interpretive schemes.
The use of archetypes in the analysis of change in professional service organisations 
(including hospitals) is, the researcher would argue, further supported by the shift in
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current organisational and sociological thinking away from the notion of 
professionalisation as a project of social closure (MacDonald, 1995:50-55). In a study 
o f professional -  management relations in the context of a threatened hospital closure, 
Dent (2003) notes an increasing involvement of professionals in management (Causer 
and Exworthy, 1999), an increasing acceptance o f ‘commercialised professionalism’ in 
the private sector (Hanlon, 1998: 51) and a recognition of ‘professionalism’ as part of 
the managerial armoury. Thus, Dent argues, ‘the emphasis is now more on the 
configuration of relations, rather than binary oppositions’ (2003:108). This, the 
researcher would suggest, invites the application of archetype theory’s holistic 
perspective, from which new archetypes such as ‘commercialised professionalism’ may 
be identified as they become established. Dent’s (2003) study found that the hospital 
doctors, being less accessible to the disciplinary power of management, were not so 
susceptible to the ‘managerialisation’ of professionalism and that there was a ‘persistence 
of values and practices’ (K itchener, 1999:185). Thus, whether through the 
contemporary concept of sedimentation or through the establishment of newly 
emerging interpretive schemes and associated structures and systems, the researcher 
argues that archetype theory is useful for the analysis of professional service 
organisations.
2.4 The Organisational Field
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that bureaucratisation and other forms o f 
homogeneity emerge out o f the structuration (i.e. institutional definition) of 
organisational fields, which they see as a process effected largely by the state and 
the professions, which had become ‘the great rationalisers o f the second half o f the 
twentieth century’. The authors defined the organisational field as ‘those 
organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area o f institutional life: 
key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other 
organisations that produce similar services or products’; this unit of analysis directs 
attention not simply to competing firms or to networks o f organisations that actually 
interact, but to the ‘totality of relevant actors’. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:147-148). 
This is an important distinction, because ‘organisations compete not just for customers
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and resources, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as 
economic fitness’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150).
In the context o f a highly structured organisational field, the individual efforts o f 
organisational actors - including new entrants to the field - to deal rationally with 
uncertainty and constraint often create an environment that constrains their ability to 
change further in later years (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:147-148). This is the result 
o f coercive, mimetic and normative processes through which, paradoxically, rational 
actors make their organisations increasingly similar as they try to change them.
Fields have been further defined in terms of shared cognitive or normative 
frameworks or a common regulative system: participants directly interact with one 
another or are influenced by each other in a meaningful way, and the patterns of 
interaction are defined by shared systems of meaning. These meaning systems or 
‘institutional logics’ establish the boundaries o f each community, creating the grounds 
o f membership and appropriate behaviours; that is, they define activities appropriate 
for particular communities and how they should be organised and formed (Scott and 
Meyer, 1991; Scott, 1995). Changing eras in health care in the USA have been 
connected with alterations in institutional logics (Scott et al. 2000; Kitchener 2002).
The significance, then, of the organisational field is that an organisation’s action is 
seen not as a matter o f free choice determined by its internal arrangements, but as 
limited to a narrowly defined set of legitimate options determined by the group of 
actors that make up the field in which the organisation participates. The field can 
consist of any actor that exercises a coercive, normative or cognitive influence on a 
given focal organisation or population of organisations, and may include the 
government, critical customers and suppliers, sources o f funding, professional and 
trade associations, special interest groups and the general public (Scott, 1991).
Organisational transformation may be analysed at the level of a single organisation 
(for example a hospital) or across an organisational field (the health care sector) 
(Ferlie, 1999). Brint and Karabel (1991) argue that the concept o f organisational field 
makes a valuable contribution to institutional analyses o f organisational change; 
they found that both the origin and the realisation of agents' interests are shaped and
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channelled by the forces of external and internal institutional arrangements, such as power 
structures, field opportunities, and ideological orientations. This perspective is particularly 
useful for the purposes of this research because it is at the organisational field level that 
we see the horizontal and vertical relationships and interaction between the 
organisations in the local health care sector (Scott et al. 2000) as they respond to 
market and institutional pressures, including interaction that reflects the influence of 
the government (through its various agents) and the health care professions. As Dent 
(2005:627) observes :
‘ ...the ‘new institutionalism’... has a certain usefulness, particularly for 
cross-comparative studies, and the framework does offer the opportunity, as 
Kitchener (1998:73-4) points out, to break out of the ‘insular and parochial’ 
disciplinary boundaries of much work on public sector organisations. Hospitals, for 
example, can usefully be viewed as being part of an organisational field. ’
2.5 Organisational Change in New Institutionalism
Up until the early 1990s the theory focused on the isomorphic processes of 
organisational change that explain the homogeneity o f organisational structures within 
an organisational field. Central to this perspective are the legitimation forces through 
which key players in the field orient their actions toward one another and partake of 
taken-for-granted archetypes of organising that both shape and constrain collective 
action (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1991). Institutions 
have been variously defined as ‘socially constructed, routine-reproduced programs or 
rule systems’ (Jepperson, 1991:149) and ‘supra-organisational patterns o f human 
activity by which individuals and organisations produce and reproduce their material 
substance and organise time and space’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991:243). 
Institutionalists themselves have acknowledged that this perspective, in which actors 
and their interests are themselves institutionally constructed, obstructs agency and 
interest and thus cannot explain how institutions change (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). Attempts have been made to correct this through various formulations o f the 
relation between institutions and agents. Powell (1991) contends that individual 
preferences and choices can only be understood in the larger cultural setting and 
historical period in which they are embedded. Brint and Karabel (1991) found that the 
origin as well as the realisation of agents' interests are shaped and channelled by 
forces imposed by external and internal institutional arrangements, such as power
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structures, field opportunities, and ideological orientations. In the same vein, 
Goodrick and Salancik (1996) argue that the direct incorporation of a strategic choice 
perspective into institutional theory would risk contradicting an essential premise of 
institutional theory: the social-fact quality of institutions.
The emphasis on the institutional embeddedness of interest and agency underlying 
these approaches leads, however, to another dilemma: ‘How can actors change 
institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very 
institution they wish to change?’ (Holm, 1995:398). Holm (1995) criticises the 
rationalist perspective on institutions, in which institutions are seen as instruments 
created to provide efficient solutions to predefined problems, thereby helping to align 
individual and collective interests. Holm argues that this ‘disregards an important 
aspect of what institutions are, namely, frameworks for action and, as such, outside 
the scope of strategic manipulation’ (1995:398). Holm also criticises the new 
institutionalist perspective, which view institutions as ‘socially constructed, routine- 
reproduced, program or rule systems’ (Jepperson, 1991:149) where behaviour is 
governed by norms. This, Holm argues, this ignores the processes by which 
institutions are formed and reformed, which tend to be interest-driven and highly 
political. Holm (1995) proposes a ‘nested system’ model based on a distinction 
between actions guided by the established institutional order ( ‘practical’ or ‘first- 
order level’ action) and actions geared toward creating new institutions or changing 
old institutions by manipulating institutional parameters (‘political’ or ‘second-order 
level’ action). This distinction, Holm argues, ‘makes it possible to retain the insight 
that institutions are products o f action, and therefore constructed for some purpose, 
without giving up the notion that institutions are frameworks for action, and therefore 
taken for granted’ (1995:399). Institutional change may originate at either of the two 
levels o f action: how this comes about depends on the relationship between the two 
levels. There appears to be a problematic limitation in Holm’s model, which is 
apparent from his description of the relationship between the two types o f action. 
Arguing that the relationships between levels are structured, Holm says:.
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‘This means that there will be rules defining what type of problems at the 
first-order level o f action can legitimately be considered at the second-order 
level, the proper procedures for doing that, who can participate in decision 
making, and so on. It also means that there will be rules defining and 
limiting the authority of the second-order level toward the first-order level’ 
(1995:400-401).
The problem here is that Holm’s model does not explain how, and under what 
circumstances, these rules may themselves be changed by agents.
More recent studies of change within institutional frameworks have shifted the focus 
from isomorphism and the creation of fields, to dynamics of institutional change 
involving movement away from an established and taken-for-granted status quo. An 
organisational field should be seen, not as static, but as evolving through the entry and 
the exit of particular organisations or populations (Barnett and Carroll, 1993, 
Fligstein, 1996) and/or through alteration of the interaction patterns and power 
balances among them (Brint and Karabel, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).
Fligstein (1998:11) observes that new institutionalists view fields as ‘interactions 
between more and less powerful collective groups according to rules and shared 
meanings’ and argues that the critical problem is to develop a more social, collective 
conception of action that gives rise to a better understanding of what actors do to 
produce or reproduce institutions. This understanding will, Fligstein argues, be 
informed by a conception o f fields as ‘institutionalised arenas of interaction’ where 
‘the rules of the arena shape what is possible by providing tools for actors to interact, 
and are the source for actors to think about what their interests are, interpret what 
other actors do, and, strategically, what they should do.’ (1998:29) In this vein, 
studies have addressed the increasing demand for strategic insights by extending new 
institutional theory’s ‘limited theory o f action’ (Fligstein 1997:397) through 
emphasising the role of power and agency (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997, Fligstein, 1997; Beckert 1999) and diversity (Kondra and Hinings 
1998).
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) recognised that institutional theory was not usually 
regarded as a theory of organisational change, but more usually as an explanation of 
the isomorphism and stability of organisational arrangements within established
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populations or organisational fields. They (along with some other scholars) 
nevertheless took the view that the theory contains an excellent basis for an account of 
change, first, by providing a convincing definition of radical (as opposed to 
convergent) change and second (and more importantly for present purposes), by 
highlighting the contextual dynamics that precipitate change. However, they noted 
that new institutional theory did not explain why some organisations adopt radical 
change whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same institutional pressures. 
For the purposes of the research presented in this thesis, this is an important question. 
The authors proposed to elaborate the theory’s insights by combining the new 
institutional emphasis on persistence (through legitimacy, the embeddedness of 
organisational fields and the centrality of routines and scripts) with the ‘old’ 
institutionalist conception of change as a dynamic of the organisation as it struggles 
with issues of influence, power, coalitions and values. This model of change, linking 
organisational context and intraorganisational dynamics, would explain the response 
of the individual organisation to pressure in the institutional field as a function o f the 
organisation’s internal dynamics, showing how the characteristics o f the 
organisational field interact with the internal dynamics of an organisation (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996).
Seo and Creed (2002) have argued that in Greenwood and Hinings (1996) work, the 
two institutionalisms are not really integrated but conceptualised as two separate 
processes one of which (comprising normative pressures operating in the institutional 
context) influences the other (agents’ political action within the organisation). This 
leaves open the question of when and how local agents change the institutional 
context itself. The researcher would suggest however that Greenwood and Hinings 
have anticipated, and to some extent at least, addressed this issue. Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) point out that in their model for understanding organisational change’ 
(helpfully shown in diagrammatic form at 1996:1034), radical organisational change, 
which is shown as the outcome of intraorganisational change dynamics, would 
become the input to market and institutional contexts. For example, if following 
radical organisational change an organisation achieved competitive success in the 
market, this would put pressure on other organisations to adopt the same 
organisational form. ‘Organisations, as Fligstein (1991:316) noted, ‘extensively 
monitor one another’, and successful practices are mimicked and institutionalised’
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(1996:1033). In this way, local agents would indeed have brought about a change in 
the institutional context through the radical change of their own organisation. Of 
course, organisations which do undergo radical change may not always be successful 
and mimicked. The researcher therefore considers Seo and Creed’s (2002) critique 
remains valid in respect of these situations and, as will be seen, proposes that the 
question of when and how local agents change the institutional context is, to the extent 
not answered by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) model, answered by the political- 
cultural perspectives incorporated in her chosen theoretical framework.
2.6 The Researcher’s Use of Archetype Theory
Thus far, the researcher’s analysis o f archetype theory has established five useful 
elements o f a robust theoretical framework for analysing the change processes 
in the cases under study: (1) an important organisational starting point, which 
may be a single or several design archetype(s), or a hybrid that can be identified by 
reference to one or more design archetypes; (2) a general outline for establishing and 
finding such archetype(s) (the coherence o f meanings, structures and processes, 
locating any ideal template(s) in the institutional field); (3) an organisational end point 
o f change, which may be a new, or the same, archetype or hybrid (4) a means of 
tracking change and determining whether there is any loss of design coherence and 
any displacement o f underpinning interpretive schemes over time; and to see 
configurations o f interpretive decoupling in order to observe whether the organisation 
does or does not move between archetypes and at what pace and (5) an understanding 
of the internal dynamics of the new hospital entity created by the merger in England 
and of the new hospital entity created by the merger in Ontario in the early post­
merger period as they attempt to implement changes (be they radical or not) following 
the decision to merge.
The researcher emphasises the limitation of the fifth element. The researcher 
considers that archetype theory’s focus on intraorganisational dynamics is appropriate 
and indeed very useful for explaining individual organisational change and differing 
responses of individual organisations to similar external pressures for change. 
However the researcher does not consider that that theory alone is adequate to explain
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differences in the outcome of two hospital merger case studies in so far as they arise 
from the pre-merger processes and interactions between the various actors. In the pre­
merger phase each case study involves the interaction, in the process leading to the 
decision to merge, not only of groups within an individual hospital, but of a large cast 
of players both internal and external to the hospital, including the other local acute 
hospitals, other health organisations, community groups, professional groups and of 
course government agencies. There is perhaps an interesting question as to whether 
the theory can be projected onto a population of organisations (for example all acute 
hospitals in Hamilton, Ontario) as well as an individual organisation (one acute 
hospital). If that were so, then intra-population dynamics could be analysed in the 
same way as individual organisational dynamics, and any difference in the outcomes 
of the two case studies (notwithstanding similar external pressures on the 
populations), could be explained by reference to intra-population dynamics. This 
question is not entirely hypothetical and arises out of the distinction drawn by some 
scholars between an organisational field and individual populations within it, or 
‘classes o f organisations that are relatively homogenous in terms of environmental 
vulnerability’ (Hannan and Freeman, 1977:166). Thus, according to Hoffman 
(1999:352):
‘A field is more than just a collection of influential organisations; it is the 
centre o f common channels of dialogue and discussion. It is not formed 
around common technologies or common industries but around issues that 
bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes: that is, 
issues that become important to the interests and objectives of a specific 
collective o f organisations. Issues define what the field is, making links that 
may not have previously been present.’
The concepts of interest dissatisfaction, value commitments, power dependencies and 
capacity for action (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996:1034) would appear, logically, to 
be as appropriate to a specific collective of organisations sharing common interests 
and objectives in relation to field-forming issues, and facing similar external 
pressures, as they are to an individual organisation. The researcher however does not 
purport to explore this interesting question in this research. Instead, the political-cultural 
approach of Fligstein will be used.
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2.7 Adopting the Political-Cultural Approach - A Dialectical Perspective
Seo and Creed (2002) used a dialectical perspective to provide a framework for 
understanding institutional change as an outcome of the dynamic interactions between 
institutional contradictions and human praxis (i.e. political action embedded in a 
system of interconnected institutional arrangements); they proposed that this would 
reconcile institutional embeddedness and transformational agency (2002:223). In this 
model, institutions change as a result of agents’ ability to mobilise different 
institutional logics and resources to frame and serve their interests (2002:240). This 
approach is broadly similar to notions of shifts in ideologies, social structures and 
power leading to the destruction of one legitimacy and replacement with another 
(Holm 1995; Kitchener 2002).
Seo and Creed (2002) argue that the dialectical framework highlights the pivotal role 
of actors’ ability or skills to mobilise institutional logics and resources from the 
heterogeneous institutional environments so as to legitimise and support their change 
efforts. Such tasks are extremely difficult and challenging and, the authors argue, 
many of the analytical models and managerial skills that traditional organisational 
theories and practices have promoted seem inadequate for addressing such a 
challenge. For example, stakeholder analysis (2002:242):
‘stakeholder analysis (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Jones & Wicks, 1999) is a model 
o f political analysis frequently used to identify, classify, and shape strategic 
responses to the individuals and groups who can affect and/or are affected by 
organizational actions or who have enforceable claims on a firm's 
performance. However, it is a static and a historical model. With its focus 
limited to the functional and legal dependencies o f the firm, it is incapable of 
capturing the multiple logics and rules that arise from the institutional 
environment and o f handling the dynamics and historical relationships that 
embed organizations and organizational members.’
Discussing the implications and limitations of their dialectical analysis o f institutional 
change, Seo and Creed emphasise the need to firmly establish its validity and 
usefulness by empirical research, and suggest future research should (2002:243):
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‘[focus] on microsociological aspects of institutional entrepreneurship. We 
have proposed that research on institutionally embedded agents, the 
practitioners o f praxis, should focus on the interplay o f their actions, skills, 
social locations, and identities. This interplay has implicitly figured 
prominently in Fligstein's (1997) depiction of institutional entrepreneurs and 
their critical actions. Many of the actions he highlights echo key features of 
praxis (a particular type o f human agency which is political action embedded 
in a historical system of interconnected yet incompatible institutional 
arrangements) using the components of existing meaning systems to frame 
alternative legitimating logics that challenge existing cultural templates, 
promulgating new meaning systems, and creating new shared social 
identities and roles as a means of mobilizing collective support for these 
alternative social arrangements. Just what each of these actions looks like 
empirically in an institutional context warrants research.’
Seo and Creed’s approval of Fligstein’s (1997) model of institutional entrepreneurship 
supports the researcher’s choice of such model (elaborated in Fligstein’s later work, 
2001) as a theoretical framework that will provide a microfoundation for analysing 
social action and overcome the problem of embedded agency.
2.8 Fligstein’s View: The Importance of Power, the Role of Actors and Social 
Skill
Although Fligstein’s more recent work (1997, 1998, 2001) is of particular relevance to 
this research in terms of institutional entrepreneurship, his earlier work will also be 
discussed as it provides useful insights into issues o f power, organisational fields and 
the state.
Fligstein (1990) develops a theory o f corporate transformation based on a sociological 
framework. Fligstein sees organisations as embedded in organisational fields defined 
in terms of product line, industry, firm size or suppliers, distributors or owners. The 
state sets the rules of behaviour within which corporations employ strategies, 
structures, and technologies that shape and constrain their patterns o f growth. These 
organisational fields are not benign but are set up to benefit their most powerful 
members.
Fligstein (1990) describes the strategy of American business before 1920 as a 
manufacturing-based attempt to control markets through price leading and vertical 
integration. Fie cites a shift, beginning in the 1920s, to sales and marketing strategies
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of diversification, which aimed for growth through increased sales. According to 
Fligstein, these shifts in strategy corresponded with a change in the locus of power 
within organisations from manufacturing to sales and marketing personnel. He argues 
that the emergence of a new strategy (such as diversification) requires ‘shocks’ to 
stable organisational fields, and that in the post-1920 period the state provided two 
such shocks: the Depression and the growth of federal anti-trust policies which 
outlawed strategies of growth through product-related mergers. Diversification and 
antitrust action provided essential conditions for the rise of the current financial 
conception of control. This emphasises the use of financial tools that measure 
performance according to profit rates. The most important goal had become keeping 
the stock price above book value because if the assets are undervalued the firm would 
become a take-over candidate and management could lose their jobs.
Fligstein (1990) attempts to document this evolution from the historical perspective of 
the actors involved, in order to demonstrate that what has survived is not necessarily 
the most efficient form but rather it has come into existence as a result o f a social and 
political process that defines and redefines markets. His theoretical approach focused 
on the role o f power in organisational change and how the actors in organisations 
could use this power.
Fligstein (1990) criticises the historical view that the market is the source of 
efficiency, and points out that this approach places the market outside the social 
process. Fligstein (1990:302) observes that:
‘the forms o f social organisation produced the market, not the reverse....T he 
interpretation of the history of the corporation that stresses efficiency 
ignores the central fact that managers and entrepreneurs were constantly 
trying to escape or control competition, not engage in it...the rules o f the 
market could be changed by powerful corporate actors and the government.’
For Fligstein, markets are comprised of social structures or sets of rules which 
preserve the power and interests of the largest organisations; and when the rules no 
longer produce positive results for those in control, the rules are changed. Fligstein's 
sociological conception o f the corporate organisation has the advantage o f recognising 
there is no absolute standard of efficiency or mode o f organisation which exists 
objectively outside social constraints. The rules by which worlds are constructed are
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constantly negotiated and changed. The market as the driving force of economic 
history is replaced by a variety of institutional constructs. Fligstein argues 
(1990:304):
‘By dropping the notion that the most efficient economic solution is the 
predominant one and accepting that efficiency is a social construction, one 
can then see how the transformation o f conceptions o f control and their 
strategies rely on organisational dynamics and the interaction between 
organisations, their leaders, and the state.’
Similarly, in his study of how the largest corporations in the United States were 
transformed over a 100-year period, Fligstein (1991) analysed the strategic 
interactions between key actors in the organisations, the government and other 
external organisations in the same organisational field.
Understanding the importance of power and the role of actor(s) in organisational 
change is crucial if we are to develop our understanding o f ‘how’ mergers evolve. 
Fligstein (1990:311) stated that:
‘the ability to change large organisations depends on a complex set o f action, 
both internal and external to the organisation and it is both the ability and 
power base o f individual actor(s) and groups that can affect organisational 
actions and outcomes.’
As an institutionalist, he recognised that organisations operate in three contexts or 
what can be called institutional spheres: the existing strategy and structure of the 
organisation, the set of organisations comprising the organisational field  and the 
state. These three contexts are where rules are created, meaningful action occurs, 
power relations are formed and concrete forms o f social organisation are set in place. 
The rules in this definition act to constrain and shape the actors behaviour. The ability 
to set the rules can be a result o f power (Fligstein, 1990).
Power Dynamics
Power is a means by which actors or groups of actors are able to persuade, induce or 
coerce others into following certain courses of actions. Most organisational power will 
be unequally shared between various groups. Even though the motives o f the merger 
can be open to amendment and change as the merger process progresses, often actors 
of the dominant group(s) can be very influential. The power status of each actor and
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group is assessed according to their position in the organisation, their specialist 
knowledge or skills, their influence in the external environment and their control over 
resources (Fligstein, 1990).
Pluralist organisations, like hospitals, are characterised by fragmented power, multiple 
objectives and conflict between groups. These would be expected to intensify, 
especially during major organisational change and restructuring, when expectations of 
what the merger will mean, bring and result in is usually different between groups 
(Mueller et al., 2003; Ashbumer et al., 1996). This tension or power struggle can be 
resolved in two ways; one by exercising control and the other is to reach a conciliatory 
compromise.
Control is about one party improving its power position over another. Depending on 
the position of the actors in the organisation, each would create a different view about 
how control should be achieved. Therefore their actions will be justified as ways to 
extend control over the situation or perceived problem. Internal control may have 
been about senior management making sure that resources were available so their 
directives could be executed, while external control could be about building coalitions 
or aligning themselves with other groups they perceived as powerful (Fligstein, 1990).
While compromise was about negotiation and agreeing on strategies and actions that 
were mutually satisfying to all parties, actors must be willing to reformulate power 
relationships between themselves and understand what they might have to concede in 
the short term in order to benefit in the long term.
The Importance o f  Actors
Archetype theory appears to side step the importance of external actors in 
organisational change. Organisations are seen as a system of power held together by 
the interests of key actors. A given system of power benefits those who are in charge 
and their views control the organisation and allow them access to the resources o f the 
organisation. Fligstein’s (1990) view suggests that if organisational 
fields/environments are turbulent and unstable, the actors must develop a set of 
solutions based on their interpretation of those problems. The actors in charge must
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have both a perception of some new strategy and the power to act upon it. When 
actors are in key positions (leadership), they can mobilise themselves and others 
which gives them the power to force strategies and structure change (Fligstein, 1990).
The actors’ position in the organisation or group would often influence their 
perception of the problem. That position might provide arguments or interpretations 
that would alter the organisation’s course by offering a particular construction of the 
organisational crisis and a solution to that crisis. Such a solution would often enhance 
the power of that actor in the organisation or the position of that organisation in the 
organisational field (Fligstein, 1990).
Fligstein (1991) claims that his view of actors differs from that o f traditional 
rationality or bounded rationality. Rationality assumes perfect information and 
'maximisation', while bounded rationality assumes imperfect information and 
'satisfying'. Fligstein claims that both approaches assume that information is 'neutral' 
and does not require interpretation. Fligstein however offers a view of actors as filling 
an interpretive (exercising cognition and perception) role in uncertain environments.
When a group of organisations in a specific field change their strategies or actions and 
other actors or groups perceive that this change has given their colleagues or 
competitors a beneficial result, then other actors in the field would probably follow 
suit (Fligstein, 1991). The proposed changes may or may not be positive for other 
organisations but what mattered was that actors in other organisations perceived the 
need for change and constructed views based upon their perceptions.
The Organisation
The internal structuring of the organisation was a source o f great power and at the 
same time, a constraint on action. Those who were in power would act to preserve 
their position through claims exercised through both formal and informal authority 
structures. Changes in organisational goals or strategies would only result when either 
a new set o f actors gained power or it was in the interest of those in power to do so. 
The strategic decision to pursue change initiatives or restructure the organisation was 
a leadership privilege based upon their power position in the organisation.
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The Organisational Field
Organisations are embedded in larger groups of organisations. The links between 
these organisations could be characterised in network terms. This was probably most 
evident in the health care sector. The other organisations in the environment could 
influence the action of any given organisation both through these network links and 
various dependency relationships (Fligstein, 1990). In an organisational field the 
actions o f one organisation could have consequences for others. Therefore, the 
merger between two hospitals could have a significant impact on other health care 
organisations in this sector.
As defined by Fligstein an ‘organisational field’ is distinct from the concept o f a 
niche. He states that the concepts share a conception of an objective external reality 
imposed on an organisation. But he claims (Fligstein, 1991:313-4):
‘The idea of a field suggests that the environment and the niche are
themselves constructions of organisations and their key actors.’
One important aspect of the organisational field concept was the ability of a given 
organisation or set of organisations to direct the actions o f the field. Organisations 
could control fields on the basis of two principles. First, the size of the organisation 
gave its actors differential power to dictate the actions of others in any given field, and 
actors from larger organisations were more likely to use this power to influence 
others. Second, where all members expected to benefit from the formation o f stable 
rules governing legitimate actions in the field, this would usually encourage group co­
operation and compliance (Fligstein, 1991).
This view of organisational field differs from archetype theory, which stresses the 
normative aspect of organisational fields. The view put forward by Fligstein (1990) 
focuses instead on the organisational field as a construction of powerful organisations 
based on the interests of those organisations. The function of the organisational field 




The state consisted of multiple organisations and institutions whose political function 
was to establish policies and legislation that would define the rules and boundaries of 
organisational behaviour. The government could mediate among organisations in the 
field and attempted to act in the interests of all organisations in order to stabilise the 
fields. Therefore, it could alter the environment more profoundly and systematically 
than any other organisation.
The actors who controlled the state achieved power through different means than the 
actors who controlled private and non-profit organisations. But once the actors were 
in power, organisational dynamics became important determinants of action. 
Sometimes the actions of the state provided shocks to the system that brought about 
unexpected consequences and forced transformational change through the 
organisational field (Fligstein, 1991). The government could exert profound power 
and control through the use of economic sanctions.
Therefore the state and actors are pivotal in understanding organisational change 
because o f their power to influence organisational decisions and actions.
Social Skill
In more recent work Fligstein (1998, 2001), incorporating and elaborating the model 
of institutional entrepreneurship in Fligstein (1997), observes that the various new 
institutional theories all agree that institutions are created to produce local social 
orders, are social constructions, fundamentally about how powerful groups create 
rules of interaction and maintain unequal resource distributions, and yet, once in 
existence, can enable as well as constrain actors in subsequent institution building. 
Fligstein criticises these theories for their inadequate attention to the role o f social 
power and actors in the creation o f institutions, and proposes an alternative view of 
the dynamics o f institutions based on a more sociological conception of rules, 
resources, and social skill. Social skill is a ‘ microfoundation ’ for clarifying from a 
sociological point of view ‘how to make sense of what actors are doing in groups and 
organisations’ (2001:112).
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Fligstein draws on the ‘new institutionalist’ concept of fields, defined as 
institutionalised arenas where organised groups of actors gather and frame their 
actions vis-a-vis one another. The rules of the arena shape what is possible by 
providing tools for actors to interact, to formulate their own interests and strategies, 
and to interpret those o f others. Fligstein observes that although new institutional 
theories focus on how collective social actors orient action towards one another, these 
theories disagree on the role of actors, and the related problem of the role o f power. 
He criticises the conception of actors in both rational choice and sociological versions 
o f new institutional theories and develops a more sociological idea of action called 
‘social skill’, defined as the ability to induce co-operation in others. It should be 
noted that Fligstein does not claim to offer a full-blown theory o f agency or 
institutions, or to present a set of testable hypotheses:
‘Instead, I am providing an abstract conceptual framework that supplies 
empirical sociologists with a set o f tools that may help them analyze the role 
of actors in the emergence, stability and transformation o f many kinds o f 
local social orders’ (Fligstein, 2001:106).
Rational choice models suggest that institutions are the outcome of individual rational 
actors interacting in game-like situations where rules are given and resources, 
indexing the relative power o f actors, are fixed. Actors are conceptualised as 
individuals even when they represent groups and so the nature o f social arenas and the 
role and position of actors in those arenas are undertheorised. States, political 
processes and power are considered to be rules and resources; and once these are 
known, actors’ interests and thus their actions follow. Fligstein argues that these 
theories miss the point that actors (decision-makers, managers, leaders, or elites) have 
many constituencies to balance off and need to produce arrangements to induce co­
operation with both their allies and opponents. Rational actor models, by treating 
rules and resources as exogenous and actors as individuals with fixed preferences, 
miss the creativity and skill required for individuals, as representatives of 
collectivities, to operate politically vis-a-vis other actors to produce, reproduce, and 
transform institutional arrangements (Fligstein, 2001). Sociological institutionalists 
focus instead on how social worlds are murky and require interpretation, and on how 
actions may or may not have consequences (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). To deal with 
this uncertainty, actors use readily available scripts, often provided by governments or 
professionals, to interpret the actions o f others and to structure their interactions
59
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Actors in these theories are more socially embedded 
and more collective. But the theory of action is about how local cultures and social 
positions in fields dictate what actors think and do, and not about interaction 
(Fligstein, 1998, 2001).
Most versions of new institutional theory in sociology lack a theory of power as well, 
which is related to the problem of the theory o f action. Institutions provide collective 
meanings which structure fields, but the question why fields should exist and in whose 
interest they exist has never been a focus of institutional theories. Field analysis and 
dynamics is rarely about power, about who is benefiting, and who is not. The theory 
of action fosters this turn away from issues of power by making actors the propagators 
of shared meanings and followers of scripts. But, asks Fligstein, why and how do 
actors who are supposed to only be able to follow scripts create new institutions? 
(Fligstein, 1998). Most versions of the new institutionalism in sociology lack a real 
theory o f interaction and power, and so have no way to make sense o f how institutions 
emerge in the first place (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995).
Fligstein (1998) argues that the idea that strategic action occurs in fields requires the 
notion o f social skill, defined as the ability o f actors to induce co-operation in other 
actors in order to create, challenge, or reproduce a given set of rules. The skill 
required to induce co-operation, from one's own group and other groups, is to find 
collective meanings that motivate other actors. Skilled actors interpret the actions of 
others in the field, and on the basis o f the position o f their group, use their perception 
of current opportunities or constraints to attain co-operation; they engage in action 
because by producing meaning for others, they produce meaning for themselves. This 
view is supported by the argument put forward by Sewell (1992) in his theory of 
structure that seeks to restore human agency to social actors and overcomes the divide 
between semiotic and materialist visions of structure; Sewell’s perception of agency 
(1992:21) needs to be quoted at some length in order to convey the complex strands of 
thought involved :
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‘Finally, I would insist that agency is collective as well as individual. I do 
not agree with Barry Hindess (1986) that the term ‘agent’ must be applied in 
the same sense to collectivities that act as corporate units in social life - 
political parties, firms, families, states, clubs, or trade unions-as it is applied 
to individuals. But I do see agency as profoundly social or collective. The 
transpositions of schemas and remobilisations of resources that constitute 
agency are always acts of communication with others. Agency entails an 
ability to co-ordinate one's actions with others and against others, to form 
collective projects, to persuade, to coerce, and to monitor the simultaneous 
effects of one's own and others' activities. Moreover, the extent of the 
agency exercised by individual persons depends profoundly on their 
positions in collective organisations. To take the extreme case, a monarch's 
personal whims or quarrels may affect the lives of thousands (see, e.g., 
Sahlins 1991). But it is also true that the agency of fathers, executives, or 
professors is greatly expanded by the places they occupy in patriarchal 
families, corporations, or universities and by their consequent authority to 
bind the collectivity by their actions. Agency, then, characterises all persons. 
But the agency exercised by persons is collective in both its sources and its 
mode of exercise. Personal agency is, therefore, laden with collectively 
produced differences o f power and implicated in collective struggles and 
resistances.’
According to Fligstein (2001), ‘institution building moments’ occur when groups o f 
social actors confront one another in some set of social interactions that is contentious. 
These moments are inherently political and involve struggles over scarce resources by 
groups with varying power. There are a number o f ways stable institutions can be 
built. Some groups come to dominate and impose a set of rules and relations on other 
groups. An outside force, such as a government (which itself is made up of fields), 
can enforce order, and privilege itself or its most favoured groups. Sometimes groups 
can produce a political coalition to bargain an outcome that provides rules for those 
groups. It is important to recognise that institution building may fail: disparate 
interests and identities of groups can prevent stable institutions from emerging. 
Fligstein suggests that (contrary to the rational choice view) actors’ preferences are 
not fixed, but can be endogenous to the process of institution building episodes. Put 
simply, people figure out what they want as events unfold (Fligstein, 1998, 2001).
Fields can go into crisis as a result of external changes, particularly in other fields that 
a given field is dependent upon. Thus, a downturn in a field's major market or 
supplier, or in the case of governments, war or economic crisis, will have 
consequences for a particular local order. Crises can be caused by the intentional or 
unintentional actions of governments. One can identify a real crisis in an existing field 
as a situation where the major groups are having difficulty reproducing their privilege
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as the rules that have governed interaction are no longer working. Skilled strategic 
actors in dominant groups will begin in a crisis situation by trying to defend the status 
quo. Challengers may find a political opportunity to force changes on the existing 
order. They may ally themselves with other dominant groups, invaders from other 
fields, or the government to help reconstitute a given field (Fligstein, 2001).
According to Fligstein (2001), the theory of social skill informs the way that we study 
the formation, stability, and transformation o f new fields. In considering the 
implications of the theory for empirical research, he suggests there are two problems 
that one must solve to make the idea of social skill empirically useful. First, one 
needs to specify what sort of tactics real socially skilled actors use to induce co­
operation. This will enable empirically oriented scholars to recognise who socially 
skilled actors are and to look for various tactics they might use to get co-operation. 
Then, one needs to connect the use of these tactics more closely to where actors stand 
in fields.
Fligstein gives several specific examples of tactics used by skilled actors. A major 
source o f framing is having direct authority to tell someone what to do; but even with 
such authority one must still induce co-operation in subordinates, which requires a 
repertoire of other tactics to structure interactions with those within and across groups. 
Very briefly these include (Fligstein, 2001:114-115): agenda setting; understanding 
field ambiguities and uncertainties and working off them; convincing others that what 
they can get is what they want; brokering rather than blustering; pressing for more 
than one is willing to accept; appearing hard to read and without interest in personal 
gain; where the problem is to find a way to join actors or groups with widely different 
preferences, creating a common collective identity so as to get enough on board and 
keep a bandwagon going so that others will follow; having lots o f balls in the air; 
getting others to believe that others are in control; and making alliances with people 
with few other choices, and isolating particularly difficult outliers.
When one is looking at the emergence or transformation of an existing field, the 
theory o f fields implies that one must identify the main collective actors, their 
resources, and the rules that guide the possibility for action. Social skill implies that 
in fluid situations some actors will try to put together alternative institutional projects
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to organise the field. According to Fligstein the goal of the analyst must be to identify 
the main possible projects and who their proponents are. By tracing how the 
proponents of these possible institutional orders framed their projects, modified them 
to make them more attractive to others, and basically built political bandwagons 
around them, the analyst can attempt to see how groups of institutional entrepreneurs 
produce new orders. (Fligstein, 2001)
The analyst can also become sensitive to why some frames win and others lose. It 
might be the simple case where the groups who align themselves around a particular 
frame are sufficiently powerful that they are able to push that frame on all of the other 
groups in the field. In other words, pre-existing rules and resources might be enough 
to explain which frame conquers. Alternatively, frames might be blocked, with no 
frame emerging as a way to organise a field, because skilled actors were not able to 
overcome potential veto points in the process. Finally, skilled strategic actors may be 
able to produce a frame that actually reorganises group interests by finding ways to 
create agreements by getting groups to change their conception of their interest 
(Fligstein, 2001).
Fligstein suggests a number of obvious methodological implications of the theory of 
fields and the idea of social skill. Analysts should spend time looking for 
entrepreneurs and examining their tactics: how do they spread their ideas, build 
political coalitions, persuade others, and create new identities? Moreover, can we 
observe them reorienting their framing? And to whom are they appealing by taking 
what the system gives, figuring out how to get others to co-operate, and figuring out 
who to co-operate with? Fligstein argues that scholars must understand who the 
players are in a field, how it works, and what are the tools available to skilled strategic 
actors to reinforce the status quo. Actors will use the tools that hold the status quo in 
place in a crisis. They will first deny that there is a crisis. If this fails, they will 
undertake actions designed to reinforce their power in the field. Finally, they will 
undertake piecemeal reforms or small changes that will leave the underlying power 
distribution in the field intact while trying to co-opt the opposition or challenger 
groups (Fligstein, 2001).
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Fligstein concludes that the idea of social skill offers us a way to begin to study how 
actors sometimes can transform social structures, but most of the time fail to do so. It 
allows us to make sense of how resources and rules, once in place, tend to favour the 
biggest and most organised groups. The theory of fields helps us see that once in 
place, generally, dominant organisational arrangements reproduce themselves on a 
period-to-period basis. They do so because of a distribution of rules and resources 
toward dominant groups and the ability o f skilled actors to use these to reproduce their 
power. That said, the reproduction of the power of groups is not always certain. There 
are always challengers to any given group's social power. Moreover, the basis o f a 
group's power, its claim over resources and rules, can be undermined by periodic 
social crises. These crises can have their origin from outside the field or within the 
field. As these crises intensify, the role of skilled social actors in the reproduction of a 
given set o f social power increases (Fligstein, 2001).
The concepts developed by Fligstein outlined above are useful in the study of mergers 
and will be used to augment and complement archetype theory for the purpose of this 
thesis. Although Fligstein’s research was based upon change in private corporations, 
many of these companies’ histories covered periods of merger activity, which will 
also provide some valuable insights into public sector mergers.
2.9 Summary
The theory o f organisational structure that underlies the archetype perspective seeks to 
overcome the duality of structure and agency. Structures are seen as a vehicle to 
reflect and facilitate meanings: they embody normative expectations and prescriptions 
for adequate performance. Power is a key analytical focus because it is the relations 
o f power that enable some organisational members to constitute and recreate 
organisational structures according to their meanings. However, agency is - even in 
the case o f powerful actors - constrained by contextual constraints
An archetype is a composition of structure and management systems given coherence 
and common orientation by an underlying set of values and beliefs as to what the 
organisation should be doing, how it should be doing it, and how it should be judged. 
More recent studies indicate that coherence can also be exhibited where alternative
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archetypes (for example one based on professionalism and one based on 
managerialism) are ‘sedimented’, producing a hybrid form o f organising. This may be 
a result o f  contemporary trends being reflected in fresh interpretive schemes, such as 
‘commercialised professionalism’ or ‘professional management’.
Archetypes originate in institutional fields. The concept o f the ‘organisational field’ is 
central to institutional theory. Archetype transition may be analysed at the level o f an 
individual organisation or across an organisational field, in the latter case giving the 
opportunity to understand the horizontal and vertical relationships and interactions 
between organisations in a particular sector, for example the hospitals and other health 
care organisations in a given locality.
Archetype theory provides a framework to enable an analysis o f the scale, pace and 
linearity o f  change using the concept o f  ‘tracks’. Four prototypical tracks (inertia, 
aborted excursions, transformations and unresolved excursions) were theorised but 
recent studies indicate the possibility for other tracks; tracks o f change should not be 
seen as predetermined and are to be discovered through empirical investigation.
In archetype theory the dynamics o f organisational change and stability are 
understood by analysing the ways in which organisational group members react to old 
and new institutionally derived ideas through their existing value commitments and 
interests and their ability to implement or enforce them through their existing power 
and capacity for action. The focus is thus on intra-organisational relationships and 
interaction. In a study o f hospital mergers this is useful for analysing the internal 
restructuring process to implement the merger, but is too limited for analysing the 
negotiations, consultations and other interactions between the merging organisations 
and other actors in the field (including powerful government agencies) that take place 
in the period leading up to the merger. Fligstein’s perspective on power and the state, 
and his microfoundational theory o f social skill is particularly useful in this respect.
Fligstein notes that rational adaptation, resource dependence, and population ecology 
all assume that the environment is a fixed hard constraint on organisations. Political 
and institutional theories pursue the notion that resource dependence is socially 
constructed, leading some scholars to focus more on how firms constructed or enacted
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their worlds. Fligstein has created what he calls a political-cultural approach, which 
posits that the basic problem facing organisational actors is to create a stable world so 
that the organisation can continue to exist. This calls for the construction o f an 
organisational field in which actors come to recognise and take into account their 
mutual interdependence: these understandings are reached through political processes. 
Generally, the largest organisations develop a collective way to control the 
organisational field and they impose it on the smaller organisations. There are two 
problems involved in creating a stable organisational field: finding a set o f 
understandings that allow a political accommodation in the field, and the legitimation 
o f those understandings by governments. Fligstein calls such a set o f understandings a 
conception o f control
From this perspective, states are implicated in all features o f organisational life. The 
organisations and institutions o f the state make and administer the rules governing 
economic interaction in a given geographic area, and they are prepared to enforce 
those rules, in the last instance through force. The state's claims to set the rules for 
economic interaction is social in origin, and as such it is contestable. The process by 
which these rules are set up, transformed, and enforced is therefore an inherently 
political process. Therefore the local politics and existing practices o f nations will 
have profound effects on the form, content, and enforcement rules in organisational 
fields. The formation o f organisational fields will depend on the politics in the field 
and the relation between the field and the state
Fligstein observes that although social theory is always concerned with the 
relationship o f agency to social structure, it has not focused on the nature o f the skills 
that social agents employ. Fligstein provides a theory o f social skill that draws on 
ideas from symbolic interactionism. Fligstein starts with the new institutionalisms’ 
common acknowledgement that action takes place within the organisational field (by 
whatever name this is called), in which social groups contest their respective interests. 
He describes the social skills used by an institutional entrepreneur (or ‘skilled actor’) 
to negotiate the interactions between powerful and powerless groups within the field 
to induce co-operation and arrive at a set o f rules governing future relationships. 
Social fields tend to be stable and opportunities for skilled actors to bring about 
change tend to emerge in periods o f crisis, especially when the field is being invaded
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by some other (challenger) field. In these situations, the skilled actor can employ a 
wide range o f interpersonal strategies, always appearing community-minded (whether 
he is or not) and unmotivated by personal gain, to manipulate rules and balancing off 
constituencies.
Fligstein describes several examples o f social skill such as agenda-setting, brokering, 
and isolating opponents. Having thus mediated the establishment o f new rules, the 
skilled actor must once again stabilise the field by instilling a new set o f behaviours in 




METHODOLOGY: A LONGITUDINAL COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
3.1 Introduction
The researcher will be conducting a longitudinal comparative case study on hospital 
mergers in England and Ontario and will examine the organisational impact o f this 
change process. When the research question seeks to examine organisational change 
over time it is important that the methodology provides a framework that can track 
and explain the unfolding temporal processes o f change. Van de Ven and Huber 
(1990:213) have endorsed processual studies stating that:
“Processual studies are fundamental to gaining an appreciation o f 
dynamic organisational life and to developing and testing theories o f 
organisational adoption, change, innovation and redesign.”
The longitudinal case studies that are produced under the processual framework 
generate an abundance o f rich data. The dynamic inductive -deductive interplay 
highlights how there is never a clear division between data and theory.
In this study the researcher will be seeking to track the merger process, identify key 
events, determine what factors affect these events, focus on the role o f key strategic 
actors and groups o f actors and then establish how all these elements come together 
and impact on the merger outcome from an organisational perspective. In most 
studies the links and patterns that emerge in the case are complex (Pettigrew, 1990; 
Langley, 1999; McPhee, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995 and Eisenhardt, 1989). Theory 
will be used as a framework for analysis rather than deriving some formal set o f 
propositions that are to be tested through the case study, thus the development o f 
theory is dependent upon and draws from the results found in the study.
The researcher will use multiple methods which will include the analysis o f 
documents and archive data, the use o f in-depth interviews and the collection o f 
observational material. The major benefit o f carrying out research over time that uses 
a range o f different methods is that it allows for cross validation o f the findings and 
enables the modification o f research strategies in the collection o f further data (Green
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et al., 2005). The case study narrative is central to the analysis and its purpose is to 
seek a more critical understanding o f the change process by accommodating multiple 
perspectives. The inductive theory building process that takes place during the data 
analysis and narrative development is key when examining the patterns in the data.
The researcher will reflect on the role o f the researcher, address issues around case 
selection and gaining access to the research site, discuss the sampling strategy for the 
study, provide examples o f how the data was analyzed and finally highlight issues 
pertaining to internal validity and reliability.
3.2 Justifying the Comparative Case Study Design
A case study is a detailed investigation or history o f a past or current phenomenon 
(Pentland, 1999). As a research strategy, it allows the researcher the flexibility to 
track change over time, as a response to contextual pressures, and the dynamics o f 
various stakeholder groups in proposing or opposing change (Hartley, 1994; Stake, 
1995 and Creswell, 1994). In this study the hospital mergers take place over an 
extended period o f time and involve numerous hospitals, community organisations, 
actors and groups o f actors. Case studies are useful when exploring new areas o f 
research, building theory, tapping into informal behaviour, exploring social processes 
as they unfold in organisations and providing detailed data essential for cross-national 
comparative research. The case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with 
multiple sources o f evidence which is crucial when studying a topic as complex as 
hospital mergers (Yin, 1994; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).
A case study will often draw on a range o f perspectives and methods with a collection 
o f longitudinal data over periods o f real and retrospective time (Pettigrew, 1985). 
However, as a research method, it cannot be defined through research techniques. 
Rather, it has to be defined in terms o f its theoretical orientation (Pettigrew et al, 
1992; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Dawson, 2003, Scott, 1994; Peterson, 1998 and 
Langley, 1999). The emphasis in this research is on understanding processes 
alongside their contexts. Therefore the intent o f the study and analysis is to develop a 
finely detailed understanding o f the change processes in order to develop theory,
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rather than to test existing theories or propositions. The purpose o f using a theoretical 
framework is to help the researcher formulate their research strategy, establish some 
basic criteria, inform the sampling process, guide the data collection and provide a 
framework for analysis. (McNulty and Ferlie, 2004; Hartley, 1995 and Pettigrew, 
1995)
Comparing Cases
The reason for studying multiple cases is to see if  the change processes and outcomes 
across cases are due to transient events or to more static factors, such as government 
policy. The longitudinal nature o f these cases meant that there is a sequence o f 
ordered information about each case, within which both internal and external 
comparisons could be drawn (McPhee, 1995). Cross-case comparisons also have 
diagnostic value because they can reveal some underlying root causes o f case 
difference and similarity. The comparative method is perhaps the best approach for 
generating and evaluating cross-national studies, because the subject matter and cases 
cover a wider range than in studies restricted to one country and this allows 
researchers to evaluate the limits o f their propositions (Van de Ven and Poole, 2002 
and Eisenhardt, 1989). The case oriented approach considers the case as a whole 
entity; looking at configurations, associations, causes and effects within the case and 
only then turns to comparative analysis.
M ultiple cases are helpful in both generating explanation and testing these 
propositions systematically. The single case is subject to limits in generalisability and 
several potential biases which can lead to misjudgement o f the actual 
representativeness o f a single event. Multiple cases can strengthen the precision, 
external validity and stability o f the findings. (McPhee, 1995; Yin, 1994: Green and 
Thorogood, 2005) The choice o f cases is usually made on conceptual grounds not on 
representative grounds.
The case study method has been described as a valuable and useful approach for 
supporting theory development, achieving high conceptual validity and assessing 
causal mechanisms and complexity. (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Green and Thorogood, 2005) Case studies explore the operation o f causal 
mechanisms in individual cases in detail. Many o f the variables that interest
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qualitative researchers are notoriously difficult to measure such as power, the political 
behaviour o f the state and the social skill o f the key actors, which will be the focus o f 
study in this research.
Limitations o f  Case Study Design
However there are limitations with this research strategy as well. Two o f the most 
common critiques o f case study methods are that o f case selection bias and the 
inherent limitation o f making generalisations that apply to broad populations. 
(McNulty and Ferlie, 2004) Case study researchers sometimes deliberately choose 
cases that share a particular outcome and for some studies this is appropriate. In these 
situations, this can help identify which variables are either sufficient or not necessary 
to influence the selected outcome. Case studies may uncover or refine a theory about 
a particular causal mechanism such as collective social action dynamics that can be 
applicable to vast populations o f cases but usually the effect o f such mechanisms 
differ from one case context to another. Therefore it becomes difficult to render 
judgments on the representativeness o f particular cases in relation to the wider 
population and it is important that the researcher points out that they seek only 
contingent generlisations that apply to the subclass o f cases that are similar to those 
under study (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). Again it is 
important to emphasize that case study researchers are more interested in finding the 
conditions under which specified outcomes occur and the mechanisms through which 
they occur rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their 
outcomes arise.
Process Analysis
The focus o f analysis in case studies is on interpretation rather than quantification. 
Process analysis or tracing is a methodological approach which is often used to 
complement the case study approach which can be described as a qualitative data 
sampling and collection framework (Hornby and Symon, 1994).
Process analysis has a fluid character that spans time and space and draws on vertical 
and horizontal levels o f analysis and the interconnections between those levels
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(Langley, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Zaheer et al, 1999 and Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This model o f analysis is particularly suited to the study o f hospital mergers and 
change in the health care sector. The vertical level o f analysis will refer to the 
interdependencies between the state, the organizational field and the actors (or groups 
o f actors) involved in the merger process. While the horizontal level o f analysis will 
focus on the sequential interconnectedness o f the events that take place during the pre 
merger and early merger time periods.
Process analysis involves breaking down the data into various components, then 
locating data under one or more categories and sub categories before building 
connections across the research material as a whole. The process had been described 
by Dawson (2003:114) as:
“ ...the  data is cracked open, labelled and then reconstructed to form 
something quite different from the original text, in an attempt to explain 
and understand the object o f the study”
In other words, the researcher is decoupling, classifying and recombining data to 
develop, and redefine the concepts which have emerged from the cases. This data 
analysis process guides the researcher towards case write up, as an analytical 
chronology, in which patterns in the data are further identified and clarified 
(Pettigrew, 1995). The central aim o f the narrative is to weave an argument that 
constantly moves from the general to the particular by linking the theoretical and 
empirical findings across the cases.
3.3 Developing a Theoretical Framework
Theory shapes the case study research process. Case studies tend to explore and probe 
in depth the particular circumstances o f the organisation and the relationship between 
organisational behaviour and its specific context (Pettigrew, 1992; Van de Ven, 1992; 
Yin, 1994). Therefore, the case study approach is more flexible and adaptable when it 
comes to probing areas o f original but also emergent theory.
Although case studies may begin with rudimentary theory, as the case unfolds a 
theoretical framework should also evolve which not only informs and enriches the
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data but also reinforces the importance and relevance o f the case findings in relation to 
theory. Working with a theory has the advantage o f sharpening and focusing the data 
collection and analysis. Van de Ven and Poole (2002) advocate the use o f two 
theories because this approach gives the researcher an alternative option and reduces 
the likelihood that the researcher will try and make the data fit one particular theory.
The aim o f this research is to develop process rather than variance theory: that is the 
researcher is interested in “describing and explaining the temporal sequence o f 
events” involved in change rather than identifying relationships between variable 
levels o f inputs and outputs. Thus, the case study method, which involves tracing 
processes in their natural context is most appropriate (Pettigrew, 1992, Van de Ven 
and Huber, 1992; Yin, 1994)
Hinings and Greenwood’s (1988) work on the dynamics o f strategic change in local 
government was very influential in the way in which the researcher framed the study 
(deductive step). Their notion o f organisational archetypes and change tracks appeared 
to be promising concepts for understanding healthcare change. Since the researcher 
was interested in developing an understanding o f the processes involved in hospital 
mergers and focusing on these dimensions o f organisational change, it was decided 
that it would be useful to deductively draw on archetype theory and extending it to the 
study o f  hospital mergers. However, as the study progressed, other observations were 
emerging from the data which were not adequately addressed in archetype theory 
(inductive step). It was noticed that many o f the activities and events in the 
organisational field surrounding the merger process were influenced and directed by 
both powerful and skilled strategic actors. At this juncture in the study, the researcher 
returned to the literature and began to look at previous work on mergers and the role 
o f power and actors in search o f theoretical ideas that would help conceptualise what 
was happening in the cases. Neil Fligstein’s (1990) work on the importance o f power 
and the role o f actor(s) in organisational change was immediately appealing and 
appeared useful to further develop the researcher’s understanding o f how mergers 
evolve. Fligstein (1990:311) stated:
“the ability to change large organisations depends on a complex set o f
action, both internal and external to the organisation and it is both the
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ability and power base o f individual actors and groups that can affect 
organisational actions and outcomes.”
Therefore the approached used in this study was partly deductive (data inspired) and 
partly inductive (data inspired). Denis, Lamothe and Langley (2001:812) conducted a 
similar study on the dynamics o f collective leadership and strategic change in 
healthcare organizations in Canada and they found that:
“this mixed approach can be very fruitful because it allows one to gain 
creative insight from the data, without necessarily denying or reinventing 
concepts that have been useful previously and by relying on multiple and 
sequential case studies, one can also use deductive and inductive logic 
iteratively to foster the development o f a richer theoretical framework 
over time.”
3.4 Conducting Research in Real versus Retrospective Time
Longitudinal case data can be obtained by observing the sequence o f change events as 
they occur in real time or by relying on archival data and interviews to obtain a 
retrospective account o f the change process (Van de Ven and Poole, 2002). Real time 
studies can increase the internal validity by enabling the researcher to track cause and 
effect. However, in order to observe critical events the researcher must spend an 
inordinate amount o f time in the field on site and in building relationships with the 
people involved. This approach requires both organisational commitment over the 
long term and the financial resources to support this type o f research. One o f the 
limitations o f conducting research in real time is the research may lose objectivity. 
This can happen should the researcher become too involved with the organisation, the 
people and the processes (Miles and Huberman; 1994)
Retrospective studies have the advantage that there is an existing knowledge o f the big 
picture, o f how things developed and o f the outcomes that ensued (Leonard-Barton, 
1995 and Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). This post-hoc knowledge is helpful for 
interpreting the events that unfolded, and for constructing a narrative o f the process. 
Although it may be easier for the researcher to maintain both in appearance and in fact 
an appropriate open mind, it is still difficult to determine cause and effect from 
reconstructed events. Studies have shown that participants don’t forget key events but 
the problem is that they may not have recognized an event as important when it
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occurred and thus may not recall it afterwards (Pettigrew, 1995) Therefore the 
researcher has to work hard at gaining access to a range o f informants who can both 
corroborate and refute accounts o f the process and since there is more reliance on self 
reporting the need to check these accounts against other sources o f data are even more 
crucial.
Regardless o f how and when the data is collected the researcher is the underlying link 
and by virtue o f the research design they become part o f the process o f producing the 
data and its meanings. Therefore it is important that the researcher reflects on the 
possible sources o f bias and how the role o f the researcher can influence their 
interaction with informants, the data collection process and the analysis.
3.5 Understanding the Role of the Researcher
When undertaking qualitative researcher it is important to acknowledge and reflect on 
the role o f  the researcher and the impact this may have on the study.(Green and 
Thorogood, 2005; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pettigrew, 1995 and Creswell, 1994) 
This will include examining the past experience o f the researcher and how this lead to 
the selection o f the research topic and sites; the political and social implication o f 
conducting research in these settings; the ways in which the researcher’s presence on 
site could effect the study; the interactions between the researcher and the informants 
and finally, the ways in which the research site could influence the researcher.
Past Experience o f  the Researcher
The researcher has worked in the healthcare arena and acute care sector in both 
Canada and Britain for over 20 years. The positions held have spanned frontline 
service delivery to senior management. During the last 10 years, the researcher has 
experienced first hand the chaos o f restructuring, the complexity o f mergers and the 
short-sightedness o f radical service reform. As a result, the researcher became 
interested in developing a better understanding o f how the merger process evolved in 
the acute care sector and what system and structural changes would result in hospitals. 
It was timely for the researcher that both countries were undergoing radical healthcare 
reform and that the governments were politically promoting mergers as a cost saving
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exercise. This present situation coupled with the researcher’s work experience, 
professional contacts and in-depth knowledge o f both healthcare systems was an 
excellent opportunity to conduct a comparative case study.
Social Implications and Political Alignment
This research study was not funded or commissioned by any external research or 
government body. Therefore there were no hidden agendas or specific directives 
about the focus o f the study; the kind o f data that should to be collected or any 
publication restrictions, other than the agreement made between the hospital Boards 
and the researcher. The researcher recognised that the access granted by the 
participating hospitals and other healthcare organisations and groups was a privilege 
and with that privilege comes the scientific and ethical responsibility to present all 
significant views before offering the researcher’s perspective. The researcher’s main 
focus was on balancing detachment and involvement and on being cautious not to 
over identify with any particular actor, group or interests being presented.
When the researcher started the site visits and interviews the first task was to clearly 
articulate who she was, why she was there and what would be done with the 
information that was being collected. If  you fail to do this from the onset, your 
presence will soon be defined by others in the settings and this could politically and 
professional undermine the research. When settings have multiple groups with 
conflicting interests, the research always runs the risk o f inevitably being perceived as 
being aligned with one group over one another. Once this association has been made, 
this can be extremely difficult to alter the definition o f your role. (Pettigrew, 1995)
The fact that these studies were conducted retrospectively and the events were now 
part o f  the organisations’ history, actually worked to the researcher’s advantage. In 
the English case the researcher may have had difficulty accessing informants, 
conducting interviews and viewing any documents because o f the conflict and 
political tension between the groups o f actors. It is also questionable, looking back on 
this case, if  information would have been so freely shared at that point in time. This 
w asn’t a problem in the Ontario case because o f the level o f  cooperation and 
consensus between groups. On the other hand, the researcher was aware that there
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could be potential hindsight bias which can be associated with interviews that occur 
long after an event has taken place (Lawrence, Malhotra and Morris, 2005). Therefore 
care was taken in the interviews to clarify the events that lead up to any major 
decisions regarding the merger and to clarify the informants’ political position, role 
and organizational alliance at the time o f the merger.
Researcher’s Presence on Site
In order to understand the impact o f the researcher’s presence at the research sites, it’s 
important that the role o f the researcher is clearly defined and the methods o f data 
collection are described. The sources o f data included document analysis, interviews, 
direct observation and informal conversations. At no time did any o f these methods o f 
data collection disrupt the functioning o f the organisations, distract the staff from 
carrying out their roles or require the researcher to take on the role o f participant 
observer. The researcher spent a substantial amount o f time looking for and reviewing 
documents. As a result, the researcher kept a low profile and was situated in either the 
hospital library or a vacant office. Social chat usually took place with personal 
assistants to senior level management, the staff responsible for archiving the 
organisational documents and reports and informal lunches with various other 
healthcare professionals.
The senior and middle management levels o f the organisation were sent a memo from 
the CEO’s office informing them about my research and that some members o f staff 
would be approached to participate in the study. It is also important to remember that 
research activity was common place in both o f these teaching hospitals so having a 
researcher present was not an anomaly.
Interaction Between Researcher and Informant
As a researcher you need to have multiple skills when conducting field work. The 
researcher’s first task is to contact the “senior gatekeepers” o f each organization. This 
requires establishing rapport with the CEOs, selling the research proposal and 
demonstrating in the interview that you have both the social and political skills 
necessary to develop and maintain credibility with a wide range o f senior executives
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and healthcare professionals across the organisation. This was the researcher’s first 
point o f contact in each case and the first step in gaining access.
In the Ontario case, the researcher was introduced to the CEO through a mutual 
colleague, whereas in the English case, contact was established through the 
researcher’s own initiative or cold calling approach. Due to the focus o f this study, a 
majority o f  the interviews were conducted with those who were relatively more 
powerful and senior to the researcher. All o f the senior leaders, clinicians and 
managers approached for interviews accepted the researcher’s invitation. The 
researcher found that all o f the informants interviewed gave 1-2 hours o f their time 
and readily shared their personal and professional views o f the merger, insights into 
the various events and details about the roles o f key actors or groups o f actors.
The key to good interviewing practice is to build a sense o f trust with the interviewee 
to encourage disclosure. Once rapport is established the interviewee feels safe to 
answer questions and participate in the interview (King, 1994). The researcher 
obtained rich and detailed information from all o f her interviews.
Effects o f  the Research Site on the Researcher
The researcher has worked in hospitals for many years and as a result may tend to 
underplay some aspects o f the context because o f her familiarity and comfort with the 
setting. Therefore a conscious effect was made on the part o f the researcher to 
acknowledge those feelings and thoughts about hospital dynamics and politics and to 
examine the activities o f the informants in a more critical light within a conceptual 
and theoretical framework versus a more collegial perspective.
3.6 Research Design
Research design encompasses several activities. The researcher needs to decide which 
organisations will be included in the study and what criteria will be used for case 
selection. Establishing hospital contact and gaining access for research purposes is a 
complex and time consuming process. It is important at the onset o f the study to 
establish timelines as this is an important point that needs to be negotiated upfront
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with the research site. Finally, the researcher needs to be clear on the sampling 
strategy.
Case Selection
In this study, cases were selected based on their comparability. In Chapter 4, the 
researcher highlights both the similarities and differences across the English and 
Ontario healthcare systems to show the comparability o f the two cases. These cases 
were evaluated under the following headings: healthcare system classification,
funding systems, guiding principles and belief systems, system structure and 
government processes and healthcare reform policies. The cases were narrowed 
further according to other relevant characteristics, such as merger activity, number o f 
hospital sites, university affiliation, acute care service provision and merger time 
frame, which will further strengthen the comparability and increase the confidence in 
the findings across the cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Pettigrew 1995).
The criteria used for case selection is highlighted below:
(a) Merger proposal -  as a key criterion this meant that a merger had either been 
officially proposed or had already taken place.
(b) Teaching hospital status -  this meant that the hospital had both an academic and 
research affiliation with a university medical school. All the hospitals in this study 
had teaching hospital status.
(c) Multiple hospital sites -  this criterion relates primarily to the size o f the hospital. 
Prior to any hospital change, each hospital was responsible for the management o f 
at least 2 hospital sites. This meant that the hospitals were matched for cross-site 
restructuring and service integration.
(d) Range o f  medical services, with more than 600 beds -  this criterion relates to the 
size and service focus o f the hospital. The hospitals in both cases were well 
matched. The Ontario hospitals had bed counts that ranged from 620 to 759 while 
the English hospitals had bed counts that ranged from 650 to 779. The hospitals in 
both cases were classified as general acute care institutions and offered a similar 
range o f medical and specialty services
(e) Timeframe fo r  change was between 1992 and 1996 -  this criterion corresponded to 
my research timeframe and also the corresponding fifth wave o f mergers.
(f) Organisational support -  it was imperative that the researcher had the support o f
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each hospital CEO and hospital Board. This level o f support was necessary both 
for access and for the credibility o f the research study. This support would need to 
cover the entire period o f observation and data collection by the researcher.
This information can be referred to in Table 3.1: Comparative Hospital Statistics for 
the English and Ontario M erger Cases.
Establishing Case Contact
The Ontario research site was contacted first. The researcher knew a senior member 
o f staff at the Hamilton Civic Hospital and was introduced to the CEO. This initial 
meeting took place during the pre-merger consultation phase. The researcher was able 
to start her initial interviews and document analysis at the Hamilton site for a short 
period o f time before returning to England to find a comparable English research site. 
At that time she was able to conduct 12 interviews.
The interviews conducted during this pre-merger phase were particularly useful in 
familiarising the researcher with local political issues, the hospital organisations, the 
senior management teams and the local government bodies. These initial contacts 
were important for establishing a data baseline on the targeted hospitals’ structure and 
systems, the key actors, community actors and groups, the activity taking place during 
this pre merger phase and the initial government involvement around the reform 
agenda. The insight gained from the various actors and community groups were 
especially useful in understanding the dynamics that would evolve between these 
actors at a later date. M any o f the hospital actors interviewed during this period left 
their respective organisations, so these initial interviews were very important because 
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The researcher would return to Canada two years later to continue the rest o f the data 
collection post merger. It should be noted that 7 of the 12 informants who were 
interviewed prior to the merger were also interviewed post merger. The data collected 
from these informants was particularly unique because they were able to compare 
their initial expectations on what they thought would be achieved through the merger 
to what had actually transpired over the 2 year period.
The researcher, after her first trawl for data in Ontario, returned to England and began 
the task o f trying to find a suitable case match for the Ontario site. Unlike the Ontario 
case, the researcher did not have a collegial contact in England and had to use the 
“cold calling” technique for the English case. Five English hospitals were contacted 
and the CEOs interviewed to determine whether any o f these hospitals would be a 
likely match for the Ontario case. Only one hospital qualified according to the criteria 
set out by the researcher. The researcher tried to find a hospital merger that was 
taking place in real time but unfortunately that was not possible. The merger in the 
English case had been completed and the hospital was now in the early post merger 
phase. Both these cases were matched according to the criteria established at onset o f 
the study and a majority o f the data collection was conducted retrospectively.
Gaining Access to the Research Sites: Securing Board Approval
As mentioned previously, the researchers’ first point o f contact in each hospital was 
the CEO. At the initial meeting the objectives o f the research study, the type o f data 
that would be collected, the required organisational access and the time frame o f the 
study was discussed. At this meeting the researcher was informed what the 
organisational expectation would be in relation to ethics approval and the 
responsibility o f the researcher as a non-member o f staff.
The ethics committees in hospitals and in local regions were primarily concerned with 
clinical research and many had little experience in judging the appropriateness o f 
qualitative research. (Green et al, 2005) Therefore it was no surprise to the researcher 
when, in both England and Ontario, it was decided by the ethics committee to delegate 
the task o f project review and approval to the senior management teams in the 
hospital. This decision was made on the premise that the criteria used in the ethics
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committee to evaluate research projects was based on principles taken from medical 
research guidelines and, due to the nature and focus o f this study, the committee felt it 
would be unable to evaluate the research protocol. Instead the researcher was asked to 
attend two senior executive meetings.
The first meeting would be with the senior executive team who would initially screen 
and review the project proposal and the second meeting would be with the hospital 
board who would decide whether or not the project would be approved. At both 
meetings the researcher was asked to submit a project proposal, make a formal 
presentation to the teams and answer questions pertaining to the study subjects and 
data collection. The focus o f the discussion with the hospital boards pertained to 
hospital document access, the use o f office space at the hospitals, how the data would 
be obtained during the interview and be secured (that only the researcher would have 
access to these tapes) and how the researcher proposed to address both informant and 
reporting confidentially. It was agreed, at the Board meeting, that the name o f the 
participating organisations could be used in the thesis. This information was also 
shared with each individual who agreed to be interviewed.
Each prospective interviewee was contacted by telephone to arrange an appointment. 
The researcher had prepared a script and it was made clear during this conversation 
that their decision to participate was voluntary. The participants were given 
information about the research objectives, the purpose o f  the interview, the kind o f 
data that would be collected and that every precaution would be taken to protect their 
identity (Creswell, 1994; Green et al ,2005).
Establishing Study Timelines
When undertaking a research project as complex and large as this study, it is 
important and necessary to set boundaries which help define the parameters o f your 
study so you can manage and establish a working timeframe. When you are working 
across several sites it becomes a major challenge to track down hospital documents, 
identify and contact your interviewees and arrange time to meet with them. Therefore 
you need to give yourself a fairly large window o f time. The researcher spent 5 
months at each site (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
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Therefore one o f the first steps prior to data collection is to establish the data 
collection start and completion dates (Pettigrew, 1995). Both these timelines are 
justified and set according to the researcher’s theoretical framework and the context o f 
both cases. Since our focus was on studying the merger process and determining if 
there had been any change or emergence o f a new hospital archetype, the logical start 
point was the beginning o f the government mandated healthcare reform and 
restructuring legislation in both cases. In the English case, this was when the Royal 
Victoria Infirmary obtained its original Trust status in 1992 and in the Ontario case it 
was when the Ontario Government had established the Health Services Restructuring 
Commission in 1996 to lead the restructuring and healthcare reform agenda across the 
province.
The end point for data collection in both cases was the early post merger phase after 
the merger agreements were approved by the government and the hospitals were 
undergoing organisational re-design and service reconfiguration. This end point in the 
data collection allowed the researcher sufficient time to evaluate and determine 
whether a new hospital archetype would emerge as a result o f  the merger.
Rationale fo r “Elite” Sampling
Process analysis or tracing is a method o f identifying and describing organisational 
processes across time and actor groups. The researcher is interested in building up a 
holistic picture o f  the merger process taking into account a number o f different 
perspectives (across the organizational field) and experiences but from a 
knowledgeable group o f informants (Dawson, 2003; Denis, Lamothe and Langley, 
1999). The purpose is to identify those people who are most knowledgeable, have 
access to specific information about the merger due to their position in the 
organization (hospital) or the community (local healthcare agencies or groups) and 
who attended meetings which had a direct bearing on the outcome o f the merger. 
Therefore sampling from senior leaders and decision makers in this study was 
important because any member from an organization below the middle management 
level would not have been privy to this kind o f information nor would they have been 
allowed to participate in the meetings where major decisions were made about the 
merger. The researcher was not interested in obtaining personal or emotive views
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from the frontline staff who would have obtained information about the merger second 
hand.
Sampling
Archetype theory emphasizes the importance o f understanding the situational 
constraints that are derived from the case context that can affect the change process. 
Therefore the researcher must be sensitive to the range o f information and data that 
can and should be collected. This should include political processes, organisational 
arrangements and social alliances that existed between different groups o f actors. 
These kinds o f factors will influence and direct the sampling process.
The second step in the sampling process was to define the sampling parameters or data 
categories (Hornby and Symon,1994). The researcher started with three data 
categories. The first category focused on identifying the organizations and groups o f 
actors that were involved in making decisions about the merger. The second category 
focused on tracking the key events and activities that led up to and influenced the 
merger. The third category focused on analyzing the role o f key actors or groups o f 
actors and the tactics they used during the merger activities. These three main 
categories o f  data would provide the sampling framework which would guide and 
inform the sampling process in the cases. In short, these parameters focused on the 
following: the setting, the organizations, the events, the actors and the processes. 
These parameters would in turn influence the choice o f informants, the specific 
episodes and events studied and the kind o f interactions that would take place between 
key actors and groups o f  actors that would be o f interest to the researcher.
Sampling within cases has been described by Miles & Huberman (1994) as having a 
‘rolling’ quality which alludes to the researcher working in progressive waves as the 
study progresses. This sequential and investigative aspect o f analysing documents, 
observing meetings and interviewing a variety o f actors in the research setting, 
continually led the researcher to new samples o f informants, observation opportunities 
and documents. The researcher throughout the data collection period was constantly 
making sampling decisions to extend the area o f information, clarify trends and 
patterns that had emerged in the data, qualify existing data, identify discrepancies and 
contrasts in relation to the interview data and to provide more evidence about another
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theme that had emerged during her investigation (Green et al, 2005). The sampling 
information further consolidated the researcher’s view o f the local merger process, the 
contextual issues, the events that took place over time, the processes that were in place 
to support those activities and the actor and groups o f actors who both influenced and 
were involved orchestrating the merger.
The theoretical framework and the sampling strategy are intrinsically linked. The 
theoretical framework establishes some basic criteria which the researcher uses to 
provide structure for the kind o f information and data the researcher will collect. 
During this process, insights from one case generate constructs that serve as a basis 
for probing the merger process in the other case. It is the combination o f deduction 
and induction through time and sequential sampling and analysis that provides the 
basis for the researcher’s theoretical inferences.
The sampling strategy used in this study research is similar to what has been described 
in the literature as judgem ent sampling. Judgement sampling is where informants are 
identified in accordance with the interests o f the researcher because they will shed 
light on a particular aspect o f behaviour or activity under investigation (Hornby and 
Symon, 1994; Dawson, 2003). In this study the researcher searched for a specific 
group o f  relevant people who had inside knowledge about the merger, had access to 
information and had participated at the decision-making level. In ethnography studies 
opportunistic sampling is used whereby people are interviewed based on their 
availability and willingness to participate (Green et al, 2005). This approach would 
not have yielded the kind o f data required in this study on hospital merger process. 
The deliberate selection o f informants in this study was paramount and the on-going 
data collection process continued to drive informant selection over time. The major 
different between this approach and theoretical sampling is that theoretical sampling is 
about generating theory, whereby the researcher collects, analyzes and decides what 
data or information to collect in order to develop theory as it emerges (Hornby et al, 
1994; Pettigrew, 1995; Green et al, 2005). Judgement sampling is a broader concept 
and although theory may inform the strategy, it may also be informed by the 
researcher’s experience and practical knowledge.
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In theoretical sampling data is collected until a point o f saturation is reached, when no 
new constructs are emerging. In process analysis, all key participants who have been 
identified in leading the merger process are included in the sample. For example, all 
the key actors who were involved in the Seabum Workshop in the English case were 
interviewed. This method or approach to sampling is flexible enough to be applied 
both when the process can be tightly defined and for more loosely defined cases when 
the start and end points are less clear (Dawson, 2003; Homby et al, 1994).
3.7 The Use and Analysis of Multiple Sources of Data
The use o f  multiple sources o f evidence allows the investigator to address a range o f 
historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues. The major benefit o f  conducting 
research over time is that it utilizes a range o f different data collection methods which 
allows for the cross validation o f data. Therefore the findings or conclusion in the 
case study is more convincing and accurate when it is based upon several different 
sources o f  information (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Green et al, 2005). In this study 
the researcher included the use o f in-depth interviews, an analysis o f documentary and 
archival data, the collection o f observational meeting material and informal 
conversations.
Organisational documents can provide factual information which is useful in 
constructing a chronology o f key events, identifying key informants and directing the 
researcher to other relevant reports. In-depth interviews allowed the researcher to 
probe deeper to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions o f a problem and to 
secure vivid, accurate and inclusive accounts that were based on personal experience 
(Burgess, 1982). The final approach used by the researcher was direct observation 
and informal conversations which covered a range o f events in real time. All o f these 
methods were used to collect data. .
The Use o f  Documents
Archival documents were a useful source o f information because these factual records 
provided historical insight into the merger process. Many o f the documents were 
records o f communication between key actors in the field about events taking place 
during the merger. These carefully crafted viewpoints which were intended for either
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key actors or particular groups o f actors were a very rich source o f data. Access to 
confidential correspondence provided a useful record o f contentious issues, however it 
is particularly important to avoid taking such documents at face value and to make 
some allowances for the audience for whom they were originally intended and the 
possible motives the author might have had in saying what they said (Reay and 
Hinings, 2005). It is important to note that from the interviews, the researcher was 
able to gain an understanding o f the political and value-laden processes inherent in 
creating many o f these documents (Forster, 1994).
Documents made up a large proportion o f the data set. The researcher had access to 
board minutes and reports, business cases, organisational strategic plans, annual 
reports, trust applications, government reports, feasibility studies, consultation reports, 
collaboration agreements, newspaper articles and the merger agreements. A complete 
list o f  the documents used for the cases can be found in Appendix A and B. The 
documents collected from the hospitals were also an integral part o f tracking change 
in the hospitals’ systems and structures and mapping the integration and re-design o f 
services during the post merger phase (Ventresca and Mohr, 2002). Senior executives 
prepared many o f the documents and most o f these actors were interviewed during the 
same period so accuracy and their authorship could be validated.
Finding the relevant information was a lengthy, time consuming process. The 
researcher often sat at a desk for weeks reading through binders and file boxes o f 
documents. There was no one definitive source o f information about the merger 
process. The information was found in different files across departments and hospital 
sites.
All documents were given a reference number; indexed according to country, 
document date was specified, the merger stage was identified and the full title o f the 
document was recorded. All this information was entered into a database, which 
facilitated storage and retrieval. This data management system allowed the researcher 
to easily cross-reference any information on the database. The researcher had 




The initial task in document analysis is to search for themes within each document and 
then clusters o f documents. At this stage the focus o f attention was on meanings 
rather than analysis. Each document was reviewed carefully and the viewpoint o f the 
authors was cross referenced with other reports in that particular time period and 
around certain events. The researcher found that it was possible to cluster documents 
by authors or groups who shared the same viewpoints and interpretations o f particular 
issues and problems that emerged during the merger process. Although documents 
may stand as sources o f  data in their own right, it is important to remember that this 
kind o f data can only ever be fully understood within the broader organisational 
contexts and processes with reference to other forms o f data (Forster, 1994).
Each document was read in its entirety and categorized according to which merger 
phase or time period it was written. The next step in the process was to identify which 
actor or groups o f actors were responsible for this report and in what capacity did their 
viewpoint or actions impact certain events in the merger process. Documents were 
also clustered around certain key events. This analysis was particularly helpful in 
establishing how the merger process evolved, who were the key actors or groups and 
what role did they play in the merger. Documentary data was also used to develop a 
chronological record o f events and formal positions taken by different groups.
Statements and quotes were selected from documents, for the case study, that 
appeared to show how actors or groups responded to particular events in the merger 
process, how the merger consultation process developed over time and what 
organisational and service changes resulted from the merger.
Conducting Interviews
The purpose o f the qualitative interview is to access ‘accounts’ from a group o f 
informants about the merger process and to compare those ‘accounts’ against 
responses from other informants and other sources o f data (Green et al., 2005; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Pettigrew 1994). It is important to remember that each account 
is valid as it is their own story o f how the merger events unfolded. Pettigrew 
(1994:106) states that:
“the interview as a research tool probes beyond the “what o f change” and 
gets into the subtleties o f “why and how change happens.”
As an interviewer, it was important to distinguish between the informants’ descriptive 
evaluations o f the ways things ought to be, their perceptions o f the way things actually 
are and the way they feel others interpret their situation (Dawson, 2003). Clarifying 
the status o f various statements is often a central analytical task in making sense o f 
interview data. Discrepancies between the views o f different groups o f actors, 
especially during the merger consultation stage, weren’t seen as problematic but rather 
part o f the rich data that is accessible through processual research.
The informants were a representative population o f  chief executive officers, director 
level executives, board chairs, medical staff, nurse managers and medical school 
academics. These senior people were selected for interviews because they had access 
to specific information about the merger because o f their positions, were 
knowledgeable about a broad variety o f changes both within and outside their 
organizations, and were directly involved in the merger negotiations. The researcher 
made sure that people from all hospital sites and the various community groups 
involved in the merger were represented in the sample.
All o f the informants approached agreed to be interviewed. The sessions were tape 
recorded and later transcribed by the researcher. Each informant was assigned a 
random number and the transcriptions were anonymised. The content was analysed to 
identify themes and patterns across the data. The length o f each interview ranged 
from 1 to 2 hours. The informants often suggested other colleagues that should be 
interviewed. The interview format initially had a low degree o f structure and the 
questions were mostly open-ended and focused on specific situations and action 
sequences. But as the interviews progressed, the researcher imposed more structure so 
the information obtained was more consistent and easily compared across cases 
(Dawson, 2003; King, 1994 and McPhee, 1995).
In the Ontario case, a total o f 42 interviews were conducted across 12 organisations. 
O f the 42 sampled, 12 informants were interviewed in real time prior to the merger 
and 30 were interviewed after that period or retrospectively. In this particular sample
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group, 8 informants were interviewed twice, once during each o f the pre-merger and 
post merger phases. In the English case 37 informants were interviewed across 13 
organisations. All o f these interviews took place retrospectively. Therefore in total 
the researcher conducted 79 interviews across 24 different healthcare and related 
organizations in both cases. The interview sample list o f  organizations and 
interviewee roles for the English and Ontario cases can be found in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 
3.3, and 3.4. For continuity in data collection the same or similar role holders were 
sampled across the cases so comparisons might be drawn.
Interview Analysis
In the interview the researcher attempted to trace the events associated with the 
merger, to identify the roles o f key groups, to understand the logic behind the actions 
and to gauge the reactions o f the informants to these events. The researcher used the 
three or four most important issues within the merger process as themes in structuring 
the interview questions (Denis, Lamothe and Langley, 2001).
All o f the interviews were taped and fully transcribed. Before commencing analysis 
o f the transcripts, the researcher thoroughly read through all the transcripts more than 
once and listened to the tapes and took into account nuances o f speech, tone o f voice, 
hesitations and other such paralinguistic information (King, 1994). The data and the 
analysis focused around key events and specific activities; processes such as the 
sequence o f events and transitional turning points in the merger, and actor level 
dynamics which focused on interactions and power dynamics between key strategic 
actors and groups o f  actors.
The data and quotes taken from the interview transcripts were further analysed 
according to themes. This analytical process allowed the researcher to readily 
compare similar events, processes, descriptions and quotes across cases.
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Figure 3.1: English Case: Interview Sample by Organisation (N=12)
Royal Victoria Infirmary and Associated 
Hospitals NHS Trust
Newcastle General Hospital
Freeman Hospitals NHS Trust
Newcastle City Health Trust
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne
North East Regional Office
Newcastle Community Health Council
Newcastle and North Tyneside Health 
Authority
Northumberland Health Authority 
Sunderland Health Authority 
Tynedale Total GP Fundholding Group 
Saville Medical Group (GP Fundholders)
Figure 3.2: English Case: Interview Sample by Roles (N=37)
Board Chair
Directorate General Manager
Chief Executive (6) Head Architect for Planning and Re-development
Medical Director Project Nurse
Director of Finance Trade Union Representative
Director of Business Development Ward Sister
Director of Corporate Planning Head of Community Care
Director of Personnel Director Community Services
Director of Nursing (3) General Practitioner
General Manager GP Practice Manager (2)
Head of Capital Finance Business Planning Manager
Head of Performance Review Professor , Medical School (2)
Clinical Directors (3) 
Directorate Head of Nursing (2)
Professor, Dental School
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Figure 3.3: Ontario Case: Interview Sample by Organisation (N=12)
Hamilton Civic Hospitals 
Chedoke-McMaster Hospital 
St. Joseph’s Catholic Hospital 
St. Peter’s Hospital 
McMaster University
Hamilton-Wentworth District Health Council
Hamilton Health Science Corporation 
Victorian Order of Nurses 
Ontario Nursing Association 
Canadian Union of Public Employees 
Health Service Organisation 
Health Action Task Force
Figure 3.4: Ontario Case: Interview Sample by Roles (N=34)
Director of Transition Planning
Board Chair
Chief Executive Officer (7)
Executive Vice President & Chief Operating 
Officer
Executive Vice President, Corporate 
Development
Vice President, Research and Strategic Initiatives 
Vice President, Community Health 
Vice President, Regional Services 
Vice President, Program Support
Vice President, Speciality Services 
Chief of Medical Staff 
Chief of Professional Practice 






Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences (3)








The researcher was invited to attend board meetings, medical advisory committee 
meetings, middle management meetings, union meetings and community based 
meetings. This gave the researcher the opportunity to observe and record the 
behaviour o f a variety o f different groups o f actors both internal and external to the 
hospitals. Observation was an ideal way to see directly how people align themselves 
politically during the merger negotiations and how the different actors interacted 
during critical junctures in the merger process. This data would then be compared with 
the information obtained in interviews and from hospital documents. The researcher 
used the material from the field notes as supplementary sources o f data that was 
included in both the document and interview analysis.
Informal Conversations
Data was also collected through numerous informal conversations. While these 
conversations were not taped or transcribed, they yielded important information which 
was captured in the researcher’s field notes.
The next step in the analysis would entail the development o f a chronology which 
would provide a sequential analysis and mapping o f the merger process over time and 
then the final step would involve the presentation o f a detailed case study narrative 
and cross case comparison.
3.8 Developing a Case Chronology
The development o f the case chronology was a crucial step in mapping the key dates 
and events over the pre and post merger phases. Documents are often a good source 
o f data for dates, numbers, events and actor identification. The main purpose o f the 
chronology is to develop analytic themes. The researcher used four different 
categories or levels o f analysis; these were the national or regional level o f 
government; the municipal or local level o f government and finally the hospital or
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service level. The researcher wrote a detailed summary o f the chronology and also 
mapped the events in a matrix format using a technique called visual mapping 
(Langley, 1999 and Pettigrew, 1990).
Visual mapping is a useful method for organising incident data. It can be described as 
a graphic diagram or other visual representation that permits the compact presentation 
o f large quantities o f information. It is particularly useful for analysing process data 
because it allows the simultaneous display o f a large number o f dimensions and shows 
precedence, parallel processes and the passage o f time. This allowed the researcher to 
establish the temporal sequence o f events and begin to map out the different pathways 
o f change.
W hat are critical were not just the events but the underlying logics that gave the 
events meaning and significance. This kind o f information was obtained through 
interviews. The researcher was able to establish links between the levels o f activity 
and key groups o f  actors. The clusters o f  activity were often associated with 
coinciding political events at key times throughout the cases. W hat gradually 
emerged out o f the data analysis was the importance o f actors in effecting change and 
the way in which they use power to manipulate and direct change,
3.9 Case Narrative
The case narrative is a descriptive story that is meant to help identify complex patterns 
and themes relevant to the merger process and to look at the theoretical propositions 
identified by the theory. The central focus o f the narrative was to focus on underlying 
processes that give rise to certain events and to identify the actors whose actions tie 
these event together (Pentland, 1999).
Most activities were initiated by more than one actor and usually different groups o f 
actors. A key question that was addressed in the case was ‘who does what?’ 
Therefore, the data concerning the identities and relationships o f and between key 
actors and groups o f actors was important in determining their roles and actions in the
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process (Pentland, 1999 and Bourgoyne, 1994). The case narrative also focused on 
the power dynamics and politics as explanatory constructs.
The narratives for both the English and Ontario cases were written several times. 
When studying mergers, this change process lends itself to decomposing the 
chronological data from each case into successive discrete time periods or phases that 
become comparative units o f analysis. Phase transitions are created by events, which 
means that events cause and prescribe phases and can even serve as break points 
(Langley, 1999). When placing the data into these temporal categories, it is important 
to distinguish between clock time and event time. This method is called temporal 
bracketing and many process studies adopt this approach.
Data Displays
In the cases, the researcher has included numerous figures, flow charts and tables 
which support the narrative and provide a visual presentation o f complex processes. 
The researcher has provided detailed flow charts mapping the hospital configurations 
before and after the merger, the stakeholder groups involved in the consultation and 
restructuring process and the re-configuration and re-location o f clinical services 
across hospital sites. Organisational charts were also included to show the structural 
transition and re-organisation across the hospitals.
Cross Case Analysis
The purpose o f  the comparative case method is to search for cross case patterns, draw 
out the subtleties o f broad themes and theoretical developments across the cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Peterson, 1998; Dawson, 2003 and Leonard-Barton, 1995). A 
technique used by the researcher was clustering. This method was particularly useful 
when conducting cross case comparisons. Clustering is a tactic that can be applied to 
events, processes and actors (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In the cases, the researcher 
identified crucial institutional building events that represented key turning points in 
the merger; at the process level, the researcher clustered groups o f activities that took 
place during the pre-merger consultation phase and when focusing on key actors, the
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researcher analyzed the tactics used by actors to influence other actors. These are just 
a few examples how this technique was used across cases.
This comparative case approach improves the likelihood o f developing a more 
accurate, reliable study and also provides a platform for capturing novel findings that 
may exist in the data (Eisenhardt, 1989).
3.10 Internal Validity: Confirming the Findings
Different methodological approaches were used in this study for several reasons. One 
was to add depth and richness to the data and to improve understanding and the other 
was to increase confidence in the validity o f the findings. (Green et al.,2005; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; McNulty and Ferlie, 2004, Lawrence, M alhotra and Morris, 
2005) Throughout the field work and data analysis the researcher sought to assure 
high levels o f internal validity by ensuring that the data obtained and transcribed was 
accurate, that the views o f the informants were honestly portrayed in the case material, 
that the context rich case reflected the temporal sequence o f merger events and that 
the data presented was linked to the theoretical constructs (Miles and Huberman,
1994). Data was collected from multiple sources and the use o f triangulation provided 
important checks on internal validity. The researcher also sought data and case 
verification through informant feedback.
Triangulation
Triangulation is about using different strategies for collecting data to improve the 
accuracy o f that data. It is about providing another perspective on a particular 
phenomenon. The primary aim o f triangulation is to offset the particular weaknesses 
o f each m ethod used and to challenge the biases that come from only one perspective 
(Yin, 1994, Eisenhardt, 1995, Hartley, 1994; Green et al., 2005). In this study the 




In this study data is collected from a range o f informants across numerous 
organisations. Each informant had a unique role in the merger process and many were 
positioned in opposing strategic groups. Although they offered different 
interpretations and perspectives on the merger process, there was consistent agreement 
on the actual facts o f the merger events, activities, actors and outcomes.
Method Triangulation
M ultiple methods were used to collect data. The research analyzed archival materials 
and documents; conducted interviews, observed a range o f meetings and engaged in 
corridor conversations. This material was able to verify many o f the accounts 
provided by the informants in interviews.
Theoretical Triangulation
This is when more than one theoretical approach is used to analyze the case material. 
The original theoretical framework used in this study was archetype theory but as the 
study evolved and the focus began to move away from intraorganisational dynamics to 
the role o f external actors, it became evident that archetype theory could not address 
all the issues that were emerging from the data. This meant that the researcher would 
have to consider another theoretical framework that would complement archetype 
theory around the role o f actors, the use o f power and social skill to bring about 
change.
The introduction o f a second theory meant that the researcher now had options 
regarding data analysis and interpretation. Therefore it was less likely that the data 
would be forced to fit one theory (Green et al., 2005).
Respondent Validation
The most logical way to evaluate the outcomes o f your study is to take the findings 
back to the participants. Green et al (2005:193) has referred to this as the ultimate 
mark o f credibility when both the researcher’s and the insider’s point o f view 
coincide. This exercise is really about confirming your findings with the experts in
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the study. Stake (1976) has taken the view that case feedback is actually a quasi- 
ethical issue and that informants have the right to know what the researcher has found 
and from a confidentiality perspective informants may want to ensure that any reports 
are not going to damage their interests.
The researcher found this feedback structure, which was built into the study design, an 
opportunity to both share the results with a key confidant and a chance for the 
confidant to evaluate the accuracy o f the findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Green 
et al., 2005, Denis et al., 1999; McNulty and Ferlie, 2004). This verification process 
was conducted three times during the course o f the study. The first two were done 
with a neutral confidant, in the early and mid stage o f data collection, who was not 
designated as an informant for interview purposes. The final feedback session was 
held after the final analysis with a few key informants who were interested in the 
findings and were prepared to scrutinize and comment on the results. An executive 
summary was also sent to the Board as a professional courtesy, an opportunity to 
comment on the findings and as agreed under the access conditions.
Reliability
Reliability refers to the ‘repeatability’ o f the study which in qualitative terms refers to 
the likelihood that a comparable piece o f research would yield similar kind o f  results. 
In cross case studies, replication is an important part o f the basic data collection effort. 
In this study, the cases were matched (as closely as possible) and the study design, 
such as sampling, data collection methods, case analysis techniques and case study 
narratives were conducted in the same manner. The idea was that this new data would 
either bolster or qualify the original data collected and that emerging patterns from the 
English case would be replicated in the Ontario case (Yin, 1994)
Conceptual Generalisability
Generalisability refers to the extent to which findings from one study apply to a wider 
population or to different contexts. The findings in this research study are based on 
only two cases which were closely matched on a variety o f criteria. However we 
cannot know for certain that we would find these dynamics o f power and the role o f
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actors as influential in other sectors or in other time periods under the same 
circumstances. But nevertheless the researcher feels that the findings in this research 
study have produced insights and enhanced our understanding o f the merger process 
in public sector hospitals. It is important to note that the claims from this research 
have been carefully constructed and the findings have been supported not only with 
empirical data but with theoretical logic. Therefore the researcher feels that this study 
has met the criteria for conceptual generalisability (Yin, 1994; Dawson, 2003; 
Pettigrew, 1990; Langley, 1999; Green et al., 2005)
3.11 Summary
This chapter provides a detailed explanation o f the methodological approach in this 
research. The primary purpose o f this study was to conduct a longitudinal 
comparative case study on hospital mergers, using a processual approach to explain 
the interconnected and dynamic processes inherent in organisational change, through a 
detailed description o f the events, the activities, the processes and the role o f the 
actors and groups o f actors involved in the merger process.
The research strategy o f  this study is discussed in relation to case selection, hospital 
fieldwork, data collection (using multiple sources o f data) and case analysis. Due to 
the longitudinal nature o f this kind o f research on organisational change, it is 
necessary to have researcher commitment, management support, long-term access to 
the organisation and systematised data collection.
Cross case comparisons can reveal underlying root causes o f case difference and 
similarity. The comparative method can strengthen the precision and validity o f case 




THE COMPARABILITY OF THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to establish the broad comparability o f the British and 
Canadian health care systems. This is important because the focus o f the research 
study is to compare hospital mergers from each country. The aim is obviously not to 
show that the health care systems involved are in all respects exactly the same, such 
that any variations in the two cases cannot be attributed to differences in the contexts. 
On the other hand, it is important to establish that the health care systems, and other 
features o f the context, are broadly comparable. This is simply to give more 
plausibility to the argument presented here, that it was the processes involved in the 
mergers themselves that were the decisive points o f difference between the cases.
M ethodologically considered, case study research must include particulars o f the 
context o f featured cases (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995; Hartley, 1994). As Miles and 
Huberman (1994:102) state:
“to focus solely on individual behaviour without attending to contexts runs a 
serious risk of misunderstanding the meaning of events”
In this instance, the salient contexts for the cases are mainly the political and 
administrative arrangements for the provision o f health care in Ontario and England. 
Health care systems are provided within an administrative system in all economically 
advanced societies, so the relevance o f this consideration is obvious. The political 
context is relevant in at least two ways: firstly, in both countries there is a political as 
well as an administrative allocation process through which the funding for the health 
care system is routinely provided. Secondly, there was a quite similar political crisis 
which precipitated the perceived need for various kinds o f cost-savings in the health 
care system, including the need for hospital mergers. This political crisis occurred in 
very similar ways, for very similar reasons and at very similar times in both countries.
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For the reasons given, it is important that this chapter highlights the political context, 
the funding system, the government structures and the reform agendas o f both the 
English and Ontario healthcare systems. As discussed, the purpose o f this comparison 
is to show in what way these systems are broadly similar. Each healthcare system will 
be compared under the following headings:
1. healthcare system classification
2. funding systems
3. guiding principles and belief systems
4. system structure and government processes
5. healthcare reform: systems in crisis
4.2 Healthcare System Classification
The health care systems o f western developed countries in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) can be classified into three groups: 
the National Health Service or the Beveridge Model; the Social Insurance or Bismarck 
Model and the Private Insurance Model (Elola, 1996; Roemer, 1960; 
Contandriopoulos, 1993). These classifications are based on the predominant 
economic system and the entitlement to access to health care services. See Figure 4.1 
below.
Britain and Canada’s health care systems are both classified under the National Health 
Service (NHS) or Beveridge model. This model is characterised by universal 
coverage for residents, financing by national general taxes and some form o f national 
ownership/control o f service production (Auer et al. 1995; Murray, 2003). However, 
it should be noted that none o f these categories are mutually exclusive but are based 
on the predominant type o f health care system in each country. Different health care 
systems co-exist in most western developed countries. In those with an NHS there is 
usually a private health care subsystem (Elola, 1996).
In Canada, hospitals have public funding for their day-to-day operations but depend 
on private contributions for many o f their capital programs. Hospitals are non-profit 
corporations governed by independent board o f trustees, while the vast majority o f
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Figure 4.1 Classifications of Different Types of Health Care Financing and Delivery 
Systems Used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)
OECD HEALTH CARE CLASSIFICATIONS:
1. The National Health Service or Beveridge Model is characterised by 
universal coverage for residents, financing by national general taxes and 
some form of national ownership/control of the factors of production. 
Examples are the United Kingdom. Canada and Italy.
2. The Social Insurance or Bismarck Model is characterised by compulsory 
universal coverage within a social security framework, financing by 
employer and individual contributions through non-profit insurance funds 
and a combination of public and private ownership of the factors of 
production. Examples are Germany and France
3. The Private Insurance Model is characterised by individual or employer- 
based purchase of private health insurance coverage, financing through 
individual and/or employer contributions and ownership of the factors of 
production by the private sector. The United States is the best example of 
this category.
Source: Auer, L., Angus, D., Cloutier, J. E., and Comis, J. (1995): Cost-Effectiveness of 
Canadian Health Care. Research Report. Queen’s - University of Ottawa Economic Projects. 
Ottawa.
doctors are self-employed and reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis (Badgley, 1991; 
Crichton et al. 1984). In contrast, Britain has a well-established private sub-system of 
health care services. The private system in Britain is better established than it is in 
Canada. It is also better integrated into the publicly funded system. Many British 
doctors supplement their NHS incomes with privately funded medical work that is 
both encouraged and sanctioned by the government (Ham, 1993; Hargadon and Fry, 
1993). During the 90s, the Thatcher government openly supported the private health 
care sector as a way to take pressure o ff the bed and service crisis in the public health 
care system (Klein, 1995). But the existence o f private treatment beds also introduced 
dual standards into the NHS.
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As much as both Britain and Canada have a private funding component in their 
existing health care systems, it is this aspect o f a distinct two-tier system in Britain, 
which is fundamentally different from the Canadian system. The Canadian 
governments have taken the position that access should be governed by need 
regardless o f their ability to pay and that “two-tier” medicine is categorically 
unacceptable (Auer et al. 1995, Clarke, 1990). Almost all parties in the Canadian 
health care system have discouraged private health care in Canada.
In principle Britain espoused the same ideals regarding access to services, but if  you 
could afford to pay to see a consultant privately, care would no longer be determined 
according to need, only your ability to pay and as a private patient you could now 
jum p the queue for treatment. The private/public split o f services in Britain would 
cause continual conflict between governments, doctors, hospitals and patients (Klein,
1995).
Provision o f  Service
The benefits covered under the health care insurance plans vary from country to 
country (OECD, 1987; Murray, 2003). There is total coverage for hospital inpatients, 
physicians and diagnostic services under the NHS and Medicare. Coverage for other 
services, such as pharmaceuticals, eyeglasses, appliances, dental care and nursing 
homes, differ according to such criteria as incomes levels, employment status, region, 
age and whether there is cost sharing (Swartz, 1993; Auer et al. 1995; Powell, 1997).
4.3 Funding Systems
The health care systems o f Britain and Canada are both centrally controlled and 
publicly funded with most services being financed out o f general taxation. The major 
difference is that Canada’s health care system is characterised by single source 
financing and hospital funding is based on global budgeting using historical costs 
rather than pre-determined criteria (Auer et al, 1995; Badgley, 1991). The British 
Conservative government, under Mrs. Thatcher in 1979, was an enthusiastic supporter 
o f private health care and in the decade following there was an extensive expansion o f 
the private health care sector in Britain (Baggott, 1994). By the 1990s it was shown
103
that joint working arrangements had substantially increased between the public and 
private health care sectors. Leadbeater (1990) had reported that about half o f the 
health authorities had used the private acute sector to care for NHS patients; a fifth 
had been involved in the joint purchasing or leasing arrangement for medical 
equipment and another fifth had used private-sector screening services. This public- 
private mix o f health care provision in Britain will remain as long as it is encouraged 
by central government.
The flow o f money into the British health care system is much more complex than the 
resource allocation system in Canada. In Britain, financial allocations based on 
resident populations are made from the central government, Department o f Health via 
the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) to the District Health Authorities (DHAs) 
(Cook, 1998). The DHAs and GP fundholders, in the internal market, act as 
purchasers o f health care for their residents/patients. As purchasers, they are 
responsible for identifying the health care needs o f their respective population and 
then entering into service contracts with the appropriate provider institutions 
(Johnson, 1995; Mason and Morgan, 1995; Ham, 1993). The provider market might 
consist o f up to four different types o f provider institution competing for contracts 
with different purchasers (see Figure 4.2).
In Canada the financial flow comes from two main sources, the federal government 
and the provincial government. The main source o f financing is from various forms 
o f direct or indirect public taxation. Funding at the federal level is from general tax 
revenues and increasing deficit financing (borrowing), while provincial funding is 
based upon a combination o f general tax revenues, premiums (fixed monthly charge 
paid by persons enrolled in the provincial Medicare plan) and user fees (Dickinson, 
1988; Badgley, 1991; Narine et al. 1996). Doctors and hospitals charge user fees for 
certain services not covered by public insurance schemes. The provincial worker’s 
compensation boards, which are funded through employer contributions, cover 
employees injured at work. Also private insurers cover the costs for services not 
insured or paid for by government plans, mostly through employer’s sponsored plans. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates how these various forms o f financing relate to one another and to 
the health care system as a whole (National Forum o f Health, 1995).
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When comparing the financing for both healthcare systems, it is clear that the 
monopoly o f purchasing power by the Canadian government allows the provinces to 
exercise a great deal o f control over the organisation and delivery o f hospital services 
(Dickinson, 1994; Auer et al. 1995). Even thought the source o f monies in both cases 
is similar, the British funding process is more fragmented requiring purchasers to 
budget and allocate limited resources among numerous providers in the field.
The largest health care expenditure in both countries is on hospitals, physicians’ 
services and pharmaceuticals (OECD, 1987). Hospital and physician reimbursement 
mechanisms vary between Britain and Canada and have been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. In the British system, payment to hospitals includes the reimbursement o f 
physicians, while in Canada the hospital and physician (usually fee-for-service) 
payments are separate (Angus, 1987; Ham, 1993). Because hospitals represent the 
largest health care expenditure, much effort to control costs has targeted this sector. 
Pharmaceuticals are usually supplied free o f charge to patients in institutions and are 
considered part o f the hospital’s overall budget (Auer et al. 1995). But the main 
difference between Britain and Canada is that pharmaceutical coverage is part o f the 
NHS and patients are required to pay a nominal fee for prescriptions. In Canada drugs 
are not covered under Medicare unless the patient qualifies for social assistance.
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Figure 4.2: Financial Flows in the British National Health Services
/  Department 




















Source: Adapted from Harrison, S.,D. J. Hunter and C. Pollitt, The Dynamics o f  






































Figure 4.4 Patients' Share of Health Care Financing, by Major Sector, 
Selected OECD Countries
0  H o s p i ta ls  
■  A m b u la t o r y  C a r e  
0  P h a r m a c e u t ic a ls
/
/  /  /  /  /  /  /
Source: O ECD  (1991), OECD Health Data, O ECD , Paris
Figure 4.4 above shows the percentage o f patients’ share o f health care financing 
under the areas o f  hospitals, ambulatory care and pharmaceuticals o f selected OECD 
countries. The chart clearly shows that patients in Britain are expected to contribute 
the least to the cost o f their health care, while Canadians are expected to cover at least 
76 percent o f  the costs for pharmaceuticals.
This graphic representation shows just how much the NHS government has subsidised 
health care in Britain and how little the British population pays above the general level 
of taxation. But these data also paint a context that shows how any change and reform 
in the system, especially regarding health care costs, is likely to have a larger impact 
on the British public, who pay less than most other OECD countries.
The OECD has paid much attention to the share o f public funding because it appears 
to have some influence on the consumption o f health care services. (Refer to Figure 
4.5 below) In Canada, the public share o f health care funding increased from about 42 
percent in 1960 to 75 percent in 1980. Since then it has decreased to about 73 percent 
in the 1990s. This was close to the OCED average. In Britain, the public share o f 
health care funding has always been above 80 percent. In 1960 it was around 83 
percent and increased to a high o f about 88 percent in the 1980s and then fell to an all 
time low o f around 82 percent in the 1990s. Overall the public share o f total health
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Source: OCED (1993), OCED Health Systems: Facts and Trends, OCED, Paris
expenditures has been substantially higher in Britain than in Canada. The trend in 
both countries was to increase during the 1970s and 1980s and experience a slightly 






The spending performance o f a health care system is often measured in terms o f the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). In the early 1990s, healthcare expenditures 
as a proportion o f the GDP ranged between 7 and 9 percent. In Canada the GDP was 
over 9 percent while in Britain it was under 7 percent (Auer et al. 1995). In the period 
1970-80, which was m arked by the oil shock o f the early 1970s, the growth o f health 
care expenditures still exceeded that o f the GDP. In the 1980s, the average growth o f 
health care expenditures relative to GDP decreased. In Britain healthcare 
expenditures actually grew more slowly than the GDP while the only Beveridge-type
10 9
health care system whose expenditures grew far more than its GDP and the OECD 
average was Canada’s, which grew by 21 percent. Auer et al (1995:29) stated that the 
three main reasons for the increase in health care expenditures were:
“first, widespread general inflation caused prices to rise everywhere for all 
goods and services; secondly, the prices of health care services usually 
increased much faster than the prices of other goods and services and thirdly, 
the real volume of health care services provided had risen”
It is important to note that the amount o f money spent on healthcare may not 
necessarily be a good indicator o f the quality and cost-effectiveness o f health services 
(Baggott, 1994).
4.4 Guiding Principles and Belief Systems
The history o f health care legislation in both Britain and Canada are clear that health 
care is a right and it is the legal responsibility and social obligation o f the government 
to provide this service to the taxpayers. The National Health Service and the 
Canadian M edicare System support the principles o f providing a comprehensive 
health care service to all citizens, which was not based on the ability to pay at the 
point o f delivery (Fitzgerald and Dufour, 1997; Powell, 1996; Auer et al. 1995; 
Baggott, 1994). Canadian residents’ health coverage is portable to the extent that all 
services are covered regardless which province you reside or visit and certain services 
are also covered if  you are abroad. The NHS also offers similar coverage.
The major difference between the two systems is the role and pay structure o f the 
medical profession. In the NHS, doctors during the 1990s had complete autonomy in 
practising medicine and were free to treat private patients while still participating in 
the NHS scheme (Levitt et al., 1995; Allsop, 1984; Moore, 1995). In Canada ,doctors 
are not allowed to extra bill patients for services already covered under the Medicare 
scheme (Clarke, 1990). The medical profession is more regulated and controlled by 
the government in Canada than in Britain. (Northcott, 1994)
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4.5 System Structure and Government Processes
The British and Canadian health care systems are structured differently yet share 
many similar functions. The role o f the British central government is analogous to the 
role o f the Canadian federal government. The central/federal government does not 
provide any health services directly but takes responsibility for determining health 
care policy and allocating resources to the NHS authorities/provinces. In Britain, the 
central government plays a more active role in setting service priorities, advising the 
NHS authorities on health care programs and are more directly involved in setting and 
monitoring service targets and reviewing performance (Allsop, 1995; Ham, 1993). 
Even though the Canadian federal government plays an important part in setting 
national policy and providing revenue to support the Medicare system, it is the 
provincial governments that have the responsibility for the provisions o f health care in 
Canada (O ’Neill, 1996).
Basically, health care in Canada is not a national system but a network o f 12 quite 
similar yet distinct provincial healthcare programs. It was only with the Canada 
Health Act (1984) that the federal government staked out a position whereby it 
compelled the provinces to operate their health system according to a set o f rules 
reinforced by financial penalties (Crichton et al. 1984; Clarke, 1990). The rationale 
for federal involvement at this level was the desire to ensure a degree o f uniformity in 
access and provision o f health care across the country. This policy set by the federal 
government at no time attempted to force onto the provinces a “health system”; 
provinces were left full liberty in the manner in which health care was to be provided, 
this o f course has lead to some variation in coverage and structure across the country 
(O ’Neill, 1996). The federal government’s leadership role in the development o f 
Canada’s health care system came about through its use o f spending power. It would 
be this financial relationship between the federal and provincial governments that 
would take centre stage and shape health care reforms up to the present.
In view o f the above, the best way too make a comparison between Britain and 
Canada for the purposes o f this study would be to compare the NHS in England and 
the province o f Ontario health care system. Many o f the roles discussed in relation to
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the central government in Britain were similar to the role o f provinces in designing, 
monitoring and reviewing their health care programs.
The British government established Regional Health Authorities across England in 
1974; these bodies were accountable to the Secretary o f State for Health. Their role 
was essentially strategic. They were responsible for planning services within their 
boundaries, within the guidelines set by the Department o f Health. The RHAs 
allocated resources to purchasers o f healthcare and would monitor the work and 
performance o f lower-tier authorities such as the Family Health Service Authorities 
(FHSAs) and the District Health Authorities (DHAs) (Secretary o f State for Health, 
1993). When the government introduced the ‘internal market’, it was the RHAs that 
were responsible for managing the internal market and sorting out any disputes that 
might arise between the purchasers and providers o f health care (Baggott, 1994).
Britain introduced regionalisation before Canada. However, it is interesting to note 
that all the provinces except Ontario introduced regional structures for health services. 
Regionalisation as a concept in Canada was open to a broad scope o f interpretation 
and this was reflected in the variety o f approaches that have evolved in Canada during 
the past two decades (Church and Barker, 1998).
As the British government adapted to the introduction o f the internal market reforms, 
additional government agencies were developed at the regional level (regional 
outposts) and many felt that the RHAs represented an unnecessary tier o f bureaucracy 
and should be abolished (National Health Service Community Act; 1990; Secretary o f 
State for Health, 1993). Ontario had already decentralised planning activities with the 
gradual introduction o f District Health Councils (DHCs) in 1973. These voluntary 
bodies, with consumer, provider and local government representation, continue to 
serve as advisory bodies to the Ontario Ministry o f Health but had no budgetary 
authority. The DHC shares many o f the same functions as the RHAs in Britain. It’s 
role was mostly strategic and at the local level involved extensive planning and co­
ordination o f community services (Mhatre and Deber, 1992). The major difference 
between the RHAs and the DHCs was the fact that the DHCs did not have the 
authority to negotiate nor allocate funding to any o f the local healthcare providers.
112
This was a role that would remain firmly within the remit o f the provincial 
government.
Like the RHA in Britain, the DHC in Canada played an active role in overseeing the 
merger consultation process. Both government agencies found it difficult to mediate 
the process and even though they tried to remain neutral it was difficult to support the 
governments change agenda and satisfy the expectations o f the local community.
Primary Care Agenda
Primary care has been regarded as a relatively neglected area, with considerable scope 
for improvement. The government in both Britain and Canada began to take a more 
active interest in developing this field believing that primary care had the potential to 
reduce the demands and financial burden on the hospital service by providing 
alternative forms o f care (Baggott, 1994; Gillett, Hutchinson and Birch, 2001; 
Shapiro, 1998).
General practitioners (GPs) in both countries have been defined as being self- 
employed professionals. In Britain, GPs were given a relatively small capitation fee 
for each patient registered with their practice, while the GPs in Canada were paid on a 
fee-for-service basis (Secretary o f State for Health, 1989a; Navarro, 1991; Clarke, 
1990). Both were paid directly from the government. The major difference between 
the two systems lay in the remuneration o f physicians. In Britain, the primary care 
sector was relatively cheap (in relation to the acute care sector) and predictable for the 
government to fund and created no perverse incentives for unnecessary extra activity 
by the doctors (Shapiro, 1998). However in Canada, the remuneration system for 
physicians was a major cause for concern and was seen to contribute directly to the 
financial problems in the health care system. Many o f the physicians were seen to 
practice medicine according to their targeted incomes.
During the 1980s both countries began to take a closer look at primary care. The GP 
was now being regarded as the gatekeeper o f the health care system. This role had the 
potential to impact on costs by regulating access to other forms o f care, such as
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hospital services (Baggott, 1994; Shapiro, 1998; Gillett et al. 2001). Primary care 
reform became a priority for both governments.
The British solution was the introduction o f the internal market, which introduced GPs 
to fundholding, while the Canadian government introduced the Health Service 
Organisation (HSO) program (Ontario Ministry o f Health, 1989). As fundholders, the 
GPs would retain their ‘independent contractor’ status, but would have stricter terms 
and conditions o f service laid down and funding would now be cash limited (Shapiro, 
1998); while under the HSO program, a key goal was to move away from the fee-for- 
service as a method o f payment for physicians and to introduce a capitation funding 
approach (Gillett et al. 2001; Suschnigg, 2001). This was seen as an alternative to the 
conventional fee-for -service family practice.
Primary care reform would now play an important role in the development o f new 
models o f co-operation and collaboration in health service delivery. These models 
would promote health maintenance, illness prevention and encourage the use o f 
ambulatory care and community services as alternatives to institutional care. To 
support this new agenda, the governments (in both Britain and Canada) needed to 
invest more money into developing the primary care sector. This meant shifting 
money from the acute sector. It was these fiscal policies on cost containment and the 
re-investment in primary care that initiated the hospital merger activity in both 
countries in the 1990s.
4.6 Healthcare Reform: Systems in Crisis
The cost o f health care had risen rapidly during the 1990s and politicians in both 
countries were concerned about containing these costs. By 1992-93 health care 
expenditure was consuming 33 percent o f the overall provincial budget and 14.9 
percent o f the British budget (O ’Neill, 1996; Levitt et al. 1995; Powell, 1997). The 
hospital sector o f both countries accounted for the largest proportion o f the health care 
budget. Hospital spending in relation to the overall budget had reached 51 percent in 
the UK and 52 percent in Canada (O’Neill, 1996; Harrison et al. 1990; Powell, 1997) 
(see Figures 4.6 and 4.7). Therefore it became clear that system reform and the
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expansion o f primary/community care would be initiated but at the expense o f the 
acute sector (Church and Barker, 1998; Wolfe, 1991; Fitzgerald and Dufour, 1997).
Precipitating Factors
By the early 1990s, both the British and Canadian governments had reached a crisis 
point with more and more people believing that the present healthcare system was no 
longer affordable. Because o f funding capitation, the NHS was closing beds, 
cancelling operations, waiting lists were increasing and there were allegations that the 
service was under funded (Mohan, 1995; Ham, 1993). At the same time the Canadian 
government had accumulated a massive federal deficit o f  $30 billion by 1991 and was 
in the process o f reducing their transfer payments to the provinces.
This decision by the federal government put considerable stress on the provincial 
budgets at a time when healthcare costs were rising (Burke and Stevenson, 1993; 
Ontario Hospital Association, 1998) These economic conditions had now put the 
Ontario government under extreme financial pressure to find a solution to cost 
containment.
The governments o f both countries believed that many o f the problems that plagued 
the healthcare system were a direct result o f poor management practices, inefficiencies 
in service delivery and organisational problems in the hospitals (Allsop, 1995; Mhatre 
and Deber, 1992). As a result, both governments acknowledged that action had to be 
taken to find solutions or new ways o f offering the same range o f services in a more 
affordable m anner (Lancet Editorial, 1995).
Restructuring Solution
The British government’s solution was to introduce the internal market reforms which 
signified a shift from the command and control economy to a managed market within 
the service (Harrison et al. 1990; Harrison, 1991; Loveridge and Starkey, 1992; 
Mohan, 1995). However, these changes weren’t enough to address the government’s 
on-going budget cuts and it’s next decision was to impose hospital restructuring sector 
wide.
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Meanwhile the Ontario M inistry o f Health in December 1995 announced that the 
healthcare budget would be slashed by approximately $1.3 billion and the 
government’s solution came in the form o f Bill 26, the Savings and Restructuring Act 
o f 1996. This Restructuring Act gave birth to the Health Services Restructuring 
Commission whose mandate was to evaluate the Ontario healthcare delivery system 
and to bring about what ever system changes were required at both the local 
community level and hospital sector to make the system more efficient and overall 
accountable (Health Services Restructuring Commission, 1996). The Commission, for 
the next four years, would be visiting and evaluating every healthcare community 
across the province and conducting reviews based on studies carried out by the District 
Health Councils. This was the beginning o f hospital restructuring, mergers, closures, 
conversion o f hospitals to community health centres and the building o f a new 
integrated healthcare system in Ontario (Lancet Editorial, 1995).
Both o f the government’s in each case were unable to sustain and continue to finance 
their present healthcare systems. Therefore in response to this crisis, each decided to 
bring about legislative reform which in the British case resulted in an unprecedented 
pace o f change and in the Canadian case the reforms fundamentally gave the 
government unparalleled power to instigate any changes they wished to make. In each 
case the same problems were identified and both governments in order to contain costs 
decided on a restructuring regime o f hospital mergers and closures during the 1990s.
4.7 Conclusion
It is a unique aspect o f this study that each case o f  public sector hospital restructuring, 
is based in a different country yet the contexts o f both cases are very similar. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1991) has classified both 
these healthcare systems as Beveridge models. The Beveridge classification is based 
upon a distinctive type o f delivery system and the funding structure. It is fair to say 
that both the British National Health Service and the Canadian Medicare System 
espouse and support the same values and beliefs about the kind o f health service that 
is available to all residents in each country. Health care is free at point o f delivery, 
and it is the responsibility o f the government to provide a comprehensive service to all 
residents. The funding systems are both government controlled, publicly funded and
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financed out o f general taxation. A key point to note is that, translated into the terms 
o f Fligstein’s institutionalism, the state is a very powerful actor, the most powerful 
actor, in both cases. Indeed, by virtue o f its power to define the rules and boundaries 
in the health care field, the state can alter the environment more profoundly and 
systematically than any other organisation (Fligstein, 1990)
The structure o f the healthcare system and the government bodies at the regional and 
provincial level in each country are different. . The central/federal governments, in 
England and Ontario respectively, have decentralised planning and the allocation o f 
resources to the next level o f government. Ontario is not regionalised like the other 
provinces and as a result the allocation o f resources has remained firmly under the 
control o f the provincial government. Whereas in Britain, the RHAs have been 
delegated more fiscal responsibilities at the local level. Healthcare planning is a role 
that has been delegated to the District Health Councils in Ontario but as an 
organisation staffed mostly by volunteers there is no real power attached or available 
to this local level organisation.
One strategic planning priority shared by both countries was the move toward 
developing, improving and expanding primary care services. This new role for 
primary care was seen partly as the panacea for reducing the financial burden o f the 
hospital sector.
The healthcare crisis o f the 1990s affected both countries and the precipitating events, 
the emerging problems and the restructuring solutions were remarkably similar. In 
both places it was decided that the steeply rising costs o f healthcare had to be 
contained. The governments in both England and Ontario decided to take direct 
action. The governments’ solution was to introduce legislative reform policies that 
would have a major impact on health delivery systems. These reforms represented a 
major ideological shift which had an obvious impact on the health care system. They 
also had an effect in shaping what we shall conceptualise at a later stage as the 
organisational field o f health care in the two counties. The internal market reforms in 
England changed the roles and relationships between government and other 
organisations in the healthcare field and the creation o f the Health Services 
Restructuring Commission in Ontario are examples o f the government’s concern
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exercising unprecedented power to make system wide changes. Both reform agendas 




THE ENGLISH HOSPITAL CASE STUDY: THE MERGER OF ACUTE
HOSPITALS IN NEWCASTLE
5.1 Introduction
This case study research seeks to provide an understanding o f how changes occurred 
in public sector acute hospitals in Newcastle upon Tyne in the early 1990s, in the 
wake o f the governm ent’s introduction o f radical reforms o f the NHS. A case 
narrative methodology was chosen for the reasons stated in the M ethodology (see 
Chapter 3). In analysing the processes o f change that were observed, the study draws 
on Greenwood and Hinings’ concepts o f archetypes and tracks o f change together 
with Neil Fligstein’s synthesis o f conceptual insights into organisational fields, power 
and social skill.
The concept o f archetype is used to define the nature and scale o f change in the 
hospitals under review, i.e. whether change is consistent or not with a move between 
one coherent pattern o f organisation and a new one, and whether change can best be 
described as incremental or quantum movement. Organisational transformation may 
be analysed not only at the level o f a single hospital organisation, but also at the level 
o f the organisational field (Ferlie, 1999): in this case the Newcastle health care sector. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) recognise that it is at the organisational field level 
where we can both identify the normative contextual pressures that maintain stability 
and locate the dynamics o f change. However, in considering both precipitating and 
enabling factors o f change, archetype theory’s main focus is on interactions between 
actors within an organisation. Given the interdependency and interaction o f the 
organisations and actors in the field under study, Fligstein’s ideas o f fields, power and 
social skill are integrated into the researcher’s theoretical framework for analysing the 
dynamics o f change because his ideas focus on interaction within the field and not just 
within an organisation.
It will be argued that external forces, located in the organisational field, precipitated
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change in the hospitals under study. The reforms passed into law by the NHS and 
Community Care Act 1990 were designed radically to challenge the NHS and pressure 
both the administrative structure and the hospitals to move from a bureaucratic 
hierarchy, comprising district and regional health authorities and ultimately the 
Secretary o f State for Health, to an internal market in which ‘purchasers’ (health 
authorities and some family doctors) were given budgets to buy health care from 
‘providers’ (acute hospitals, organisations providing care for the mentally ill, people 
with learning disabilities and the elderly, and ambulance services). To become a 
provider in the internal market, health organisations needed to become NHS Trusts: 
independent organisations with their own managements, competing with each other in 
a health quasi market. Hospitals would need to find and adopt a new pattern o f 
organisation that was suitable for the new context, and they would strive to do this 
within the new form o f trust hospitals. The 1990 Act, in fact, created both a new 
market context and the general pattern for a new structural form o f hospital. 
However, there was no guarantee that any particular hospital would actually achieve a 
new coherent pattern o f organisation and it will be shown that, as to what actually 
emerged, much depended on the pattern o f interactions at the local level that followed 
these nation-wide policy changes. In this instance, as will be shown, a change to a 
new coherent archetype does not, in the end, transpire. The reasons for this have more 
to do with the way the reform process was implemented at the local field level than 
with the imposed nature o f the reforms as such, as similar policy reforms were 
imposed in both England and Ontario, with very different results.
The study begins in 1990, when the first applications were made by Newcastle 
hospitals for trust status. The end marker for the case is June 1994, when, only two 
months into the merger, the decision was made by the newly merged hospital to look 
to the PFI scheme for funding.
5.2 Introducing the Actors: the Organisational Field
The concept o f organisational field is important to understanding what happened in 
the cases. Change was politically induced, and implemented by government agencies 
through the administrative structure embodied in the field. The field in which the
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three hospitals operated consisted o f numerous interdependent actors. The 
government, through the agency o f the RHA and the DHA was (both before and after 
the 1990 reforms) ultimately responsible for funding all medically necessary hospital 
services. The University o f Newcastle upon Tyne Medical School (“the University”) 
was involved in medical teaching activities with all three hospitals. Doctors and other 
health professionals interacted informally among themselves and with hospital 
administrators, the University, and social service agencies in order to provide 
appropriate services for patients, including specialised treatment. The local 
Community Health Council (“CRC”) interacted with the hospitals and other NHS 
health organisations, government agencies and the public in its role as an independent 
consumer council set up by the government to monitor and review the NHS and to 
recommend improvements. These key actors in the field would interact with each 
other continuously (sometimes in antagonistic ways) and use their varying degrees o f 
power to pursue their own interests (Fligstein, 1990). The configuration o f hospitals in 
Newcastle at the outset o f the case is shown in Figure 5.1.
In statements made by the various individuals interviewed during this research and 
also in the case documents obtained, the term ‘stakeholder’ is used simply to denote a 
person or organisation (individual actor), or a group o f persons or organisations 
(group or collective actor), having an active interest in the workings o f the health 
sector. It is not intended to be interpreted in a theoretical analytical manner, as in 
stakeholder analysis (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Jones and Wicks, 1999). This is also the 
researcher’s personal experience, having worked for many years in the health care 
sector in both the UK and Ontario. Accordingly, when used in this Chapter and the 
following Chapters, the term ‘stakeholder’ simply means ‘actor’ and carries no 
connotation o f stakeholder analysis, which is not used in this research. However, 
where the context permits, government agencies are referred to by their specific 
names (for example, the RHA).
5.3 Initial Archetypes
Before the introduction o f the 1990 reforms, the interpretive scheme underpinning the 


























































elements. First that treatment should be given, free at the point of delivery, in a stable 
environment. Second, although hospitals were administered by the state through a 
bureaucratic hierarchy comprising district and regional health authorities (DHAs and 
RHAs) and ultimately the Secretary o f State for Health, powerful professionals 
practised with a high degree o f autonomy, reinforced through the process o f peer 
review and the professional management o f clinical practices. Third, a widespread 
anticipation within hospitals o f annual funding increases. This set o f structures, 
systems and interpretive scheme was labelled the “directly managed hospital 
archetype” (Kitchener and Whipp, 1997). This old NHS template has been presented 
as highly homogenous, evident across populations o f organisations (Kitchener, 1998).
At the outset o f the change process investigated in the case under study, two o f the 
three acute hospitals in Newcastle had only very recently achieved Trust status and the 
third was actively pursuing an application for Trust status. Trust status o f course 
entailed the compulsory introduction a Trust Board structure conforming to the 
relevant legislative requirements. However, as suggested above, that alone would not 
guarantee that a hospital would find and adopt a new pattern o f organisation that was 
suitable for the new context. Various factors both internal and external to the hospital 
would come into play, such as the continuing role o f higher tiers in shaping the quasi­
market (resulting in ‘managed’ competition), the response o f medical professionals to 
the perceived threat to their professional dominance (Ferlie, 1999) and the effects o f 
the quasi-market on local inter-organisational relations (Mays et al., 2000) and any 
other empirically discovered local variables (Dent et al., 2004).
Kitchener (1998) suggested that a new ideal ‘quasi m arket’ archetype emerged over a 
relatively short time scale following the 1990 reforms. However, this is questionable. 
K itchener’s suggestion has been described as ‘bullish’ by Ferlie (1999:12). Exworthy 
et al. (1999) argue that a market ideal type is a poor representation o f the NHS 
because it fails to recognise the ‘political and organisational complexities o f the N H S’ 
(1999:17). More recently, Mueller et al. (2003) suggest that a ‘Trust Hospital (TH) 
archetype’ replaced the Directly Managed Hospital (DMH) archetype following the 
introduction o f  NHS Trusts. It is based on principles such as managerial authority 
(instead o f professional autonomy); self-sufficiency through financial discipline
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(instead o f lobbying political bodies); internal (rather than external) management o f 
the asset base; ‘realistic’ contract prices (rather than cross subsidy between services); 
and staff recruitment requiring business (rather than professional) justification 
(Kitchener 1998, 1999; Kitchener and Whipp, 1997).
Since, at the outset o f the case, two o f the Newcastle hospitals had only just become 
trusts and the third was still in the process o f applying for Trust status, the initial 
archetype-in-use in the present case is best identified as the Directly Managed 
Hospital as the hospitals had not yet, at that stage, actually undergone any 
transformatory ‘change’ to a new template but were, rather, in a nascent state o f 
‘changing’ (Weick and Quinn, 1999:382). The direction o f such changing was not 
predetermined (Loughlin, 1991) but subject to empirical investigation in the case.
As in the Ontario case study, the hospital merger was part o f a restructuring o f local 
public sector health care services the aim o f which was to produce an integrated local 
health care system that would accommodate changing trends in health care 
requirements and operate effectively within given financial constraints. In each case 
the hospitals would have a degree o f managerial and financial autonomy (in the 
English case this assumed Trust status). Within this overall context, there would 
clearly be very considerable scope, in each case, for differing conceptions among the 
various groups o f actors as to what the hospitals should be doing, how they should be 
doing it and how they should be judged (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988).
5.4 Institutional Upheaval: Early Tracks of Change
In 1990-91 the three acute hospitals in Newcastle embarked on similar tracks o f
change when they each applied for Trust status. Thus, there is evidence o f a
reformative commitment across all three acute hospitals in Newcastle which would 
interact with the market and institutional reforms o f 1990 to create pressure for radical 
change in the local hospital field (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996:1037). The Freeman 
and NGH applied in 1990; the Freeman was successful but the NGH was not. The 
RVI applied in 1991 and was successful, becoming a Trust on 1 April 1992. Thus the
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hospitals’ tracks o f change took different directions with the outcome o f their Trust 
applications. NGH would subsequently go on to prepare a second application in April 
1993 in the fourth wave, but as we shall see the setback suffered by NGH at this stage 
altered the power balance in the field.
In 1992 all three hospitals were not only facing the general market pressures o f the 
1990 reforms but were also struggling with local financial constraints. A capitation 
shift in funding resulting in a loss o f more than £12m would severely impact on the 
purchasing power o f the DHA, and further substantial cuts in its funding were 
expected. The three-hospital configuration was becoming increasingly unaffordable 
[177]. There would need to be a new, affordable institutional arrangement for the 
future provision o f acute hospital services in Newcastle.
5.5 Strategic Alliances
There was evidence that in striving for a new, stable institutional configuration o f 
acute hospitals in Newcastle, the RHA favoured the Trust hospitals and employed a 
combination o f two o f the methods in which stable institutions can be built: by 
enforcing order and privileging its most favoured groups and by forming a political 
coalition with those groups to bargain an outcome that would provide rules for those 
groups (Fligstein, 2001: 108).
It is relevant to the analysis that at this time the RVI and the University were heavily 
committed to each other financially. The RHA was in the process o f financing the 
construction o f  a new medical block for the University on the RVI site at a cost o f 
£3 5m. The University managed many government-funded research programmes. The 
Dental School was also located on the RVI site and had recently received substantial 
government funding for its brand new state-of-the-art laboratories.
By September 1992 private discussions were underway between the RHA, the RVI 
and the Freeman about a possible move to a two-hospital configuration in the city. 
The RHA asked the CEOs o f the RVI and the Freeman Hospital to prepare a briefing 
paper outlining their views on the restructuring o f hospital services in Newcastle [135c, 
177]. Minutes o f the discussions record:
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“Purchasers have asked the RVI and Freeman Chief Executives for a preview 
of the proposals; early indications are of a favourable response”. [133]
NGH was not aware o f these discussions. The political alliance underpinning these 
discussions altered further the power balance in the hospital field and signalled the 
beginning o f the local reorganisation o f acute hospital services in Newcastle. It also 
marks a further movement along the Trust hospitals’ tracks o f change as they sought 
to define their own roles in the now changing organisation o f health care in 
Newcastle.
The briefing paper prepared by the CEOs o f the RVI and Freeman (known as the 
‘Larry’ document - so called by combining parts o f the names o f its authors) was 
submitted to the RHA in October 1992. It recommended that the RVI should be the 
focus for medical education underpinned by a full range o f general acute services and 
complemented by a number o f specialist interests. The Freeman should be established 
as a regional tertiary care centre concentrating on highly specialised services 
complemented by a core o f general acute services, while NGH should become a 
community based hospital with an emphasis on day care and primary care support 
complemented by specialist outreach and diagnostic facilities which would remain on 
site. This proposed reconfiguration was based on a two-hospital solution for the 
future service provision o f general medicine and general surgery, and only just 
stopped short o f closing the NGH site altogether. N G H ’s role would be totally re­
defined, while the RVI and Freeman would maintain their present services and inherit 
the NGH acute services [177].
In November 1992 NGH notified the RHA o f its intention to apply for Trust status, 
whereupon the RHA promptly sent a fax to the RVI to informing the RVI o f N G H ’s 
intention. If NGH were to secure Trust status it would be extremely difficult to 
implement the proposed two-hospital model. The next day, the ‘Larry’ document was 
leaked to the press [3c, 3d, 3e]. The RVI and the Freeman issued a press release stating 
that they regretted the leaking o f this draft report, which they claimed was prepared 
primarily to stimulate debate about the future o f health care services in Newcastle 
[138].
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5.6 Conflict and Political Dynamics
The Newcastle Evening Chronicle [3c, 3d] reported the information leak with headlines 
that read:
“Secret Report Reveals Shock Take-over Plan by RVI and Freeman” “General 
Under Threat: Respected Teaching Hospital - 150 years of Caring”.
The newspaper’s main criticism was that the future o f the region’s biggest hospital 
should not be decided by its two rival Trusts. NGH consultants were quoted in the 
newspaper, one stating:
“it is ridiculous to asset strip NGH to pay for more expensive medicine at the 
Freeman and the RVI. These two hospitals should bear the brunt of cuts, not 
NGH, which provides the right clinical mix with the least cost.” (Wilsdon, J.
B., 1992)
The CEO o f NGH in an interview with the leading journal for the health sector 
accused the Trusts o f seeking to:
‘take over’ local services, deplete provision in Newcastle’s underprivileged 
West End and fix the market.” (Health Services Journal, December 1992)
The M ember o f Parliament for Newcastle Central highlighted how the RHA and DHA 
stood back and allowed the power-crazy Trusts to fight it out (see press release 
‘Newcastle Hospitals Civil War Breaks Out’ - Evening Chronicle, 26th November 
1992). This accusation goes even further in a letter to the RHA from the same MP, 
which states:
“the two Trusts (RVI and the Freeman) have made their own plans. 
Essentially to strip NGH of all its acute treatment functions. But their 
proposals go much further. Nor do they disguise their object, which is to 
transfer the capitation gains of those areas by organisational force, and not 
market force, to their own operations. This is a most serious and well planned 
attempt to construct a cartel.” [138]
Similarly, one senior Trust executive said when interviewed for this study:
“It was quite simple: there were too many hospitals in Newcastle and not 
enough money. So the two biggest got together and decided to basically crush 
and eliminate the smallest.”
A senior NGH executive interviewed said:
127
“We had no idea about the depth of the conspiracy unfolding behind closed 
doors”.
These statements with references to “take over”, “asset strip”, “fix the market” “civil 
war”, “organisational force”, “crush and eliminate” and “conspiracy” reflect the 
conflict that characterised the change process that was now evolving. The statements 
also highlight the politics involved in the process. The RVI and Freeman are 
portrayed as the sole conspirators and the RHA and DHA as passive bystanders, 
indicating that attention had been successfully diverted away from the behind-the- 
scenes manoeuvring o f the RHA. The Freeman is perceived as one o f the two 
“biggest” hospitals even though it was well known to be the smallest [118]; this 
reflects an assessment based on the perceived political power o f the Freeman rather 
than its size. As one NGH consultant observed when interviewed:
“It’s all about politics and turf protection. Everyone knew the General was 
larger than the Freeman, had more in-patient and outpatient services and 
regional recognition of its speciality services. Plus its overheads and unit costs 
were less than at the Freeman and the RVI.”
5.7 Social Skill
It is clear from the data that the RHA had already decided that NGH should no longer 
continue as an acute hospital and was adopting a highly political approach to bringing 
about this change. As a key actor, the RHA had many constituencies to balance o ff 
and was aware o f the need to produce arrangements to induce co-operation with allies 
and opponents alike (Fligstein, 2001:111). Outright closure o f NGH by the RHA 
(through the DHA) would have been politically unacceptable, and simply leaving the 
fate o f NGH to be determined by the internal market would still have left the 
government and its agencies open to political flack. As Enthoven observed:
“The internal market neither had nor created any “political space” within 
which markets could work to reorganise services. The public continued to hold 
government responsible for any changes in the configuration of hospital 
services, so government’s interest in the details of hospital services remained 
high. It has always been.. ..important for the NHS to avoid doing anything that 
might upset voters, or even to talk about doing any such thing. As Charles 
Shultze explains it, the government cannot be seen as inflicting direct harm on 
anybody, such as by cutting back on the services of a local hospital. So 
changes that involve curtailing some services to transfer resources to more 
productive uses happen only with considerable difficulty. Every proposed 
change is immediately a political issue. Private market forces, on the other
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hand, are impersonal and do not provide a visible political target for the 
opponents of change.” (Enthoven, 2000:106-107)
The data show that, instead, the RHA chose to use its power at this stage o f the change 
process in a more strategic way. Here, in the behind-the-scenes alliance with the Trust 
hospitals leading to the covert preparation and deliberate leak o f the “Larry” 
document, we see the use by the RHA o f a ploy used by strategic actors to get others 
to co-operate without appearing Machiavellian: getting others to believe that others 
are in control; an example o f “social skill” (Fligstein, 2001:115).
Demonstrating a continuous reformative value commitment, NGH continued 
nevertheless with its plan to apply for Trust status and responded to the Larry 
document in a detailed report proposing that some peripheral hospitals should close 
and that the three acute providers should be able to continue and build upon their 
existing strengths at a relatively low capital cost [4]. It appears that the RHA and 
DHA ignored this report. NGH is thus seen as proceeding on a track o f change that is 
already beset by conflict and incoherence.
We have seen how the RHA set the dynamics o f field-level change in motion. In the 
next section we examine the way in which the government through the RHA used its 
position as the most powerful actor in the field to control the direction o f that change.
5.8 Setting the Agenda: The Acute Services Review
The RHA had decided by this stage that the present system o f health care services 
could not continue in Newcastle, but acknowledged that it would be impossible to 
achieve consensus among the key stakeholders [141]. The next step taken by the RHA 
would have a fundamental impact on the restructuring o f the hospital field in 
Newcastle and in particular on the tracks o f change within each o f the three acute 
hospitals.
In January 1993 the RHA launched a review headed by the DHA and (although 
formally called the ‘Newcastle Strategic Review’) commonly referred to as the ‘Acute 
Services Review’ or “ASR”. The membership o f the ASR Group reflected the 
purchaser-provider split introduced by the 1990 reforms: seven DHAs, the RHA, the
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three acute hospitals, Newcastle Mental Health Trust, UnityNE Health Trust, and the 
University [141]. NHS Estates and the York Health Economics Consortium provided 
research and consultancy services [107,117].
The Review would consist o f a three-stage process. First, the writing o f a Joint 
Purchasing Strategy to apply across the DHAs. Second, discussion and identification 
o f possible configuration options for the acute hospitals [182]. The third stage would 
prove to be the most critical part o f the Review. This would involve a participative 
workshop for all o f the key stakeholders to assess hospital service options against the 
criteria identified in the Joint Purchasing Strategy and to reach a clear consensual 
view o f a preferred strategic option [96]. There would also be structured discussions 
with all the GP practices in Newcastle, the hospital consultants, other Tyneside acute 
providers, the University and the Newcastle CHC.
In the four months leading up to the workshop the seven DHAs developed a Joint 
Purchasing Strategy that provided criteria by which the workshop group would be able 
to judge the options put forward for service re-configuration [102, 182]. The UK 
government’s introduction o f competitive commissioning meant that the Newcastle 
DHA would no longer be the main purchaser o f health care services in Newcastle and 
that purchasers in the surrounding districts would begin to have more influence on the 
services provided by acute Trusts [96]. Therefore the emphasis on spending would 
now be more about core services than about estate maintenance for the acute provider, 
so that acute providers might have to consider locating acute services onto an estate 
which would require less maintenance and be sustainable on a smaller annual income. 
This change would play into the hands o f the RVI and the Freeman. The NGH site 
would require extensive re-development and had a growing backlog o f maintenance 
problems, while the RVI, already in receipt o f a large amount o f government 
investment capital, was undergoing extensive re-development and the much newer 
Freeman was located on a large plot o f land which had potential for future expansion 
[107].
In launching the Acute Services Review and formulating the Joint Purchasing Strategy 
as the basis for discussion, the government through its RHA and DHAs is seen to be
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using another tactic used by skilled actors: agenda setting. According to Fligstein 
(2001:114):
“Agenda setting is usually attained by behind the scene action to convince 
multiple actors and groups that a particular agenda is in their interests. When 
the groups meet, the agenda is set, the terms of discussion are set, and the 
identity and interests of actors are framed. This requires actors to come to 
understand their interests within certain bounds and closes off some courses of 
action”
5.9 Stakeholders’ Values and Interests Articulated
Several key stakeholder groups were asked to submit reports to the Review Group (the 
stakeholder groups involved in the Review process are shown in Figure 5.2). Each 
group was asked to provide a list o f criteria it considered would be essential in order 
to develop an efficient service, meet the clinical needs and provide quality patient care 
to the population o f Newcastle. This would prompt the stakeholders to articulate 
elements o f interpretive schemes as purposive values and interests that could 
potentially lie behind the strategic implementation o f a new structural framework for 
local hospital services. In fact, as illustrated by the submissions outlined below, most 
o f  the stakeholder groups raised concerns about the negative impact they believed 
certain options would have upon the Newcastle area [75, 78, 80, 82,83,84, 86,87,115].
General Practitioners
The GP group was concerned about bed availability, improved communication 
between the hospitals and primary care, reduction in waiting times for consultants 
appointments and the need for additional resources prior to any service changes in the 
acute sector [111]. The following views were expressed by GP fundholding practice 
managers interviewed:
“It’s all very well to put primary care development as a priority but it’s still 
important to have the support and access to acute care.”
“If the government expects primary care to offer more services it had better be 
prepared to invest more money and recruit more health professionals”
“NGH was an integral part of local life. It was easily accessible and receptive 








































The Consultant group took the view that potential changes in clinical practice would 
put pressure on relevant specialities and this would influence the need for different 
hospital facilities such as day case facilities. It was not the intention o f their report to 
recommend service re-configurations but the consultants believed that once an option 
was adopted, the interrelationship between specialities was essential. A key concern 
was summarised by one o f the key medical staff as follows:
“Service reconfiguration is just the tip of the iceberg. Integration success will 
depend upon cross site consultant collaboration and without this, the whole 
plan will collapse at the expense o f patient care” [112]
The University Medical School
The University was concerned that any plan to reconfigure hospital services must take 
into account the needs o f postgraduate medical education [88, 90]. A senior medical 
academic interviewed observed:
“Medical education is the backbone of the system and patient care. If anyone 
should have a voice at the table, it’s us.”
Medical postgraduate training was regulated by formal educational bodies, subject to 
NHS regulations and practice guidelines and was required to comply with national 
agreements. Locating services on split sites could create problems for medical 
training and supervision and limit the breadth o f  clinical experience for the medical 
student [114]. It was fairly clear that the University would favour the two-hospital 
model o f service delivery in Newcastle and not the slimmed down version o f three 
acute units [91].
The Community Health Council and Voluntary Sectors
The CHC organised 26 user and resident focus groups across Newcastle, ensuring that 
they represented different geographic localities and a range o f ages, gender and 
cultural backgrounds [180]. The voluntary sector sent questionnaires to 115 groups, 
representing service providers, community development projects and users [181].
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Location was a major concern for residents in the West End of the city where there 
was a clear allegiance to NGH:
“NGH was an important part of the West End. This hospital supports a very 
large ethnic and poor population in the city. Many people depend upon the 
accessibility o f these local hospital services, especially its A & E. To close 
this hospital will pose serious problems for many o f the local residents.”
(Senior Hospital Executive)
A common complaint was that the public had not been given adequate information 
about the RH A’s plans to transfer hospital based services to primary care settings and 
therefore many respondents were not convinced that the proposed changes would 
improve patient care.
The City Council
The City Council argued that N G H ’s closure would have potentially dramatic 
economic effects, creating immediate and long-term unemployment amongst those 
directly employed and those who supplied goods and services to the site. The city’s 
transport infrastructure would be substantially affected by closure or severe cuts in 
services offered at the NGH site and the viability o f  certain public transportation 
routes would be in jeopardy [110].
In addition to the economic factors, the provision o f health care in the W est End 
would deteriorate dramatically, further increasing the perception that this part o f the 
city was under-resourced and neglected. NGH was a vital cog in the community care 
programme in the W est End, which was the area o f greatest deprivation and had the 
largest proportion o f people from ethnic minorities.
The Council considered that NGH had been severely hampered by lack o f Trust status, 
making it difficult to compete with the other two acute providers. It also was outraged 
by the diminishing commitment to public accountability in all the proposals that were 
being debated around the re-configurations o f hospital services in Newcastle [110].
The views o f the City Council and the CHC were the most independent and objective 
o f all the submissions made to the Acute Services Review Group. It is notable that 
even though common concerns (articulated purposive values and interests) were
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emerging across some stakeholder groups, there was no political alliance formed these 
groups to challenge the leaked ‘Larry’ proposals, and no public meetings were called 
to debate the matter, even though the proposals were now in the public domain due to 
media coverage.
5.10 The Seaburn Workshop -  A Key Turning Point
The third stage o f  the ASR would prove to be an “institution building moment” in 
which key stakeholders and in particular the three hospitals, now with varying power 
depending on their Trust status and political alliances, would confront one another in 
the struggle over scarce resources (Fligstein, 2001). The Review Group’s workshop 
was held over two days in April 1993 at Seaburn, near Sunderland. The groups o f key 
stakeholders represented in the Group would make strategic decisions at this 
workshop that would change the face o f health care in Newcastle. The workshop was 
chaired by the CEO o f the Newcastle DHA [102]. The stated aims o f this workshop 
were: (i) consider and discuss the reports submitted by the various community
stakeholders and special working groups, the NHS Estates and York Health 
Economics Consortium, (ii) identify the key issues and propose solutions at the 
strategic level, rather than the operational level, and (iii) use this forum as an 
opportunity for practical debate rather than approving or rejecting predetermined 
proposals [107]. Figure 5.3 shows the six options discussed at the workshop.
Post-workshop feasibility testing would involve public consultation on the option 
chosen by the workshop participants. A detailed analysis would be conducted to 
determine whether the option could be achieved within the limits determined at the 
workshop and whether the identified option would be capable o f delivering projected 
benefits in terms o f service quality and capital/revenue release [102].
The RHA again demonstrated social skill in presenting itself as neutral in the ASR -  it 
did not submit any proposals o f its own and merely co-ordinated the Review process — 
and appeared more as selling the group collective identity and appealing to the other 
members to reach a consensus. In short, it engaged in “brokering more than 
blustering” (Fligstein, 2001:114). Yet, the underlying reality was that NGH was being 
coerced into submission. NGH was heavily outnumbered by other members o f the
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Review Group whose interests conflicted with the continued existence o f NGH as an 
acute hospital. Seven members o f the Group were government organisations 
(purchasers) that were allies o f the RHA. The two other acute care providers, the RVI 
and Freeman, were keen to acquire NGH’s financial surplus o f almost £3m and its 
high profile, well-developed clinical programmes [151].
Several o f the stakeholders who attended this workshop were interviewed. All
commented on the intensity o f the group dynamics, the politicking between key
groups and the animosity directed at NGH by the RVI and Freeman; several reported 
that as the workshop proceeded it became apparent that there had already been some 
deal making behind closed doors. NGH was the most vulnerable stakeholder at the 
workshop because it had not achieved Trust status and was still being directly 
managed by the DHA [127, 65]. NGH, and other stakeholders who supported NGH, 
were already feeling undermined by the political manoeuvring o f the RVI and the 
Freeman and the leak o f the Larry document.
“The RVI was out to conquer and the Freeman was its partner in crime.” 
(Community Stakeholder)
“The Newcastle General was always seen as the poor relation. Let’s face it, 
the RVI was running the show and calling all the shots. The Health Authority 
was quite happy to take a back seat.” (Senior Hospital Executive)
“The RVI was often referred to as the Kremlin and don’t think for one minute 
that the leaking of the Larry document was any accident - it was all politically 
choreographed down to the last step.” (Senior Hospital Clinician)
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Figure 5.3: Acute Services Review - Options Discussed at Seaburn Workshop
Options Discussed at Seaburn Workshop
Option 1
Retain the existing organisation and services in all three acute hospitals with the 
current num ber o f  beds.
Option 2
Reorganise all acute hospital services onto the Freem an site; close the RV I and NGH. 
Option 3
Reorganise all acute hospital services onto two hospital sites, Freem an and NG H ; 
close RVI.
Option 4
Reorganise all acute hospital services onto two hospital sites, Freem an and RVI; close 
NGH.
Option 5
Retain all three acute hospitals, but smaller.
Option 6
Reorganise acute hospital services onto two hospital sites, Freem an and RVI, and 
establish new  style services at N G H  linked closely w ith strengthened prim ary health 
care.
Source: N ew castle H ealth Authority, New castle Health - A  Concept for the Future: 
Update, July 1993.
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NGH was brutally attacked at the workshop and the aggressive tactics used by the 
RVI led to conflict and the polarisation o f group loyalties. Several interviewees 
reported that the CEO o f NGH had been literally reduced to tears. Recent studies 
indicate that governments have shown a tendency to seek to impose change using a 
variety o f coercive mechanisms, such as, for example, central performance targets, 
league tables and even threats o f intervention in the case o f “failing services” 
(Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 2003:10). In this workshop we see another form of 
coercion in the combination o f overwhelming political alliances against NGH and an 
agenda that emphasised NG H’s disadvantages in comparison with its rivals in terms o f 
its site re-development and maintenance problems.
The participants were however acutely aware o f the external support for NGH. They 
realised that any action taken to completely close the site would send political shock 
waves around the city. The University tried to remain impartial at this workshop as it 
had a vested interest in maintaining access to all clinical specialities in order to sustain 
its research activities and medical training. It was a prestigious and long-established 
member o f the medical community, and carried considerable influence. In an attempt 
to appease the NGH and its supporters the University introduced Option 6, which 
would not completely close the site. Option 6 proposed:
“The existing acute hospital services will be largely concentrated at RVI and 
Freeman with major service and site rationalisation and new style services 
based at NGH with a strong primary/community based focus - a hospital for 
the 2 1st century.” [92:1]
One senior academic who was present at the workshop observed:
“People at the University supported the merger because we felt it was the best 
solution. In terms of delivering health services in a city this size you can’t 
really afford to have a disjointed arrangement of services. We needed to take 
into account community and tertiary services. Option 6 seemed like a 
workable solution.”
The RVI and the Health Authorities supported this option. In selling this option to the 
Review Group the University was acting strategically as a broker, presenting itself as 
neutral and as trying to mediate between the opposing camps, in order to help keep the 
peace. The workshop decided that there should be a public consultation and that a 
more detailed assessment by key stakeholder groups o f the proposed changes should
138
be submitted to the public during the consultation period. The purpose o f the 
consultation process was to allow all the relevant stakeholders to submit comments 
and critiques before the final document was drafted. The Newcastle DHA and the 
RHA would consider these reports before any final decision would be made [94].
At the workshop, the RHA also encouraged NGH to proceed with its second Trust 
application, which was submitted in April 1993 [96]. This is seen as a continuation of 
the RHA’s strategy to be perceived as a neutral party.
Following the Seaburn Workshop many o f the senior staff, including the CEO, left 
NGH. The consultants however continued to wage war against the RVI and tried to 
muster support to keep NGH open as an acute care provider.
5.11 A New Incoherence in the RVI’s Direction of Change
The Acute Services Review Group now renamed itself the Newcastle Implementation 
Steering Group, chaired again by the CEO o f the Newcastle DHA [188]. This choice 
o f name is interesting, as it suggests that Option 6 was no longer just an option to put 
out to consultation. The Implementation Steering Group appointed seven working 
groups, each to submit a report to be incorporated into the final draft o f  the strategy 
document for public consultation [158]. The two most important groups for present 
purposes are described below.
The Clinical Service Configuration Group was to deliberate on a distribution and 
configuration o f specialities and clinical support services, principally between the RVI 
and Freeman, in conjunction with the proposed shape o f the new services at NGH 
[100], In essence it was trying to appease all o f  the key stakeholders who would be 
affected by these changes: the hospitals, the medical community, the University and 
the RHA [100], The Group was unclear about lines o f accountability, whether there 
were any extra funds available to help with the transition and the time frame for 
change. The Group considered that this lack o f information and the inadequate 
communication between these stakeholders and the RHA was an indication that the 
time frame was unrealistic and that the RHA was not really aware o f all the issues that
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had to be taken into account when merging and relocating medical services across 
sites. In short, the RHA had grossly underestimated the complexity o f this task [187],
The role o f the NGH Vision Group was to develop a new model o f service delivery 
for the NGH site. It would seek to define what was referred to as “new style” hospital 
and to understand the service demands o f both the community services sector and 
primary care. The Group needed to be informed about which acute services would 
remain on site at NGH, which acute services would be moved to other sites and who 
would be responsible for managing the site [184],
Both these groups struggled because o f this lack o f important information. The issues 
that these groups highlighted would remain politically contentious areas and develop 
into major hurdles during the post merger integration phase. The change process was 
now seen to be lacking certainty and coherence and had the potential to cause conflict 
among the actors who had supported Option 6.
5.12 Public Consultation: More Agenda-Setting
Newcastle Health Authority published its proposals, ‘The Future o f Health Care in 
Newcastle’ on 30th June 1993 and commenced a three-month period o f formal public 
consultation [215], This consultation document was a booklet, the body o f which ran 
to 20 pages. It outlined changing trends in health care resulting from several factors 
including advances in medical technology and health care practices, and greater public 
awareness and demands, and highlighted the need for improvement o f the way 
primary care, community services and hospitals worked together.
The document outlined the six Options considered at Seaburn. It noted that many 
services were duplicated across the three hospitals. Backlog maintenance figures 
showed that the costs to bring the hospitals up to standard were: Freeman, £5m; 
NGH, £20m; and the RVI, £23m. The document highlighted that the hospitals were 
facing increasing financial pressures and that other priorities were emerging -  
continuing care for the elderly and those with mental health problems and learning 
difficulties.
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The consultation document stated that all but Options 4 and 6 were unacceptable, and 
that Option 6 was preferred over Option 4 (which also would close NGH but with no 
plans for re-use o f its site). It did not refer to the issues raised in the stakeholder 
submissions that had been received in opposition to the closure o f NGH. 
Furthermore, although it was expressed to be a proposal developed by Newcastle 
Health Authority working “in partnership with” NGH and the other Review Group 
members, the document did not mention the alternative proposal that had been put 
forward by NGH. The document stated:
“During the four months of the review, extensive discussions were held with 
representatives o f hospital doctors, GPs, and the public. External consultants 
carried out an analysis of finance, building use, and projections for the 
numbers of patients treated and how long they stay in hospital. This work 
formed the basis for identifying and assessing possible options.
Although the review started as an examination of acute services, it became 
clear from the feedback from the public and GPs that we needed to do more 
than just re-organise hospitals.
Improving the way primary care (provided by GPs and their support staff), 
community services, and hospitals work together will provide a much better 
opportunity to meet the concerns and health needs o f local people as we move 
into the next century.
The proposal in this document has already gained support from the health 
professionals involved. Now Newcastle Health Authority wishes to consider 
as wide a range o f views as possible before any decision is taken about the best 
way forward.” [215:4]
The suggestion that all health professionals involved had support the proposal in the 
document was plainly incorrect and misleading, and discounted entirely the views o f 
the many who did not support the proposal, including the NGH medical staff.
In framing the consultation document in the manner described above, the RHA was 
once again setting the agenda for discussion, and closing o ff other options that would 
enable NGH to survive as an acute hospital. The document’s emphasis on the 
involvement and approval o f the health professionals involved is also a further 
example o f  the tactic o f inducing others to believe that others are in control, thereby 
avoiding being the target for any backlash.
To support the consultation process 5000 copies o f the consultation document were 
distributed and 60,000 summary leaflets printed. Newcastle Health Authority held 
public meetings in 19 districts throughout the city from 14 - 29th July and 2 - 30th
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September 1993. Health professionals organised several structured professional 
discussions among themselves. The CHC organised 26 special needs and focus 
groups. The Newcastle Health Authority’s CEO, or its Director o f Public Health, led 
the public presentations [185],
The public meetings were poorly attended and it was recorded that attendance varied 
from as few as five people to a maximum o f 40 [186], Among factors identified by the 
Newcastle DHA as contributing to the poor attendance were poor publicity, the fact 
that these meetings had been scheduled over the summer period when many people 
were on vacation, and the lack o f creche facilities at many o f the meetings [187].
Key agencies and individuals from throughout the city, including the CHC, Newcastle 
City Council, Newcastle Council for Voluntary Service, GPs, Medical community and 
the University, were invited by Newcastle Health Authority to work independently but 
in co-operation with the Authority, to debate the proposals. Throughout this 
consultation period, the only stakeholder group to work in collaboration with other 
groups was the CHC. The CHC recognised the need to try to lessen the impact o f one 
important aspect o f the RHA’s, the possession o f  information and evidence relating to 
the proposals. As one Community Stakeholder observed:
“It was important for us to meet with as many groups as we could. We wanted 
to get our own information and evidence or we would have been forced to rely 
on everything the health authority was presenting.” (Community Stakeholder)
There was a political divide between the RVI and its supporters and the rest o f the 
health care community on how to reconfigure acute care services in Newcastle. There 
were strong views in the health care community as indicated by the following 
comments:
“This health service review and initial merger proposal was just a political 
excuse to take money out o f the system and to reconfigure services and NGH 
didn’t have a chance against the other key players. There was too much at 
risk. Mergers were about expansion and bigger budgets and scoring brownie 
points with the government not patient care.” (Senior Hospital Clinician)
“NGH wasn’t powerful enough to win the war but at least it was prepared to 
wage war against its opponents.” (Health Authority Manager)
“The community knew that this battle was not about merging services but 
about who would take over the NGH services and staff, the consultation 
process was a waste o f money.” (Community Stakeholder)
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5.13 Stakeholder Values and Interests Articulated Again
The responses o f the key stakeholder groups are summarised below.
The Royal Victoria Infirmary
The general view o f staff and management was that the task ahead was extremely 
complex and that there were many uncertainties inherent in the Acute Services 
Review.
“Merging clinical services is one thing but bringing staff from different sites 
together to work is another.” (Hospital Manager)
“They kept telling us no one will lose their job but I’m not convinced. How 
can you have so much change and still keep all the staff.” (Hospital Clinician)
Money was being taken out o f acute care and re-directed into the development o f 
primary care. The District Health Authorities represented at the Seaburn workshop 
told the Trusts that there would be £20 million less each year to spend on acute 
hospital care [149]. With this size o f financial funding reduction the continued 
provision o f acute hospital services on three sites looked unaffordable. The RV I’s 
view was that competition between the acute hospitals would be destructive and 
wasteful. This would only lead to bankruptcy and major disruption o f services.
The RVI was concerned by a modification that had appeared in the consultation 
document, that all out-patient services and day case activity should be based at NGH. 
This modification was seen by some interviewees as an attempt by the DHA, from a 
public relations perspective, to soften the impact o f the changes to the NGH site by 
suggesting an ongoing hospital presence through the use o f the term “Outpatients” .
“It was all a sham, deception. Somehow the RHA wanted to create this 
illusion that the hospital still had a presence in the West End. This was their 
way o f trying to appease the public. The General consultants knew this 
wouldn’t happen so they quickly crossed over to the other side and joined their 
colleagues at the RVI and the Freeman.” (Senior Hospital Executive)
The University
The University believed that it was essential for research, clinical development and 
undergraduate teaching that there should be a correct distribution and critical mass o f
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general surgical sub-specialities across the two sites [90, 91, 114]. The present proposal 
w ould create a gross im balance o f  such services that would lead to a cessation o f  
surgical research and im pairm ent o f  undergraduate teaching at the RVI [87], It 
recom m ended that this re-distribution o f  services be re-evaluated.
From a research perspective, the amalgamation o f some services on specific sites 
would increase both the facilities and opportunities for research.
“In terms o f academic endeavour -  merger across sites makes sense. You can’t 
teach and conduct research very effectively if the participants are in one half of 
their life competing with one another and in the other half of their life 
collaborating with each other in research.” (Senior Academic)
A hospital consultant who was also actively involved in medical research with the 
University gave this further insight:
“Doctors see mergers from another perspective. We have a different agenda.
We can actually pool resources and get on with our research. We can see 
working as a united department or services as a way to get this done.”
The Medical Community
The NGH medical staff were totally against the proposals for many o f the same 
reasons as the CHC while the Freeman medical staff wanted to move the changes 
forward sooner rather than later [71, 75], The RVI consultants were non-committal 
because they knew that the proposed changes could have an impact on their speciality 
location, budget, staffing compliment and even their own jobs .
“The problem for both the RVI and the Freeman consultants was that there 
was a lot of bickering about who would get what services and who would be in 
charge o f who, and who would take leadership of what service.” (Community 
Stakeholder)
However, from a medical and clinical viewpoint, the majority o f the medical 
professionals in Newcastle were in agreement as to the clinical and medical issues that 
needed to be taken into consideration if  acute and outpatient services were to be re ­
located and that the Health Authorities and hospital managers promoting Option 6 did 
not appreciate the complexity o f these issues [87].
The Consultant group at NGH was vehemently opposed to the service stripping and 
closure o f NGH.
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“Many of the medics felt that patient care was never the issue it was all about 
power, politics and conquering the other side. Winning was everything and it 
had to be achieved at all costs.” (Senior Hospital Executive)
The following expresses a commonly held view among the consultants:
“the rationale behind the decision to close NGH was based upon back room 
politics and that the University wielded a big stick. The medical school was 
ultimately concerned about its status and the hospital’s ability to support and 
fund their research. Even though the NGH choice made more economical 
sense, the RVI still had the historical prestige o f being attached to the medical 
school whereas NGH was still regarded as the poor relation.” (Senior Hospital 
Clinician)
The Newcastle General Hospital
N G H ’s senior management, consultants and staff conducted a vigorous “Save the 
General Hospital Campaign”, which was funded by many o f the consultants 
personally. The hospital had the support o f the CHC, Newcastle Upon Tyne City 
Council, many GPs within the Tyneside area and 104,000 signatories supporting a 
petition to be forwarded to the Secretary o f State [181,187], NGH drew attention to the 
fact that many o f  the objections raised during the consultation period still had not been 
fully addressed, such as the projected revenue savings that would be achieved by the 
amalgamation o f services on the RVI site. The consultation document had not 
addressed how the services remaining on the NGH site would be managed, and none 
o f the staff in the targeted departments had been consulted .
“O f course the NGH wasn’t consulted. They didn’t hold the power. The 
University, the RVI and the Freeman had it all mapped out. And the NGH 
wasn’t privy to any o f those discussions.” (Senior Hospital Clinician)
Community Health Council Rejects the Proposal for Change
The CHC was concerned that the DHA was trying to rush a decision on a very 
complex process that would impact on all NHS services in Newcastle, and that other 
options needed to be considered and accurately costed before any decision should be 
made. M any o f the public focus groups shared the same concerns:
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“during this consultation period people were expected to make decisions about 
very complex issues with very little information and in a very short time 
period. It was frustrating if you needed further details but even more 
frustrating when you didn’t know who to ask for that information. There 
didn’t appear to be anyone in charge and certainly no one who was willing to 
take the responsibility. As for costings, the government had tunnel vision. All 
they thought about was how much money they could save and never stopped 
to think how much this just might cost instead.” (Community Stakeholder)
The CHC fully supported NGH in its bid to retain its status as an acute care provider. 
It raised the point that at no time were the RVI or Freeman considered for a different 
role and questioned whether the debate regarding the best location for services had 
been adequate [187],
The CHC was concerned that a more detailed description o f the site development 
should have been made available for public review along with costs. It also 
considered that in light o f these many unanswered issues the DHA should have 
extended the consultation period [187]. The CHC adamantly rejected both the 
consultation process and the recommendations put forward for health care reform in 
Newcastle, and would put its case forward to the DHA.
5.14 Missing Critical Information
Although the stakeholder groups worked independently, many had identified common 
issues in their respective reports submitted to the DHA. These were as follows: (i) 
the consultation period was too short; (ii) the report lacked adequate detail and 
important financial information; (iii) there was no time-scale regarding the 
implementation o f the proposed changes; (iv) the calculated reduction in acute bed 
numbers might have been excessive and (v) it was imperative that there be extensive 
discussion, consultation and planning before any clinical services were transferred 
between existing sites [80,81,82,91,101,105],
The lack o f detail in the proposal made it difficult for the stakeholders to assess the 
impact these changes would have on patients, costs and resources available, service 
reconfiguration, staffing, and treatment accessibility. A clear service development 
plan should have been available to at least inform the stakeholders what they could 
expect as baseline community and primary health services .
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“Initially this consultation exercise was supposed to be about reducing acute 
care capacity and saving money in Newcastle. The plan to turn the General 
into a site for chronic care, services for the elderly and mental health was a 
decision made behind closed doors - so it’s no wonder there was no written 
formal plan. The arrangements were still being negotiated with the powers 
that be.” (Senior Trust Executive)
The consultation document had failed to provide the necessary financial information 
on the availability o f capital, which made it difficult for some stakeholder groups to 
adequately evaluate the proposed service changes. Since the aim o f this exercise was 
to rationalise services because o f decreased government revenue, there should have 
been some financial forecast as to what the proposed changes might cost in relation to 
the existing service configuration. It was an open question whether these service 
changes would result in any cost savings [88,183,187].
The expected time scale o f the proposed changes was not made public at this stage o f  
the consultation. Many considered that the consultation period was too short in view  
o f the complexity o f the proposed changes. The University response stated:
’’the whole process could be a recipe for disaster coupled with the many 
changes taking place in NHS. It’s a slippery slope which could easily lead to 
financial destabilisation if  these proposed changes are not carefully planned 
and phased in over the long term.” [88]
The DHA was giving mixed messages about admission numbers. It predicted a slight 
increase in the number o f acute patients requiring treatment despite the bed cuts [117].
It was clear from the consultation exercise that many stakeholders had raised 
numerous legitimate concerns about the proposed changes. Some went further and 
accused the RHA o f presenting information to the public which it knew to be 
misleading. Several stakeholder groups believed that the information in the 
consultation document and the information presented by the DHA at the public 
meetings varied, and did not reflect Option 6 as formulated at the Seaburn workshop 
[187]. This was a serious allegation but was in fact supported by interviewees from the 
RVI, the Freeman and the CHC .
“In actual fa c t , there were major discrepancies between what was agreed on at 
Seabum and what the DHA was selling to the general public. They had 
become a law unto themselves. This kind o f politicking would only confuse 
the issues and could back fire to the detriment o f all involved.” (Senior 
Hospital Executive)
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The withholding o f critical information was therefore seen by many stakeholders as a 
deliberate tactic used by the RHA to reinforce its coercive control o f the restructuring 
of local hospitals. This tactic is part o f the wider tactic used by skilled actors as 
described in the next paragraph.
5.15 Isolation of the RHA’s Opponents
A number o f interviewees expressed concerns about the RHA’s handling o f the review 
process generally. The consultation process was ostensibly an exercise whereby the 
community and Health Authorities would work together in developing health care 
reform initiatives. Having asked stakeholders to identify concerns about the proposed 
changes and provide feedback, the RHA, DHA and the Secretary o f State might have 
been expected to consider those concerns fully and openly. However, there had been 
no formal debate or discussions between the Health Authorities and the health 
community. Discussions were held with individual groups behind closed doors and at 
no time were the different stakeholder groups given information about the position or 
views o f other groups across the health care community. It appeared that the RHA 
had chosen to ignore stakeholder submissions, and made no concessions to 
stakeholder concerns.
“Let’s face it -  it was very clear when the Secretary of State just ignored the 
report submitted by the CHC. The writing was on the wall. This had been the 
government’s intention all along. So much for transparency.” (Hospital 
Manager)
Ultimately each stakeholder group was concerned about how the proposed changes 
might affect its own interests, particularly its ability to function in the long term as 
money was became a scarce resource. Some stakeholders found it difficult to wholly 
support either o f the NGH or RVI camps. None o f the stakeholder groups attempted 
to work together or submit joint reports, and perhaps may not have been aware or 
confident o f the potential advantages o f concerted action. Importantly, the RHA was 
careful not to become the node o f a network for them and avoided communicating the 
views o f one group to other groups. NGH and its supporter groups were all isolated 
outliers and, as Fligstein (2001:115) observes:
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“If they are upset and even if there are a number o f upset but isolated actors, 
they generally remain disorganised. Since these types of actors are usually 
incapable of strategic action themselves, they remain isolates”
Here we see one o f the factors explaining why NGH was losing the battle.
The DHA had a statutory responsibility to consult with the CHC over its proposals for 
any ‘substantial change’ o f service [12]. When the CHC decided to oppose the 
recommendations put forward in Option 6 o f the consultation document, the matter 
was referred to the RHA for a further decision. The RHA supported the DHA but the 
CHC still opposed the recommendation, and so, as required under statute, the proposal 
was referred to the Secretary o f State in November 1993 for a final decision.
5.16 Another Key Turning Point
On 9th December 1993 the RHA informed the CHC that the Secretary o f State had 
agreed that the Newcastle DHA should proceed to implement Option 6 o f the Acute 
Services Review, regardless o f the issues raised and opposition from key stakeholder 
groups. This was another key turning point in the case and marked the end o f N G H ’s 
application for Trust status, which did not reach the consultation stage. As one 
hospital consultant interviewed put it:
“By denying NGH Trust status, the message from the government couldn’t be 
more clear -  this was the end o f the General as we knew it.”
The Secretary o f State at the same time authorised the RHA to proceed with a public 
consultation on the proposal to create a new Newcastle City Health NHS Trust that 
would be located on the NGH site [192]. This new Trust would be formed from a 
merger between two o f  the members o f the Acute Services Review Group, Newcastle 
Mental Health Trust and UnityNE Health and would also incorporate part o f N G H ’s 
services. (That merger is not included in this research.)
5.17 Hospital Restructuring and Service Reconfiguration
The Secretary o f  State decided that the Newcastle DHA would assume the role o f 
monitoring and managing the implementation process, which would commence on 1st
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April 1994 [20a], The first phase o f the implementation plan focused on the 
reorganisation o f management and clinical responsibility for acute services at the RVI 
and on the NGH site, supported by the transfer o f employment o f medical, nursing, 
professional and managerial staff directly responsible for these services [20a], Most o f 
the clinical services at NGH would be managed by the RVI [154],
The Secretary o f State’s decision to support the recommendations o f the ASR and to 
reshape health services in Newcastle would have major restructuring and financial 
implications for the RVI and to a lesser extent the Freeman. The NGH site would see 
the development o f a new style community and primary care based Trust [194], The 
value o f the assets to be transferred to the RVI had been assessed at £8m while the 
contract income generated by these services was valued at £42m. The Freeman was 
estimated to gain contract income around £7.5m [154],
The RVI would now be required to dissolve its present Trust status in order to 
establish a new Trust reflecting the take over o f NGH’s acute services, and would 
have to conduct another consultation process for these changes [151]. The changes 
affecting the Freeman were not o f  sufficient scale as to require the dissolution o f  the 
existing Freeman Trust and formation o f a new Trust, but responses would be sought 
as to the reconfiguration o f the Trust [154].
The new RVI and Associated Hospitals NHS Trust was established on 1st April 1994. 
The Freeman inherited the Regional Cancer Services from NGH and other key clinical 
services were to be transferred at a later date depending upon the hospitals capital 
investment plans. The new Newcastle City Health NHS Trust was established on the 
former site o f  NGH and was to be responsible for the management o f any remaining 
NGH clinical services.
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5.18 Existing Values Continue
The RVI Trust Board would have overall corporate responsibility for restructuring the 
Trust. The Trust Board was made up o f five executives and five non-executives 
Directors led by a non-executive Chairman. The Secretary o f State appointed the non­
executive members to the Board. The membership o f the RVI Board remained 
virtually the same from 1991 until 1997. There were no changes in the Board 
composition when NGH was taken over. The RVI’s mission statement also remained 
unchanged following the revision o f its Trust status in 1994 (RVI Annual Reports 
1991 -  1997). It can be seen that the process o f restructuring acute hospital services 
did not reflect an archetypal shift within the RVL
The Trust Executive Group’s first task would be to provide project direction for the 
planning and implementation o f the ASR [173]. It would be given the power to 
interpret Trust policy, make decisions on behalf o f the Board and oversee the 
development o f new clinical directorates. This Group would be recognised as the 
authoritative reference source on the ASR. The membership o f this Group was 
important because it had representation from the RVI, NGH, Hexham General, the 
medical executive committees from each site and nursing [I62e]. The Chairman o f the 
Group would be the CEO o f the RVI.
5.19 Scale of Change in RVI: Structural Adjustment
Middle Management
The RVI senior executive structure in 1991 had seven Director positions. When the 
Secretary o f  State announced that the RVI would be taking over the management o f 
the acute services from the NGH, the RV I’s CEO decided that a transitional 
management structure would be put in place [145, 162e]. The major structural changes 
within the RVI would take place at the middle management level. This was in direct 
response to the introduction o f the clinical directorate system and the absorption o f
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N G H’s clinical services [162c], These new structural changes were implemented in 
1995 [171].
By 1997 organisational structure was more streamlined than the previous versions and 
consisted o f four executive directors and the Clinical Director o f each Directorate, 
with a new tier consisting o f six Heads o f Department directly accountable to the new 
Deputy CEO [214], There were no less than four different management structures at 
the RVI in the period from 1993-97, as shown in Figures 5.4 - 5.7.
Clinical Directorates
A new Clinical Directorate structure was implemented to re-design existing services 
by merging clinical areas and developing a “streams o f care” model [202], The number 
o f clinical directorates would be reduced from 21 to a manageable 8. Individual sub­
speciality groups would be defined and designated as Departments (see Figure 5.8). 
Heads o f Department would have responsibility and authority over their staff and 
would be accountable to their respective Clinical Directors.
The creation o f clinical directorates saw a major shift in power held by the medical 
profession in their roles as clinical and medical directors. There was a feeling among 
the profession that through the introduction o f the internal market they had lost control 
over the flow o f patients and resources but that through their new management role 
they had regained some o f that lost power by having budgetary control o f clinical 
directorates (Ashbumer et al., 1996). However, most clinical directors believed that 
the time demands o f their new administrative roles in addition to their on-going 
clinical, teaching, research and medical supervision commitments, far exceeded the 
number o f hours in a day, and many considered that they were unable to fulfil their 
professional obligations.
“The workload had become ridiculous. I was financially and clinically 
responsible for this new clinical directorate. As Directors, we were expected 
to teach, conduct research, maintain our clinical practice, supervise fellow 
clinicians and sit on the Board. Something had to give.” (Senior Hospital 
Clinician)
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Figure 5.7: Royal Victoria Infirmary & Associated Hospitals NHS Trust 
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These changes at the middle management and clinical directorate level characterise 
the change occurring within the RVI as a result o f the merger as a pattern o f relatively 
minor and structural alterations that characterise hospital change prior to the 
introduction o f transformational change: this is labelled ‘structural adjustment’ 
(Kitchener and Whipp, 1997).
5.20 Integration of Acute Services
Many o f the NGH acute services were to be transferred to the RVI and the few that 
were transferred to NGH were only temporary moves until such time the RVI had 
completed its re-development plans. The RVI and Newcastle City Health NHS Trust 
were reviewing their options for establishing ambulatory care services, a day case 
surgical unit and a minor injuries unit on the NGH site [194], There was still a 
substantial degree o f  indecision about what was intended for these three services, and 
these proposed models o f service delivery remained controversial with consultants 
across Newcastle [81, 82, 87, 89,91].
“It appeared that the new NGH was an institution looking for a purpose and 
trying to hold on to anything which might still define it as an acute care 
provider.” (Senior Hospital Administrator)
These issues arising out o f the introduction o f Clinical Directorates and the integration 
o f acute services are seen to create difficulties and incoherence in the RV I’s track o f 
change. Against this, two major areas o f success were seen in the integration o f 
medical staff from NGH into the RVI and the introduction o f project management 
department.
The in-patient services that were amalgamated into the RVI site also required the 
transfer o f staff. This activity often proved to be difficult as there had always been 
feelings o f rivalry between the NGH and the RVI. However, the leadership qualities 
o f the RVI Medical Director, who commanded universal respect in the local health 
services field, moved the reconciliation process forward.
“If you can rally the medics and get them on board, others will follow. You 
need the knowledge of a clinician, the determination of a salesman and the 
diplomacy of a politician.” (Senior Hospital Clinician)
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In this approach by the Medical Director we see, at the level o f key individual actors, 
another example o f social skill: to find a way to join actors or groups with widely 
different preferences and help reorder those preferences.
“Once a number of actors come on board, then others will follow This is
most frequently done by trying to create a common collective identity (Ansell 
1998). Such an identity allows groups to attach their divergent senses of their 
interest to a common project” (Fligstein, 2001:114-5)
The new hospital configuration in Newcastle resulting from the ASR is shown in 
Figure 5.14.
5.21 Towards Transformation: Project Management
Another new aspect o f the management re-structuring was the introduction o f a 
Project M anagement Department to co-ordinate and supervise the transfer o f clinical 
services [213]. The Trust had been experiencing problems with project management 
because it was poor at managing process [57d]. One major shortcoming was:
“the Trust failed to realise the complexity and the amount of work involved 
when trying to carry out these change projects. They should have appointed a 
project management team from the very beginning” (Hospital Clinician)
A commonly held view was summarised as follows:
"the culture of the hospital was to solve problems as they occurred not to 
manage long term preventative processes. The Trust had no framework within 
which projects should have been managed nor did they have the skill base or 
discipline required for effective project management." (Senior Hospital 
Clinician)
A key role o f this new Department was to ensure that any request by a department for 
funds was supported by a convincing business case. This was an entirely new, 
business-oriented ethos for a public sector hospital at this time. Whereas the other 
aspects o f restructuring and integration discussed above are seen to be attributable to 
the acquisition o f N G H ’s acute services, the introduction o f the Project Management 
Department was an indication o f the adoption by the RVI o f  a more private sector 
oriented approach to structures and systems and is compatible with a movement over 
the long term toward transformational change in the RVI.
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5.22 Financial Pressures
Over the next few years there would be a change in the way NHS money would be 
distributed. Newcastle could expect to have a total budget reduction o f approximately 
£20m each year over the next five years, while the NHS was expected to invest at 
least £10m each year in primary care during the same period. It was estimated that 
savings o f over £30m each year would be achieved through the re-organisation o f 
hospital services in Newcastle [167].
Additional financial pressures, hospital debt and overspend, government fiscal 
constraints, reallocation o f scarce revenue and backlog maintenance costs were 
placing a very heavy burden on Newcastle. The RHA had intended that a merger 
between Trusts would reduce many o f these pressures by reducing overheads and 
expenses and that the economies o f scale could be successfully achieved.
However, it was becoming increasingly clear that the merger process was much more 
complex than anticipated and that the financial cost o f merging several Trusts had 
been greatly underestimated [162b]. By the end o f June 1994, only two months into the 
merger, the RVI was already experiencing an income and expenditure over­
commitment in excess o f £600,000 (RVI Annual Report 1994/95). A further 
difficulty was that the monies originally promised by the government to re-develop 
health care services across Newcastle were around £63m but the government now 
changed its mind and set a ceiling o f between £30-40m. This substantial and 
unexpected reduction o f capital monies available meant that the acute services re­
configuration plans would have to be drastically revised and down scaled [35c]. In a 
major twist along the RVI’s path towards transformational change, the RVI Board 
decided that the only way to move the Acute Services Review and restructuring 
agenda forward would be to embrace the PFI Scheme and to apply to the Exchequer 
for fast track funding. The fast track scheme would provide £8.37m and the PFI 
schemes would provide £39.56m. The ASR would now involve a capital investment 
in the order o f £47m across the city [62], The financial reality and strain o f 
implementing the Acute Services Review change initiatives was starting to show.
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5.23 Summary
We see the restructuring o f the hospital field in Newcastle and also the changes 
occurring at the hospital organisation level as a process dominated by the purposeful 
use by one key actor (the RHA as agent o f the government) o f its power as the 
ultimate source o f funding for the field. In its use o f this power we have seen how the 
RHA, rather than risk political flack by directly closing NGH, employed several 
tactics used by socially skilled strategic actors to covertly force the NGH into closure 
as an acute hospital.
Some actors (NGH consultants and NGH itself) resisted the field-level changes that 
they did not agree with (closure o f NGH as an acute hospital) but did not have 
sufficient power to overcome the political alliance o f other actors against them. This 
was in part due to the lack o f any well-organised alliance with other actors who 
supported them (CHC, City Council, Member o f Parliament, the local newspaper and 
the public).
Other actors in the field (the RVI, the Freeman, the University, DHAs and non-acute 
hospital Trusts) espoused the RH A ’s change agenda because they perceived that their 
interests would be served by doing so.
The case highlights the significance o f taking into account the local variants o f an 
archetype, which can be discovered and understood by relating them to their 
organisational and institutional contexts (Kitchener, 1998:4; Dent et al., 2004:738). 
These local variants will include the political relationships between key actors which 
may not be based on concerns for market efficiency: NGH had a strong case for acute 
hospital Trust status but was not allowed the opportunity to prove this in the internal 
market.
NGH itself followed an abortive track o f change notwithstanding its clear reformative 
commitment. This is explained by the RHA’s control o f the change process through 
the use o f its power. There was reformative commitment within NGH, which would 
precipitate change. NGH also had the “capacity for action” to enable radical change: 
there was no evidence in the data that NGH lacked any o f the understandings, skills
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and abilities necessary for successful operation as a Trust hospital. However, NGH 
did not have the other necessary enabling factor: supportive power dependencies. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) acknowledge, citing Fligstein (1991:313) that 
“Change....can only occur when either a new set o f actors gains power or it is in the 
interest o f those in power to alter the organisation’s goals”. If  the RHA had allowed 
NGH to obtain Trust status, then a new set o f actors (the Trust Board) would have 
gained power.
In the case, the RVI followed a track o f change that can be seen as structural 
adjustment following acquisition o f N G H ’s acute services while at the same time 
pursuing transformational change (from DMH to Trust hospital) over the longer term. 
As at the end o f our case the RVI was struggling with both external (financing) and 
internal (managerial) difficulties and was experiencing a degree o f conflict and 
incoherence reflected in the concerns o f groups within the RVI and the Freeman about 
how the restructuring was handled by the RHA and the consequential uncertainty as to 
how the changes would affect them.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ONTARIO HOSPITAL CASE STUDY: THE RESTRUCTURING OF 
ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS IN HAMILTON
6.1 Introduction
This case study research seeks to provide an understanding o f how changes occurred 
in hospitals in Hamilton in the period after December 1995 when the Ministry o f 
Health (MOH) introduced Bill 26 (later to become the Savings and Restructuring Act) 
and announced that hospital funding would be reduced by 18 percent over the next 
three years. Overall health care spending in Ontario was to be held at $17.4 billion, 
and the $1.3 billion expected to be cut from hospitals would be re-invested into further 
development o f the community health services sector [12]. This Bill gave the M inister 
o f Health unprecedented statutory powers to bring about system-wide change. These 
would include powers to allocate funding, direct hospital operations and regulate 
physician privileges [13].
A case narrative methodology was chosen for the reasons stated in the Methodology 
(see Chapter 3). In analysing the processes o f change that were observed, the study 
draws on Greenwood and Hinings’ concepts o f archetypes and tracks o f change 
together with Neil Fligstein’s synthesis o f conceptual insights into organisational 
fields, power and social skill. The changes proposed by Bill 26 clearly created the 
potential for altered domains o f activity for health services providers and thus 
potentially elements o f  new or modified interpretive schemes. The concept o f 
archetype is used to define the nature and scale o f change in the hospitals under 
review, i.e. whether change is consistent or not with a move between one coherent 
pattern o f organisation and a new one, and whether change can best be described as 
incremental or quantum movement. Organisational transformation may be analysed 
not only at the level o f a single hospital organisation, but also at the level o f the 
organisational field (Ferlie, 1999): in this case the health care sector in Hamilton. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) recognise that it is at the organisational field level 
where we can both identify the normative contextual pressures that maintain stability 
and locate the dynamics o f change. However, in considering both precipitating and
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enabling factors o f change, archetype theory’s main focus is on interactions between 
actors within an organisation. Given the interdependency and interaction o f the 
organisations and actors in the field under study, Fligstein’s ideas o f fields, power and 
social skill are integrated into the researcher’s theoretical framework for analysing the 
dynamics o f change because his ideas focus on interaction within the field and not just 
within an organisation.
It will be argued that whilst Bill 26 was the initial trigger o f change, it was the co­
operation and collaboration between key stakeholders that brought about a voluntary 
hospital merger the merging hospitals and a transition to a new coherent archetype. 
As will be shown, this process was enabled by the way in which the MOH chose to 
use its fundamental power as the ultimate source o f funding for the hospitals, e 
reasons for this have more to do with the way the reform process was implemented at 
the local field level than with the imposed nature o f the reforms as such, as similar 
policy reforms were imposed in both England and Ontario, with very different results.
The study begins in 1996, when Bill 26 came into effect. The end marker for the case 
is October 1999, when the MOH initiated an Operational Review and Clinical Audit 
to determine reasons for the financial deficit o f  the new hospital.
6.2 The Organisational Field - Key Stakeholder Groups in Hamilton
Hamilton had three acute care hospital organisations, Hamilton Civic Hospitals 
(HCH), Chedoke M cM aster Hospital (CMH) and St. Joseph’s Catholic Hospital (St. 
Joseph’s). HCH operated two acute care hospital sites, the General Hospital in the 
industrial quarter o f the city centre and the Henderson Hospital on the central 
mountain, which supported and shared accommodation with the new Hamilton 
Regional Cancer Centre. CMH operated the M cMaster University Medical Center, an 
acute care hospital on the McMaster University campus in the west end o f the city, 
and Chedoke General Hospital, a non-acute hospital on the west mountain. St. 
Joseph’s was an acute care hospital the city centre, owned and operated by the Sisters 
o f St. Joseph .
































system, which included St. Peter’s Hospital (a chronic care hospital), and the 
Hamilton Psychiatric Hospital. All o f the seven hospital sites in Hamilton had 
teaching programs linked to the Faculty o f Health Sciences at M cMaster University or 
other departments at the University, and Mohawk College. Hamilton was home to a 
number o f regional and provincial programs because o f its status as one o f the five 
academic health science centres in Ontario.
‘Considering the number o f acute care hospitals in Hamilton, there was 
surprisingly little service duplication. Each hospital had its own Centres of 
Excellence and we had a good track record o f collaboration and sharing o f each 
other’s expertise.’ (Hospital CEO)
6.3 Initial Archetypes
The hospitals in Hamilton were found to share a common archetype. The interpretive 
scheme was characterised by patient-focused service (quantity and throughput); 
professional autonomy; and a local service provider identity. Systems, processes and 
practices were characterised by annual resource increments; a bottom-up management 
style; financial autonomy (restricted to non-profit activities and patient related 
practices); and a focus on the internal functioning o f hospital (in-patient services); 
changes historically tended to be incremental. The organisation structure was 
characterised by medium differentiation and medium integration between clinical and 
managerial domains - doctors held senior management positions; a functional matrix 
based on medical speciality; centralised control; two-site management; and a single 
hospital focus.
6.4 Existing Tracks of Change
In 1993 the CMH Board o f Trustees had decided that the hospital needed to re­
position itself in relation to the rapidly changing fiscal environment that was being 
imposed by the government [35]. In response the hospital launched an intensive 
strategic development project that would eventually lead to organisational 
restructuring. This would mark the beginning o f extensive change to both the clinical 
programs and the service directions o f CMH.
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The hospital, which was based at McMaster University in the Faculty o f Health 
Sciences, and the Medical School had achieved international success in the area of 
research and medical education but had remained significantly under-developed from 
a clinical service perspective and detached from many other community services.
‘McMaster Medical Centre was created by the University for the University. It 
was never thought o f or used like a community hospital. It’s priorities were 
research and teaching and less about patient care.’ (Senior Hospital Executive)
‘The Civic was the people’s hospital. Friendly atmosphere, helpful staff and 
always managed with less. Mac was perceived as the ‘fat cat’. More money, lots 
o f staff and arrogant.’ (Hospital Director)
‘Mac was about researchers, technicians and intellectuals. It was powerful but 
not user friendly.’ (Professor, Health Action Task Force)
The CMH Board recognised that the hospital must develop a stronger clinical and 
service role within the community if  it were to survive the provincial restructuring 
process [27, 36]. The re-organisation o f CMH was to be phased in over the next 3 to 5 
years [27],
The Hamilton Civic Hospitals were also about to embark on a restructuring initiative 
at the same time. Even though the Henderson and the General hospitals had been 
amalgamated as long ago as 1962 the present organisational structure o f the HCH did 
not provide for shared management, administrative or nursing responsibilities across 
hospital sites. Therefore the Board o f Directors had decided to develop a new 
organisational structure that would bring the two hospital management teams together 
under one administration [1,38b, 10,20].
Thus, the hospitals in Hamilton were all, at the outset o f the case, already undergoing 
some form o f evolutionary change.
6.5 Institutional Upheaval: Accelerating Tracks of Change
Under Bill 26, a new independent body, the Health Services Restructuring 
Commission (HSRC or Commission) was to be appointed to make decisions about 
hospital restructuring and to advise the Minister o f Health on restructuring other parts 
o f Ontario’s health services system [129]. The Commission was appointed for a term 
o f four years from April 1996. The Commission had the power to make hospital
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restructuring decisions without any need for ministerial approval [12]. The 
appointment o f an independent body was seen by senior managers as a politically 
astute move:
‘..by establishing the restructuring commission what the government sought to 
do was insulate itselfpolitically from their own restructuring agenda... .and the 
public actually bought into this.’ (Hospital CEO)
‘ So in terms of how hospitals were to be restructured which ones were merged, 
which ones were closed, which ones were left alone -  the ministry didn’t have 
any direct involvement in any o f that. Politically that was a smart move on the 
part o f the government.’ (Hospital Vice President)
‘...the fact the government created a commission -the writing was on the wall.
They were going to do something but the million dollar question was, what 
were they going to do to us and that was still a guessing game.’ (Senior Hospital 
Chief)
Here we see a clear similarity with the English case: government agencies trying to 
avoid being seen as directly responsible for the politically controversial restructuring 
decisions that would have to be made: although they have direct authority (to simply 
close a hospital or cut o ff its funding) they still need to induce co-operation in others 
and may seek to do this by getting people to believe that others are in control 
(Fligstein, 2001).
Many cities in Ontario were unable to reach consensus on cost reduction measures or 
ways to re-design their present health care services. In such cases, the Commission 
was left with no option but to enforce mandatory change initiatives through the use o f 
its statutory powers [The Toronto Star Newspaper, July 7, 1996]. The Commission 
encouraged the District Health Councils (DHCs) and their communities to recommend 
service changes. This pre-emptive work made the Com m ission’s job easier as the 
Commission saw its role as working with the community to bring about change that 
was best suited to the needs o f the local population [98], The Commission recognised 
that local politics and professional biases would often impede this process at the local 
level and then it would be the role o f the Commission and DHC to act as arbitrator to 
bring about the necessary change [22],
The Commission recognised that its task would be complex because it would be 
impossible to review hospitals in isolation from community and social services, or 
acute care in isolation from chronic and rehabilitative health services. Reconfiguring
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the hospital sector had major economic and logistic implications. The Commission 
would need to take into account the quality o f care, quality o f management and 
administration, broader health systems issues, availability o f capital and operating 
resources, and accessibility to health services in the community. Any 
recommendation to merge hospitals or reform community services would need to 
strategically address quality, cost and access concerns from a regional perspective [12].
The Health Action Task Force
In March 1995, the DHC and the MOH worked in partnership with community 
stakeholders to identify how Hamilton could improve and design a more efficient 
health care delivery system and to make recommendations on how this new system 
should be organised.
‘This was a really tall order. The first problem was that the MOH did not give 
us clear guidelines. Each region in the province had different directives but 
Hamilton wasn’t given a specific target, such as you must take x% out of the 
system. It was too open ended which meant open for interpretation.’ (CEO 
Community Organisation)
The first step was to appoint a 10-member Health Action Task Force (HATF or Task 
Force) to prepare a new health care plan for the region. The Task Force’s members all 
had professional experience as leaders in, or consultants to, public sector or 
community organisations. However, in relation to the Task Force’s work they were 
independent in that they had no direct association with or vested interest in any 
particular health care organisation. As a group, they would be powerful actors 
because their recommendations would influence the decisions o f the MOH on the re­
configuration o f health care services in Hamilton.
‘..the task o f forging a new strategic direction that would be acceptable to all 
three acute hospitals would be a real challenge. On the surface there appeared 
a willingness to share and collaborate with other hospitals but underneath they 
were all very territorial. This would not be an easy task for the Health Action 
Task Force.’ (Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences) (researcher’s emphasis)
Here the Task Force is addressing the problem faced by socially skilled actors o f 
finding a way to join actors or groups with different preferences, and help reorder 
those preferences (Fligstein, 2001). Concepts o f domain (what the hospitals should be 
doing) and appropriate principles o f organising principles (how they should be doing
169
it) are evident in the quoted statement. The perceived aim appears to be to foster a 
common orientation across the acute hospitals, so as to in effect establish a coherent 
pattern o f organisation (and thus an ideal template) for the restructured configuration 
o f acute hospitals in Hamilton under the Bill 26 reforms.
The various stakeholder groups who were involved in this restructuring process are 
identified in Figure 6.2.
The role o f the Task Force was to develop a comprehensive health care plan for 
Hamilton that would strengthen and integrate the full range o f health care services.
The Task Force anticipated that it would have two years to do this job, but discovered 
following the provincial general election on 8th June 1995 that the new government 
wanted to move more quickly, and that it would have to submit its report by Spring, 
1996 [68]. Thus there would be an enforced stepping up o f the existing evolutionary 
change within the hospitals to a revolutionary pace. Notwithstanding the drastic 
reduction o f its timetable the Task Force used a comprehensive, consultative process 
to develop its plan and recommendations, involving feedback from a wide range o f 
stakeholder groups in the community. The findings from these various sectors would 
be integrated into a series o f recommendations designed to support a comprehensive 
plan. The process would involve several activities, many o f which occurred 
concurrently, and all o f  which continued throughout the year [67,69].
Individuals and organisations in the health care community were invited to submit 
reports, attend working sessions and focus groups or make formal presentations to 
working groups. In this way the Task Force would gain a clear idea o f the prevailing 
purposive values and interests o f these stakeholders, an essential factor if  restructuring 


































































In all, more than 700 providers and community members were involved. The interim 
report prepared by the Task Force evaluated the strengths and weaknesses o f  the 
existing health programs and services, described any unmet needs or unresolved issues 
and recommended strategies that could be used to strengthen services, meet needs and 
resolve issues [67],
‘The Task Force left no stone unturned. We prepared inserts for the Hamilton 
Spectator and 186,000 copies were distributed throughout Hamilton. Several of 
our members spoke on call-in radio and television talk shows. And we also 
conducted 775 telephone surveys. I think we did a good job. We wanted the 
public to be informed and to be part o f the process.’ (Professor, Health Action 
Task Force)
After this period o f extensive information-gathering and public consultation, the Task 
Force began to shape a plan and develop a series o f recommendations. The report 
would be published and feedback was invited before the final draft was submitted to 
the DHC and presented for a public vote. The outcome o f the public vote would form 
the basis o f the final report to be forwarded to the MOH [6],
The Task Force’s consultative approach is a good example o f social skill: if  the Task 
Force appeared open to stakeholders’ needs and not wedded to any predetermined 
course o f action, stakeholders would find the situation more attractive for negotiation 
and be more willing to allow brokering or helping to forge a collective identity 
(Fligstein, 2001).
6.6 Actions taken by Key Stakeholders: Collaboration Agreement and Merger 
Talks
The CEOs o f  HCH and St. Joseph’s came to the view that a collaboration agreement 
between the three acute hospitals would strengthen their collective position in relation 
to the Task Force’s review, but when CMH was approached it declined to participate 
in the proposed collaboration [9], This was a political decision taken by the CEO o f 
CMH. It was a public rejection, and was symptomatic o f a long-standing rivalry
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between CMH and HCH1.
‘trying to bring the CEOs of the Civic and McMaster together was like trying to 
mix oil and water. It just wasn’t going to happen. They both rubbed each other 
the wrong way. It was a stand off before it even happened.’ (Professor, Faculty 
of Health Sciences)
‘This alliance was important to the Civic. St. Joe’s had the Catholic Church,
McMaster had the University and the Civic felt exposed. It needed this alliance
more than the others.’ (Hospital Vice President)
The HCH Board was concerned that a financial deficit would weaken its strategic 
position in any government-directed merger with CMH [19, 20]. Merger negotiations 
would be influenced by political and financial power, and CMH was perceived to be
in an advantageous position already through its closer affiliation, and sharing o f
premises, with M cMaster University’s Faculty o f Health Sciences. The Board 
decided to pursue the possible collaboration agreement with St. Joseph’s and the two 
hospitals agreed to conduct a study to analyse the impact o f collaboration between 
them [9].
The collaboration agreement would not change the existing governance o f either 
hospital. An Executive Management Council would be appointed and would have the 
overall management responsibility o f the collaboration. This would include the 
implementation, monitoring, review and co-ordination o f programs and services 
within the collaboration [9]. The HCH Board o f Directors passed the initial motion 
supporting the collaboration with St. Joseph’s in Nov 1995. HCH and St. Joseph’s 
were initially hoping that their arrangement may have been sufficient to avoid any 
drastic compulsory restructuring o f their organisations. The collaboration agreement 
was finalised on June 14, 1996.
This formal collaboration between HCH and St. Joseph’s was quite significant for 
several reasons.
‘Strategic alliances or collaborations isn’t something that is common place in 
healthcare. This was an innovative agreement and a real opportunity to cut 
expenses by sharing non-clinical costs.’ (Hospital Vice President)
1 Being a denominational hospital, St. Joseph’s was not involved in this local hospital rivalry.
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‘Hospitals partnering to share services is the first step toward integrating our 
local healthcare community. This is our future.’ (CEO, Community Organisation)
‘The Catholic and provincial healthcare institutions have always operated 
independently of each other. This is a first for a business arrangement to have 
been forged between a denominational and non-denominational hospital in 
Ontario.’ (Hospital CEO)
‘Aside from saving costs in the long term -  this arrangement is primarily 
intended to give both these parties political advantage over McMaster.’ 
(Hospital Vice President) (researcher’s emphasis)
The varying interpretations o f the collaboration/strategic alliance are indicative, the 
researcher suggests, o f  the politically charged nature o f the stakeholders' response to 
the reforms. Given the ‘very territorial’ (see above) character o f each o f the Hamilton 
hospitals and the motives o f the HCH Board in pursuing the collaboration with St. 
Joseph’s, the collaboration agreement appears to be more about building a dominant 
political coalition than a concern for integrating the local health care community.
Hospital Boards Initiate Merger Discussions
The M inistry’s announcement also prompted the Boards o f HCH and CMH to explore 
the opportunities for and benefits o f merger o f their organisations in order to further 
reduce costs and rationalise services. It had become clear to the Board o f Trustees o f 
both hospitals that their CEOs would not be able to work co-operatively, so they 
decided that the Board, and not the CEOs, would now make all key decisions.
‘Merger is a governance issue. Therefore it was right that the Boards would be 
the ones that would make the decision. They set the strategic direction and they 
have the power to make it happen. (Hospital Vice President)
‘..it made more sense to come up with our own solutions as opposed to having it 
imposed by someone from the outside.’ (Hospital CEO)
‘The government’s agenda was clear. Cut, slash and bum. So let’s start the 
process ourselves and try to be the masters of our own destiny.’ (Hospital Vice 
President)
‘The Boards had no choice. It was now war and the battle between the Civic 
and McMaster got nasty.’ (Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences)
The two Boards established a Transition Committee with authority to take the merger 
process forward. The Committee was expressly required to ensure equality o f
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participation by both hospitals in carrying out its work. The Committee received and 
considered a range o f presentations and extensive information covering for example 
the financial positions o f each hospital, their human resources and their medical staff 
structures. The Committee also consulted with the Faculty o f Health Sciences, the 
Regional Cancer Centre and employee representatives [51,63].
A merger would make this new organisation the second largest teaching hospital in 
Canada [48], It was agreed that, until such time the merger was finalised, both 
hospitals would continue with their own restructuring/re-engineering initiatives. It 
was recognised that the two most influential and powerful actors in this change 
process would be M cMaster University and the provincial government and that they 
needed to satisfy the demands o f both these parties if  their proposed merger and 
service re-organisation was to be supported. The University would be expecting the 
hospitals to collaborate with its teaching and research commitments while the MOH 
would expect the hospitals to strictly meet and adhere to their care priorities and fiscal 
budget restraints [147].
The proposed merger between CMH and HCH was a logical solution but it would not 
be without its problems. As potential partners, they were quite similar in relation to 
budgets, bed numbers, staffing complement, patient services and number o f hospital 
sites. The real differences lay in their organisational cultures, style o f management, 
and present budget deficits. CMH had a deficit o f $10.5m at the time o f the proposed 
merger, while HCH was carrying a budget deficit o f only $1.5m (see Chapter 3, Table
3.1 on Comparative Hospital Statistics). The Boards o f both hospitals acknowledged 
that they had been rivals competing for dwindling government funds in the past, but 
now they needed to look at other options if  they were to survive the government’s 
restructuring agenda.
During this initial period o f merger negotiations, the University was not invited to 
participate in the merger discussions. However, when the Boards were unable to 
reach agreement, the University was invited to act as mediator to help resolve the 
issue:
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‘We were finally invited to join the inner circle. People now saw us as the 
honest broker because we really had a vested interest in all sites.’ (Professor, 
Faculty of Health Sciences)
This comment is very much reflective o f Fligstein’s (2001:114) perception o f the 
social skill o f ‘brokering’ rather than ‘blustering’: ‘skilled actors have to convince 
others that they are not narrowly self-interested and that others will gain personally 
from finding a negotiated position’.
It was important that the hospitals kept focused on completing this voluntary merger 
rather than risk mandated hospital closure by the Commission. During the merger 
discussions CMH was continuing with its own major re-engineering project, and HCH 
was continuing with its own re-organisation and in the process o f finalising its 
collaboration agreement with St. Joseph’s. The new merged organisation would 
inherit the collaboration agreement and would continue to define shared programs and 
working practices between both hospitals [9].
The Transition Committee developed a merger framework, which mapped the merger 
timetable and key tasks over the next nine months. The first task was to recommend a 
structure and composition o f a new Board [132], It would also be the Board’s 
responsibility to outline a hiring process and find a new CEO [56].
The Transition Committee realised that integration o f the two organisations depended 
upon identifying, early in the planning process, key actors and stakeholder groups who 
could lead on issues pertaining to medical staff, finance and human resources. These 
stakeholders had both expertise and internal information that was vital in identifying 
potential problems during the transition period and in understanding how each 
organisation would perceive and react to the proposed merger. Mergers are complex 
and these issues needed to be addressed early in the merger process especially where 
the merger spans several hospital sites [Connections, Feb 96].
The Medical S taff Embrace the Merger
The medical staff were already organised through a Medical Advisory Committee in 
each o f the two hospitals. The hospital’s Chiefs o f Staff joined forces and quickly 
prepared reports comparing the clinical departments and structures across the hospital
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sites, highlighting issues they considered w ould need addressing during the m erger 
[56], These issues addressed both m edical staffing concerns and potential clinical 
service problem s. Both the HCH and CM H m edical groups recognised the potential 
advantage o f  the m erger. The M edical A dvisory Com m ittees jo ined  to draft m edical 
by-law s for the new  hospital [57, 58, 59], As a group, the doctors w ere the first 
stakeholders to w ork collectively to support the m erger, raising issues concerning 
practice and professional interests, and subm itted m edical by-law s to the Boards 
before the two hospitals w ere officially m erged [61]. This collective action by  the 
m edical com m unities across both hospitals w ould give the doctors som e political 
pow er and profile w ithin the new  organisation.
‘It was a smart move for the doctors to get together from both hospitals. It 
allowed us to thrash out our differences behind closed doors and present a 
united front to the Board. It was actually very productive and politically it was 
a good move. We felt strongly that we needed to protect our clinical practice 
and specialities’ (Medical Director)
‘The doctors lead the way, as they were the first group to really embrace the 
change. They gave the merger momentum and it helped pave the way for other 
staff.’ (Hospital Vice President)
These by-laws can be seen as a major contribution to the interpretive scheme for the 
merged hospital organisation, as they would inform ‘beliefs and values about 
appropriate principles o f organising’ (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988:295).
6.7 Values and Interests Articulated Again
The Task Force presented its first report to the Hamilton DHC and to the community 
on the 4th March 1996. The main body o f the report ran to 89 pages. The report’s 
five-part strategy examined specific needs and service reconfigurations in the areas o f 
primary care, continuing care, mental health, acute care services and education and 
research [6].
The Task Force acknowledged, and expressed support for, the efforts made in recent 
months by various health organisations in the community to collaborate in governance 
and in service delivery, including the collaboration agreement between St. Joseph's 
Hospital and HCH and the proposed merger o f HCH and CMH. However, the Task 
Force found further opportunities for efficiencies in admission management,
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discharge/transfer management and length o f stay management, and formulated new 
targets [67],
Task Force Recommendations
The Task Force’s main recommendations concerning acute care services were as 
follows. St. Joseph’s would be closed, and its programs and services would be moved 
to the Henderson Hospital site. The Sisters o f St. Joseph would take over the 
governance o f the Henderson site. The existing Hamilton Psychiatric Hospital site 
would also be closed, and the hospital re-located to become an addition to the 
Chedoke hospital site. Thus the number o f acute hospital sites would be reduced from 
four to three, and the total number o f hospital sites would be reduced from seven to 
five. The report noted that this recommended configuration o f acute hospital programs 
and services, which kept an acute hospital on the university campus, was designed to 
acknowledge the value o f an excellence in service, education and research, and to 
provide the critical mass to support strong academic programs [67].
The Task Force report also targeted HCH ’s Henderson site for partial closure with the 
recommendation that several acute services should be re-located to CM H’s McMaster 
site [67]. The Henderson site was location-sensitive for the local mountain community 
and for the Regional Cancer Centre was located on the site. The criteria used to site 
programs and services can be referred to in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: Criteria Used for Distributing Programs across the System
Criteria used by the Health Action Task Force to Site Programs and Services
-critical mass requirements
-co-dependencies and complementarities among programs
-the sites’ physical capacity
-program cultures
-impact on flagship programs
-operating room requirements
-supporting teaching and research requirements
Source: Our Health, Our Future: Comprehensive Health Care Plan for Hamilton - 
Wentworth. The Health Action Task Forcer Report, 4 March 1996, pg.72.
The ramifications o f this recommendation were grossly underestimated.
‘It was a really bold move by the Task Force to announce hospital closures and 
to close St Joe’s which is near and dear to the hearts of so many Hamiltonians. 
W ow ...did this send shock waves across the City. And boy did people sit up 
and take notice then.’ (Trade Union Representative)
‘I don’t know whether the Task Force was naive or was having delusions of 
grandeur to think for one minute they could take on the Catholic Church. They 
had already closed two Catholic hospitals, one in Brantford and the other in 
Guelph and there was no way they would allow this hospital to close and you 
have to realise this was their flagship hospital as well.’ (Hospital Board Member)
‘When the Task Force recommended that St. Joe’s close, they never saw the 
Catholic backlash coming. The Bishop got involved, he rallied the priests and 
the parishioners and the battle began between the Catholics and non-Catholics 
in the community. The message was loud and clear — hands off St. Joe’s.’ 
(Professor, Health Care Task Force)
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Stakeholders Challenge the Task Forceps Report
Between 4 March and April 15 1996 the Task Force received 1,470 calls, 272 faxes, 
1,334 letters, 46,578 mail-in cards, 84,668 signatures on petitions against moving St. 
Joseph’s and 606 other formal submissions. There was widespread community 
support for an integrated health care system and for several o f the recommendations in 
specific areas, such as developing more capacity in long-term and chronic care. 
However, the proposals for reconfiguring the acute care system provoked the strong 
opposition from the community, which expressed concerns about (i) the proposed 
reduction o f acute care hospitals from four to three, (ii) the suggested distribution o f 
acute care programs and services among three sites, and (iii) the methodology used 
and the interpretation o f the data analysis. A number o f submissions expressed 
concern about the need for an implementation plan, the importance o f staging changes 
in the system appropriately, and the need to reinvest any savings in other parts o f the 
health system [69].
The City Council disagreed outright with the Task Force recommendation to close an 
acute site and passed a motion to support four acute care hospitals; it was concerned 
about the economic implications o f such restructuring initiatives and how these 
proposed changes would effect local transportation systems in relation to service 
access. The local community became embroiled in politics and Task Force members 
came under tremendous pressure.
‘It was a scary time. This was an emotive issue and when I arrived at one o f the 
public forums my car my surrounded by pickets, people shouting and pushing 
the car.’ (Chair, Health Action Task Force)
‘The Chair o f the Task Force received death threats, his house was defaced, it 
was unbelievable. The Task Force members were under terrible pressure.’ 
(Professor, Health Action Task Force)
‘So there was a lot o f dirty stuff going on. But no-one has ever really admitted 
that and you know the Task Force people were just trying to be good citizens.
You have to give them credit because they didn’t want to drag out all the dirt 
but they took an awful lot of heat.’ (Hospital Vice President)
The Academic Health Care Network (AHCN) submitted a detailed response to the 
Task Force on 12 April 1996. The members o f the AHCN were HCH, CMH, St. 
Joseph’s, Hamilton Psychiatric Hospital, St. Peter’s Hospital, the Hamilton Regional
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Cancer Centre, the Victorian Order o f Nurses and the Faculty o f Health Sciences o f 
McMaster University [50], The AHCN was thus a powerful coalition o f key 
stakeholders. The A H CN’s response, although largely supportive o f many aspects o f 
the Task Force report, proposed that St. Joseph’s be maintained as a full acute care 
site, and the Henderson hospital be reduced to a cancer hospital with a small number 
o f non-oncological beds and a 24-hour urgent care centre. The AHCN proposal 
argued that future demands for acute care beds would exceed the capacity o f three 
acute care sites and that a fourth site should be retained for acute care to ensure that 
the hospital system retained the flexibility to meet the future needs o f the population 
[69].
‘We weren’t convinced that closing a hospital really addressed the future needs 
of this growing community, especially on the Mountain. It would be staggering 
to contemplate the expense of having to build another hospital in the not to 
distant future.’ (General Practitioner)
The University expressed concern about the potential disruption o f research centres 
with the moving o f hospital sites and hospital programs and services. The Task Force 
had not addressed the impact o f the changes on research and education, leaving this to 
be addressed in the implementation stage [69].
Task Force’s Final Report
After all the submissions received from the community were carefully analysed, the 
Task Force prepared a second report, which it called the ‘Implications Report’, 
addressing the concerns raised by the community. The Task Force observed that it was 
pleased that so many o f the key participants in the system came together to work on 
the issues highlighted in its report [69].
In its Implications Report the Task Force modified some o f its recommendations, to 
accommodate concerns raised by the community, but did not significantly change its 
recommendations with regard to the reconfiguration o f acute care services. The 
Implications Report addressed in detail the AH CN’s proposed alternative 
configuration o f acute care services.
The Task Force’s final submission, comprising its Report o f 4 March 1996 and
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Implications Report o f 13 May 1996 and executive summary, was presented to the 
Hamilton DHC on 13 May 1996 [67, 69], All stakeholders were given a copy. The 
DHC would vote on the recommendations at a meeting later the same month to which 
the public would be invited.
6.8 Key Turning Point: Hamilton DHC Bows to Community Pressure
The DHC contacted every CEO and Board Chair o f the hospitals and all the major 
community agencies in order to determine whether they would support the Task Force 
recommendations. Members o f the DHC were under political, professional and 
emotional pressure to make the right choice.
‘We met with every CEO and Board Chair of the hospitals and all the major 
community agencies to find out where they stood, what they were thinking and 
how they felt the community would handle the outcome with so much 
infighting.’ (Hospital Vice President)
The number attending the DHC’s public meeting far exceeded the DHC’s expectation, 
and the meeting had to be re-convened at the Hamilton Convention Centre with over 
800 in attendance. The political backlash to the proposed closure o f St. Joseph’s 
became more apparent as the meeting progressed.
‘We had no idea there would be such a turn out. We had booked a room for 100 
not 800. The public was enraged, there were demonstrations, DHC members 
were intimidated to the point where some felt they could not vote and the 
meeting was a nightmare.’ (CEO, Community Organisation)
This was a highly dramatic expression o f the beliefs and values o f the wider local 
community. In the end, the DHC voted against the proposed hospital closures and in 
favour o f maintaining four acute sites, three o f which would be full acute hospitals, 
with 4 full emergency rooms. The only hospital site to close would be the Hamilton 
Psychiatric Hospital. The DHC’S final report was forwarded to the MOH on May 29, 
1996 [68], It would then be reviewed by the Commission.
6.9 Hamilton Civic and Chedoke McMaster Hospitals Merge
In June 1996 the joint HCH and CMH merger Transition Committee submitted its 
report on the proposed merger to the hospital Boards, recommending that the Boards
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proceed with the merger. The Committee concluded that the hospitals faced a number 
o f common challenges and would be better placed to address them as a single 
organisational entity, and that benefits could be derived from critical mass, economies 
o f scale, medical staff integration, enhanced relationships with the medical school, 
streamlined management and support services and inter-site integration and 
collaboration [51]. This constituted a fairly comprehensive set o f principles o f 
organising that would form part o f the new interpretive scheme. In considering the 
merits o f the proposed merger the Transition Committee took a number o f factors into 
consideration (see Figure 6.4). It found that the proposed merger was supported by 
many community stakeholders, who believed there was a strong case for merger.
‘..people were prepared to make some hard decisions and shifts when they can 
see the end point.’ (Professor, Member of the Health Action Task Force)
‘Hopefully the merger will side step closure but it’s the Commission we need to 
worry about. Take a look at their track record -  it’s not too promising.’ (Local 
Union President)
‘Restructuring ourselves was the only way we were going to beat the system.’ 
(Hospital Clinical Manager)
The Transition Committee had sought wide-ranging input into the selection o f a name 
for the new legal entity and enlisted the help o f focus groups to draw up a short list. 
The Committee decided to recommend the name ‘Hamilton Health Sciences 
Corporation’, noting that it expected that the individual hospitals/sites would continue 
to be known by their existing names [63].
‘I think calling it the ‘corporation’ was the wrong thing to do because it implied 
business and business implies bottom line not patient care and I think that 
turned off a lot of people.’ (Hospital Director)
‘They really tried to convince the public that this was a great new name -  
banners, bill boards, promotional material. Forget it, the Henderson would 
always be referred to as the Henderson and nothing else.’ (Hospital Program 
Director)
The Committee recommended that the search for a new CEO should be an open 
process [147], The CEO o f HCH applied for the position, unsuccessfully, and at the 
last minute the CEO o f CMH resigned and left the organisation before the merger was 
finalised. The resignation o f the CEO o f CMH caused considerable political fallout 
and bad feelings both within the organisation and among various community
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Figure 6.4: Case for Merger
Factors Taken into Consideration 
Facilitate continuous improvement of the quality of patient care
consolidating clinical programs and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
care delivery systems
developing of an integrated delivery system enhancing the continuity of care 
improving patient access
developing uniform clinical guidelines and care maps 
attracting clinical recruits 
Enhance education and research
better co-ordination and integration of activities with the University 
developing specialisation and research reputation 
attract research expertise and funding 
Enhance the leadership position in the health system
Simplify decision-making and improve relationship with other stakeholders
Strengthen the ability to deal with current fiscal pressures:
economies of scale - combining administration and management producing- 
savings from the elimination of duplication, streamlining and standardising 
internal processes and the integration of systems
easier implementation of support services
a larger and more powerful purchasing base for a wide-range of products and 
services, (more attractive agreements and contracts with suppliers).
estimated operating cost savings in excess of $9 million per year.
Source: Chedoke-McMaster and Hamilton Civic Hospitals Proposed Merger, Report of the 
Transition Committee. June 1996, pp. 9-11.
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stakeholders.
‘What kind of message does it give the staff when the leader abandons them 
before the change process and key decisions are made. Some of the folks that 
worked with her were saying that they felt betrayed.’ (Hospital Director)
‘The CEO actually left before the merger and so they felt a little bit abandoned.
I think they didn’t have the same preparation. They weren’t a team in fact they 
were anything but a team and it had some impact on our team functioning as the 
new group but you could see the difference in fact some of the people 
previously at McMaster say you know we were really a little bit jealous at the 
cohesiveness of your group so I believe strongly that the preparation for merger 
makes a difference.’ (Hospital Vice President)
The Boards o f HCH and CMH accepted the Committee’s recommendations and 
accompanying draft by-laws and other legal documentation. The approved resolution 
to amalgamate CMH and HCH and completed legal papers were sent to the MOH in 
July 1996 for approval, with a proposed effective date for the merger o f 1 October 
1996 [63,56]. The MOH approved the merger as proposed.
As is clear from the above account o f events, the process o f negotiating and agreeing 
comprehensive merger terms was completed in a matter o f months. The Commission 
had yet to turn its attention to Hamilton and it was possible that it would require 
further re-structuring; however in the meantime the process o f implementing the 
merger terms would begin.
6.10 The Post-M erger Phase: The Restructuring Process Begins
The first two staff appointments to be made in the new hospital were the external 
appointment o f the CEO and the internal appointment o f the Chief o f Staff [21,131].
‘I think for me it even confirms more when appointing a new CEO in a merged 
organisation you can begin to understand how problematic it would be bringing 
in one of the existing CEOs no matter what decision they make it would always 
be seen as biased.’ (Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences)
The new Board o f  Trustees, the joint Medical Advisory Committee and the CEO were 
now in place and ready to take the hospital forward through a series o f restructuring 
stages [63], The new hospital was thus developing the capacity for action necessary to 
manage the transition from one template o f organising to another (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996).
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The organisational restructuring process was envisioned to take place over the next 
five years [52], The following goals were identified as priorities for the first 6 months. 
First, an interim senior management team would be appointed. This would be crucial 
for developing a new organisational structure [109]. Secondly, the CEO would begin 
to set the strategic direction o f the new corporation. This would involve the 
introduction o f a new approach to the strategic planning process and the development 
of the preliminary mission, vision and , value statements for the organisation [55, 21]. 
The third set o f tasks involved establishing the building blocks necessary to facilitate 
the integration o f programs and services [116,117]. These included the development o f  
processes and structures in such areas as human resources, communication strategies 
both internal and external and the logistics o f information transfer across sites [109, 
113], While the final set o f tasks focused on developing specific integration plans for 
the clinical programs, specialist services and support departments. The process o f  
integrating programs and services had to take into account issues in the wider context, 
including the restructuring agenda, the program re-design initiatives and resource 
management [109], All o f  these activities and changes were in preparation for the 
Commission’s review [63]. This would be a major hurdle for the Corporation because 
the Commission still had the power to challenge and reject any o f the changes
Senior Management Team
The hospital management would now be responsible for four sites. The size o f the 
hospital had doubled and a management presence to support staff at each campus 
would be a key consideration in the organisational design . (Refer to Table 3.1 in 
Chapter 3)
The selection o f the senior management team would be a two-stage process. The 
transitional team was established at the onset o f the new organisation in September 
1996 with 11 Vice Presidents selected from an existing group o f 23 senior executives 
[71]. The transitional management team would be in place for 18 to 24 months. The 
appointments were split between the two hospitals’ management groups. Each senior 
VP would be responsible for activity on all four sites.
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The new CEO chose a transitional management structure similar to that used by the 
two hospitals so as to minimise disruption to these ongoing processes [106, 107], The 
transitional management team would be responsible for overseeing the organisational 
restructuring and program integration phase o f the merger before any further 
downsizing o f the senior executive group and reduction o f the number o f clinical 
programs [71]. The transitional management structure can be seen in Figure 6.5.
The transitional management team was downsized again in 1999 leaving 8 Vice 
Presidents to take the organisation through the restructuring process [71]. Each time 
the senior team was downsized their respective organisational portfolios and span of  
control would increase. Figure 6.6 shows the configuration o f the final management 
structure.
Setting a New Strategic Direction
Although both hospitals had supported a management style which encouraged and 
championed participation from the bottom up, this was not to be the management style 
in the new organisation. The new CEO described his role as that o f a strategist, 
setting the organisation’s direction with the support o f the Board. The CEO stated 
that the merger was about optimising resources and enhancing quality [95a], The main 
challenge surrounding this merger was that it was occurring at a time o f shrinking 
revenue. The CEO wrote in document stating that mergers were about:
‘leveraging synergies between organisations and making the most out of the 
collective resources’ [55].
The CEO would have to be decisive and directive in the current climate o f rapid 
change, and expeditious in his approach to strategic planning because the luxury o f  
long term planning was gone [89]. Many o f the issues which needed to be taken into 
consideration had already been flagged by the Commission, such as reducing length o f  
stay targets.
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its final edict and it would be this balancing act that would be the real test for the new 
hospital’s leadership. In this period o f limbo the leadership would have to bring about 
the changes required to move the merger forward and still deliver quality patient care, 
while at the same time trying to second guess what changes the Commission would 
recommend. The hospital’s new CEO stated:
‘...in terms of strategic planning, we were essentially just trying to tread water 
to survive the restructuring. Trying to plan for the future was difficult because 
we were about to move into a era of provincially mandated restructuring, 
whereby the restructuring commission could decide what programs we ran to 
what buildings we used. They had the power to dictate our future and make all 
the decisions for us.’
Defining and Supporting the Core Business and Mission o f  the Corporation
The CEO decided that an inclusive and consultative approach to planning should be 
used in this environment o f rapid continuous change. The strategy document was 
presented to 14 different focus groups [75], Their feedback played a major part in re­
shaping the Corporation’s strategy. This focus group approach was found to be 
extremely successful and had been used twice during the transition management phase. 
It provided a fair amount o f information from a variety o f highly respected community 
leaders who had a wide breadth o f experience and expertise in the field o f health care. 
Their feedback was constructive and relevant for an organisation and community 
undergoing transition.
‘I have actually found that focus group activity significantly informs what our 
strategy is and it ensures better alignment between strategy and community 
need.’ (New Hospital CEO)
During the strategic planning process the first task for the new senior management 
team was to develop a new mission and value statement [84], The core business and 
missions o f the Corporation would include community hospital services, regional 
referral services, highly specialised services and chronic care and rehabilitation [102], 
As a teaching hospital, education and research were also major components o f the 
mission. The hospital structure would need to reflect the organisation’s mission and 
assure leadership accountability for each core component o f the organisation’s 
mission [73], Thus the new hospital (Corporation) is formulating its own new 
archetype: mission and values are to be reflected in the hospital’s structure and
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systems. Here we see an example o f an archetype not derived from an existing 
template in the institutional sphere, but one created by the organisation itself from a 
newly defined set o f mission and values.
In order to make the transition to the new archetype, however, the new hospital would 
need to have sufficient understanding o f  the new conceptual destination, the skills and 
competencies required to function in that new destination, and the ability to manage 
the process o f getting there. Having all o f these constitutes capacity for action 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). The first o f  these was found to present no difficulty:
‘Defining the hospital’s mission and creating the vision statement wasn’t so bad.
We were lucky because both hospitals had relatively similar value statements.
So we were able to bring these together and merge them. We were more or less 
on the same page already.’ (New Hospital Executive Vice President)
‘Getting consensus about the vision statement was really important in the early 
stages because everyone needed to agree where we were going and what was 
expected of them. After I arrived it was clear to me that we were going to need 
to put some key statements in place and so we developed pretty early on a 
statement of mission, vision and values which then led to a management 
retreat.’ (New Hospital CEO)
‘As mergers go, it is my true belief that the merger between Chedoke McMaster 
and the Hamilton Civics is as easy as a merger of this size and complexity can 
get. There was good alignment really between the two organisations overall.’ 
(Hospital Vice President)
Processes and Structure: Testing Capacity fo r  Action
It was decided that the new structure would be relatively flat, with a preference for 
fewer rather than more reporting levels [71,95a, 98], The senior executive level o f the 
organisation would be substantially leaner with one whole senior level o f 
administration removed.
The next level o f management to be put in place would be the program/department 
directors [94], Determining the optimal structure design at the program level would be 
challenging because o f the complexity o f multi-site locations. The planning would 
process would need to include broad consultation and collaboration with both internal 
staff and external stakeholders [106, 98], This would be the joint responsibility o f the
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Vice Presidents, program directors, key medical staff and a newly created Office o f 
Integration.
While their values were similar, the merging organisation had different structures. 
CMH had a decentralised program management structure while HCH was developing 
a more modified approach [17, 34], The new HHSC would now result in 19 clinical 
programs across four clinical portfolios [78], The spread and scope o f this new 
program structure can be seen in Figure 6.7 and gave rise to problems o f 
manageability, testing the new hospital’s capacity for action:
‘Questions are being raised about how many programs there are and how they 
should be organised. We will look then at what resources are allocated to it, 
what kind of administrative support is available, how many clinical managers 
are there reporting to program directors and how much management is at the 
front line level. The sense I’m getting here is there isn’t enough and that the 
downsizing in the management structure has been too severe.’ (Hospital 
Executive Vice President)
‘19 clinical programs is too many. It was far too ambitious to structure, let 
alone assign staff. Moving staff across sites had become a labour relations 
nightmare.’ (Senior Hospital Director)
‘Program management can be a good way of delivering patient care if all parties 
are committed to making it work but it takes a lot of work, communication, 
team building resources and time.’ (Hospital Clinical Manager)
‘We had way too many programs. Really it was unmanageable but the problem 
was that we were just following orders and we thought we were being equitable 
and fair but no one at that time had enough history to critique the process. This 
was a new experience for all of us sitting around the table.’ (Hospital Vice 
President)
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Figure 6.7: Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation Clinical Programs, 1997
CLINICAL PORTFOLIOS PROGRAMS





Regional Services Critical Care
Cardiac and Vascular
Bums, Musculoskeletal and Trauma
Digestive Diseases
Neurosciences
Special Services Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
Women’s Health 
Acute Children’s Services 
Child and Family Centre
Chronic Care and Rehabilitation Rehabilitation 
Acquired Brain Injury 
Health Services for the Elderly 
Chronic Care




Source: Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation Operating Plan for the Fiscal Year 1997-1998. 
Published August 1997.
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The Clinical Programs task force co-ordinated all efforts across programs. Sub­
groups were established to set out guiding principles and directions. Each group was 
responsible for defining the clinical programs and the program organisational structure, 
designing patient care delivery models specific to that particular program and 
developing templates for resource management [107], This approach ensured 
consistency and management standards across the different clinical programs.
The HR system and policies in each hospital were very different and the systems 
could not communicate with each other. Designing a compatible IT system would 
become an on-going project for the next 3 years [83], Labour relation issues were also 
a major problem. The two HCH hospitals and Chedoke Hospital were unionised, but 
McMaster had never been unionised. This created tremendous tension between the 
hospitals.
Managing Organisational Transition and Integration
The integration process was be overseen by several different task forces. Each task 
force was accountable to a member o f the senior management team, who would be 
responsible for that specific portfolio. The task forces had clearly defined goals, 
objectives and target dates, and membership was open to hospital staff and 
medical/professional staff. Members were included from each hospital site [107], This 
approach was in line with Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) argument that capacity for 
action embraces both the availability o f the necessary skills and their mobilisation. 
The seven task forces appointed covered the following areas: human resources, 
transition management (staff support), information and decision support systems, 
professional staff organisation, research and education, clinical services and programs 
and support services and other departments [107,139,113]. This use o f staff expertise 
was an effective approach, as it both reflected and developed an internal commitment 
to change and assisted the staff in understanding and confronting resistance to 
program changes. Such commitment greatly assisted the new hospital’s ability to 
manage the transition and is thus an enabling dynamic o f change (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996).
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The redesign project team was responsible for working with the clinical portfolio staff 
and defining, implementing and evaluating the strategies for the redesign initiatives
[80]. Its main role was to try and influence the change process at the program level, 
but there were many problems that impeded their progress and threatened to 
undermine the whole process.
‘Many of the frontline staff felt the pressure to change was driven by the senior 
management with little input from the front line staff. The timeframe was too 
quick. It was unrealistic. Everyone was feeling overloaded. Units were closing, 
programs were moving, staff were being bumped. It was a crazy time and 
stressful for everyone.’ (Hospital Staff Nurse)
In addition to its internal restructuring agenda the new Corporation needed to be 
responsive to external pressure coming from the impending review by the 
Commission and on-going collaborative projects with St. Joseph’s and other health 
care providers [107,115].
6.11 The Health Services Restructuring Commission Evaluates the Hospital 
Merger and Service Re-configuration Changes
In April 1997, the Commission began its work in Hamilton. Its first task was to study 
the DHC’s health care restructuring recommendations for the City and to review any 
other written submissions from interested organisations or individuals [67,119]. Thus, 
once again, stakeholders would be invited to articulate their beliefs and values.
The Corporation submitted a report to the Commission to provide it with a more 
complete understanding o f the Corporation as a newly merged health care 
organisation as well as to offer comment on issues relevant to the work o f the 
Commission [81].
The Corporation and the Academic Health Care Network: a United Front
The Corporation’s report submitted to the Commission described the progress made 
since the merger between CMH and HCH and expressed its support for the 
recommendations made by the DHC to the MOH [87, 88, 120, 121]. The Corporation 
acknowledged the need for restructuring as a response to fiscal constraints imposed by
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the government, but emphasised the collaborative response and voluntary 
restructuring already initiated in Hamilton as a local solution [81].
The merger o f CMH and HCH provided evidence o f Hamilton’s commitment to 
responsible health services restructuring. The Corporation had demonstrated its 
commitment to enhancing value by consolidation programs to increase clinical 
excellence, facilitated by unified governance and management. It was supporting 
community partnerships through the agreement with St. Joseph’s Hospital, on a 
number o f collaborative projects, aimed at rationalising services and decreasing costs
[81]. The Corporation’s programs and services were distributed across four campuses 
and they provided primary, secondary and tertiary care for both the population o f  
Hamilton and the region. The AHCN’s report corroborated the submissions made by 
the Corporation [105].
The Commission Issues its First Report
The Commission conducted site visits in Hamilton in June 1997 and its members met 
with residents, administrators, board members, physicians, professionals, labour 
representatives and others in an effort to better understand the issues affecting and 
interrelationships among the hospitals and other health services in the region [87], The 
Commission’s initial report was issued in November 1997 and the health care 
community was given 30 days in which to respond to the report. The Corporation 
requested and was granted an extension, and were given a final deadline o f January 18, 
1998 [88, 89].
The Health Services Restructuring Report supported many o f the proposals put 
forward by the DHC. It proposed that the Corporation and St Joseph’s should 
function as two separate hospitals and agreed to keep the Henderson as a full service 
acute facility specialising in oncology and an emergency department [87]. The health 
care community was disappointed however with the Commission’s proposal that St. 
Peter’s Hospital and the Chedoke hospital site would cease to operate as hospitals, 
which would severely affect the rehabilitation and chronic care roles o f both. [90].
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The initial reactions o f most stakeholders to the report were positive, and they felt 
they could work with the recommendations put forward by the Commission [88], It 
would now be the responsibility o f the hospital boards and other community 
stakeholders to respond to the report.
‘Actually we came out of the restructuring process completely unscathed 
compared to other hospitals in the province -  we still have all our sites.’ 
(Surgeon)
Stakeholders Respond
The health care community was hoping to respond to the Commission report as one 
voice but found it impossible, even with the extension, to achieve this objective. 
Therefore, it was agreed that stakeholders would submit their own response to the 
restructuring report [97],
The Corporation and St. Joseph’s supported most o f the acute care recommendations 
and decided to continue with the clinical program integration plans [121]. The area in 
which there was significant disagreement with the Commission’s proposal was the 
proposed closure o f the Chedoke site and the re-location o f complex continuing care. 
It was considered that all complex continuing care beds should be sited on one 
location.
The DHC, in its response to the Commission, supported the Corporation in its concern 
about the closure o f the Chedoke site and transferring o f chronic care beds [119]. It 
was also concerned about the apparent lack o f commitment to inclusive partnerships 
across primary, secondary and social care boundaries to ensure a responsive and 
functionally integrated health care service in Hamilton.
The Community Develops an Alternative Plan fo r Complex Continuing Care
The Corporation decided it needed to be proactive on the issue o f complex continuing 
care services. It was unlikely that St. Peter’s Hospital could successfully challenge 
the Commission’s decision on its own. In April 1998, another report was submitted 
to the Commission which recommended a regionally integrated health care system for 
seniors, that St. Peter’s Hospital would manage all complex continuing care in the
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region and that the University would develop a Research Centre in Ageing and Health. 
[125,160,200], These recommendations were accepted by the Commission and became 
part o f its final restructuring report.
The Commission Finalises the Plan
It took one year, from April 1997 to May 1998, for the Commission to complete and 
submit its final restructuring report to the Hamilton health community [129]. The 
report incorporated many o f the stakeholders recommendations. Program and service 
allocations for the individual hospitals are shown in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Summary of Acute Care Restructuring in Hamilton-Wentworth, May 1998
HOSPITAL ROLES
St. Joseph’s Hospital
• regional programs in nephrology, acute and longer term mental health, respiratory and
thoracic surgery and complex continuing care
• ambulatory and urgent care services
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation
• McMaster site - focus on high risk obstetrics and inpatient paediatrics
• General site - focus on cardiovascular sciences, neurosurgery and trauma. Designated
regional rehabilitation centre.
• Henderson site - focus on oncology and haematology programs and serve as host
hospital for the Regional Cancer Centre.
• Chedoke site - provide complex continuing care and acquired brain injury
rehabilitation services.
Source:: Hamilton -Wentworth Health Services Restructuring Report, May 1998.
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The Commission had projected that the estimated restructuring capital expenditure for 
Hamilton would be in the region o f $77.2 million while the speciality service and 
community based care reinvestment initiative would cost $55 million [129]. In total 
for the province o f Ontario, the Commission had recommended annual reinvestment 
o f $900 million in community based services and over $1.4 billion for renovations and 
new construction in hospitals. This had been the largest capital spending program in 
the history o f Ontario’s public health care [128],
6.12 The New Corporate Hospital Archetype
The new hospital Corporation’s archetype is shown in summary form in Figure 7.1. 
The hospital’s mission, value and vision statements prior to the merger are analysed 
and compared to those o f the Corporation. Archetype transition is apparent. The 
Corporation was more about forging and managing collaborative community 
partnerships and providing data to support both clinical outcomes and funding 
expectations. These underlying values and beliefs support the emergence o f a new 
hospital archetype which started out as a patient focused service and has evolved to 
one that is now more performance driven.
Structures and Systems
The senior management team o f the Corporation and most o f the program directors 
were in post by 1999. A new Chief Operating Officer position was created, freeing 
the CEO from operational responsibilities thus allowing him to have more time to 
work with the Board and the medical staff, nurture better relationships with the 
University and community agencies and to oversee the hospital restructuring as 
instructed by the Commission [127].
The program management model was being implemented across the hospital sites and 
this initiative was now suffering from a number o f teething problems. First, it 
demanded an enormous amount o f time and commitment by the staff involved. 
Secondly, implementation o f the radical change process can be expected to take years, 
not months: a number o f researchers have suggested that not less than three years is 
required to gain an understanding o f how such changes are proceeding (e.g. Nadler
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and Tushman, 1989; Huber and Van de Ven, 1995). This protracted period o f change 
puts enormous pressure on both staff and patients. The message from frontline staff 
was that the downsizing in the middle management structure had been too severe with 
many cross-site appointments. The span o f control o f these managers and number o f 
staff reporting to them was unrealistic [109], As reported by one o f the Clinical 
managers:
‘..you know you’re in trouble when your own staff were now being admitted to 
the ER with chest pains and other anxiety disorders straight from work on the 
ward and long term leave no longer meant a few weeks we were now talking 
months. It was also reported by HR that the hospitals insurer (staff benefit 
package) had reported a substantial rise in anti-depressant prescriptions for 
staff.’
Another question raised about program management would be the number o f 
programs across the organisation and whether some o f these should be consolidated. 
It would become apparent that there was considerable inequity in both the size and 
resources available to some o f  the programs [111]. The program re-design teams also 
thought there were too many programs. It was decided that some programs could be 
collapsed into other streams of care and others would have to be closed and 
transferred to other service providers in the community.
Interpretive Scheme
The Corporation’s interpretive scheme was characterised by a focus on performance - 
driven service (quality and efficiency), organisational autonomy, and the role o f a 
major regional provider.
Collaborations and Alliances
The Corporation was developing into a networked organisation as its organisational 
affiliations, collaborations, strategic alliances, management service contracts and joint 
ventures got under way [123], Refer to Figure 6.9 for the new configuration o f 
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation.
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‘Our model really has been one hospital on four sites rather than four hospitals 
with a shared administrative structure — in other words we are a new hospital.’ 
(Hospital Board Member)
Regional Affiliations
As teaching hospital, the Corporation’s predecessors had long standing links to both 
M cMaster University and Mohawk College, both o f which were responsible for 
providing on-going medical and affiliated health care teaching and research. They 
were also actively involved with the numerous Research Institutes in Hamilton [133],
Collaboration Agreement with St. Joseph’s Hospital
The collaboration agreement between HCH and St. Joseph’s, inherited by the 
Corporation, was designed to share support and clinical services in an attempt to 
reduce costs and duplication [133,145],
Strategic Alliance Agreement with St. Peter’s
The Corporation’s alliance with St. Peter’s Hospital arose naturally through their 
joining together to respond to the Commission’s original restructuring proposals. This 
alliance would lead to the consolidation o f service for the care o f seniors, including 
complex continuing care, long term care, homes for the aged and the development o f a 
research institute for the elderly [160,163,164,200].
Hospital Management Service Contracts
In 1997, the Corporation entered into management services agreements with Groves 
M emorial Community Hospital (Fergus, Ontario) and W est Lincoln Memorial 
Hospital (Grimsby, Ontario). Under these arrangements the Corporation would be 
responsible for the day-to-day management and administration o f these hospitals [123]. 
Each hospital would retain its separate governance through independent Boards o f 
Trustees but the chief administrators would be from the Corporation’s senior 
m anagement team [133],
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International Joint Ventures
During 1998, the Corporation entered a contract with InterHealth Canada Limited to 
act as a consultant to assure the implementation o f appropriate health care standards in 
the development o f the first private hospital to be built in Beijing [77], This hospital 
would provide medical and health care services primarily but not exclusively to the 
expatriate population in China. The Beijing Toronto International Hospital project 
would provide a base consulting income plus performance bonuses when the project 
was completed [77], Another international hospital project was also undertaken in Abu 
Dhabi. These international business ventures were a first for acute care hospitals in 
Ontario.
6.13 Financial Problems
M any o f  the stakeholders interviewed thought in retrospect that the Task Force had 
been right to recommend closure o f one o f the acute hospitals, and that it was simply 
not feasible to run and maintain four acute hospitals in Hamilton. Other cities in 
Ontario o f comparable size had fewer ERs and fewer acute hospitals.
In common with all hospitals across Ontario, the Corporation experienced significant 
financial problems following the Bill 26 restructuring reforms. As o f October 1998 
the Corporation’s operating deficit was around $38 million. A deficit o f $42 million 
was predicted in the operating plan o f April 1998, if  estimated wage increases and 
Y2K costs were included [72, 89, 149, 145]. The premium o f operating four sites had 
increased staff costs by about $10 million compared to other Ontario hospitals o f 
similar size [Loop, Oct 98]. The breakdown o f the $38 million deficit can be seen below:
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Table 6.1 Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation - 1998 Deficit
Deficit Source Amount
Carried forward from the 1997 deficit: $12m
Decrease in revenue: $4m
Increase in costs for wages and on-going projects: $22m
Loop Newsletter, October 1998.
There was no doubt that the restructuring o f Canada’s health care system had been an 
unprecedented experiment in social and organisational change, carried out in what was 
a very short period o f time for a field so complex. Yet further efficiencies and cost 
reductions would need to be found, in a way that would not jeopardise patient care. 
The Corporation had already informed the Commission that its benchmarks were too 
aggressive and in order to meet these targets a cost reduction plan would have to be 
implemented which would affect patient care and also necessitate more staff lay-offs 
[74, 75, 133],
In April 1999, the Corporation finally received the financial contribution to 
restructuring costs that had been promised by the MOH back in December 1996, in 
the form o f a one-time grant for working capital and merger related costs o f $25 
million, an incremental base funding adjustment o f $7.7 million, and an additional 
funding o f $9 million tied to new programs, and extra funding to support the Y2K 
initiative [155], This additional money meant that the Corporation’s 1999 fiscal year 
would now end with a deficit o f  $10 million instead o f $42 million.
In October 1999 the MOH initiated an Operational Review and Clinical Audit to 
determine reasons for the financial deficit and to develop a multi-year recovery plan to 
bring the Corporation back to a balanced budget position [155].
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6.14 Summary
In this case, the threat posed by Bill 26 o f compulsory closures or other restructuring 
o f hospitals in Hamilton caused the three acute hospitals and other stakeholders to 
adopt a voluntary merger o f two o f the hospitals and a collaboration agreement 
involving the third. These measures successfully avoided any compulsory 
restructuring being imposed by government agencies or independent review bodies, 
and resulted in an archetype transition from the patient-centred General Hospital form 
previously operated by the merging hospitals to a Corporate archetype on which the 
new hospital formed by the merger was based.
Over a matter o f only months the merger was negotiated, agreed, planned 
meticulously, approved by the MOH and initiated. Implementation began 
immediately following the M O H ’s approval and was pursued notwithstanding that the 
merger had yet to be evaluated by the Commission and may not have satisfied its 
requirements for savings and restructuring. There were no reversals, delays, periods 
o f inertia, or shizoid positions at any time and thus a transformatory track o f change 
was followed at revolutionary pace. When a possible obstacle to the merger appeared, 
in the form o f antagonism between hospital chief executives, both were immediately 
removed from the negotiation process. Analysis revealed that the new hospital 
showed remarkable capacity for action in the face o f severe implementation problems 
including resentment among some front line employees.
An interesting feature in this case is the high degree o f co-operation between medical 
professional and managers: professional autonomy was never challenged, even under 
the new Corporate archetype. This probably reflects the tradition in Ontario (and 
indeed in the other Provinces) o f medical professionals occupying management 
positions and often holding managerial qualifications such as MHA or MBA degrees. 
Mention has been made in Chapter 2 o f the growth o f ‘commercialised 
professionalism ’ as a possible explanation for the resilience o f sedimented archetypes. 
This case perhaps illustrates ‘managerial professionalism’.
W hat is particularly interesting about this case, however, is the fact that the hospitals 
and other stakeholders were given the opportunity to come up with their own solution
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locally to the problems addressed by Bill 26, for consideration by the Commission. 
The MOH as ultimate funder o f the hospital system had the power to simply close 
hospitals down, but as was recognised by some interviewees, adopted a politically 
astute stance by interposing two levels o f independent review (the provincial 
Commission and the local Task Force). This is a manifestation o f social skill going 
somewhat further than Fligstein’s example o f letting others think that others are in 
control. In this case, control was, to a degree, actually devolved to the stakeholders, in 
the form o f an opportunity to come up with their own plan rather than have one 
imposed on them.
Social skills apparent in the case were o f a positive nature: brokering, for example. 
Skills oriented towards manipulated or coerced co-operation (such as agenda-setting, 
isolation o f opponents) were not apparent or needed, reflecting the field - wide co­
operation between stakeholders which in turn was enabled by the way in which the 
MOH chose to exercise its power.
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CHAPTER 7
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF THE CASES
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter the hospital cases will be compared in relation to the role and 
interaction o f government agencies and stakeholder groups in the pre-merger 
consultation process and the post-merger organisational restructuring and service 
integration stage. These changes will then be further examined in terms o f whether a 
new organisational form has emerged as a result o f  the restructuring agendas.
In the English case the reform agenda was controlled from the top down and the 
government (through its Regional and District Health Authorities) was actively 
involved at every stage o f the change process. In contrast, reform in the Ontario case 
evolved from the bottom up, with the local community taking responsibility for 
service re-design and change. In each case stakeholder groups and key actors were 
described in reference to their individual power positions and by the political alliances 
that they forged in the wider health care community. The interaction between these 
groups provided insight into the power dynamics that would shape the pre-merger 
change process.
There were certain key events in each case whereby groups o f actors challenged the 
political power and control o f the government, resulting in either division or co­
operation between groups. Conflict emerged between groups in the English case 
while powerful coalitions developed in the Ontario case. In the Ontario case solidarity 
among the health care community and the public prevented two hospital closures and 
supported a voluntary merger. The conflict within the health care community in the 
English case was largely attributable to the control and manipulation o f the pre-merger 
review and consultation process by a Regional Health Authority whose primary goal 
was to close the NGH.
W ith regard to organisational restructuring and service re-configuration, the hospitals 
involved in both countries went through several transitional management stages before 
the final structure emerged. The re-design and implementation o f the program 
management and clinical directorate structures were based on project management
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principles in both instances. However, the integration o f staff and the restructuring o f 
board and senior levels o f management were done differently in each case. In the 
Ontario hospitals, a new organisational archetype, which we will call the multi-site 
networked hospital (with more o f an entrepreneurial culture than its predecessor) 
emerged from the change processes. In Figure 7.1 the researcher compares the 
original general hospital archetype with the new multi-site hospital archetype. In 
contrast, the new English hospital structure retained many of the fundamental 
characteristics and features o f the RVI Trust structure, and was not a new hospital 
archetype, but simply an enlarged and somewhat elaborated version o f the RVI Trust.
A merger typology is developed to demonstrate the relationship between the research 
findings and the constructs o f archetype theory and Fligstein’s ideas. The first part o f 
the typology highlights the power dynamics during the pre-merger phase and the 
second part focuses on archetypal development in the hospitals. This typology can be 
seen in Figure 7.2.
7.2 Contextual Comparison
An appropriate starting point for comparing the cases is what Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) call the “exogenous variables” o f market and institutional context.
Market Context
In both cases there was considerable upheaval in the acute care sector. The acute care 
system had either failed to respond, or was responding too slowly to the changing 
trends in health care delivery. These advances ranged from new medical technologies 
and practices to a greater public awareness and demand for better service. The 
prevailing market themes in health care were both influenced by politics, competing 
demands for resources and a growing need for more community based programs and 
services.
In Newcastle, the service delivery model for acute care had remained basically 
unchanged and unchallenged since the Freeman Hospital was built in the 1970s. There
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were serious problems with hospital services in Newcastle including lengthy waiting 
lists, inadequate use o f resources, poor service planning, a significant backlog in 
building maintenance costs and financial pressures resulting from inefficient 
organisation o f services. In Hamilton, like the rest o f Ontario, hospital resources were 
being used to maintain hospital surplus capacity while other needs were increasing, 
and in some cases remained unmet, including the need for increased home care, 
community mental health and long-term care beds, and for different hospital services 
such as sub-acute care, rehabilitation, MRIs and other highly specialised and costly 
services.
The Ontario provincial government was spending 52% o f its health care budget on 
hospitals; similarly the British government was spending 51% o f its health care budget 
on acute services (Mhatre et al., 1992; Burke et al., 1993 and Baggott, 1994). Both 
governments had adopted a policy o f radical re-shaping o f health care services to 
improve quality, range and cost-effectiveness, with a significant redirection o f funding 
from the acute hospital sector into primary and community health services. In both 
cases, the acute hospitals were facing a substantial reduction in government funding.
Institutional Context
In both cases, the hospitals were multi-site and provided a range o f services for their 
respective communities. There were two acute care hospitals involved in the merger 
in Hamilton (Chedoke McMaster and Hamilton Civic), and two acute care hospitals 
involved in the amalgamation o f acute services in Newcastle (Royal Victoria 
Infirmary and Newcastle General). These organisations were also broadly similar in 
size, particularly in reference to bed count, services provided and budget.
In Newcastle, following the introduction o f the internal market and the split between 
purchasers and providers in 1991, the hospitals were required to negotiate service 
contracts and funding with nine different Health Authorities. Whilst this arrangement 
was somewhat more complex than that in Ontario (see Figure 4.3), the cases are 
comparable in terms o f hospital funding because ultimately hospitals in both countries 
are primarily funded by the government through public taxation.
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The major difference between the hospitals in each case was the formal governance 
structure. In Hamilton, all the acute hospitals were governed by independent, 
autonomous boards. In Newcastle, the RVI and Freeman Hospitals were self- 
governing trusts, and therefore broadly comparable in terms o f autonomy to the 
Hamilton hospitals. However, Newcastle General Hospital was refused trust status 
and was still a Directly Managed Unit o f the Newcastle Health Authority. Therefore, 
it is arguable that NGH was not a “self directed organisation” but only part o f another 
organisation, the Newcastle Health Authority. In addition to being deprived o f official 
‘trust status’ , NGH as a DM unit within the NHS was subject to what many at the 
sharp end saw as
“oppressive top-down management practised in what many regarded as the
biggest bureaucracy in Europe” (Caines, 1993:130).
M ore importantly, from at least as early as September 1992 (several months before the 
launch o f the Acute Services Review), NGH was not invited to take part in any key 
discussions between the Regional Health Authority and the Chief Executives o f the 
RVI and Freeman hospitals concerning reconfiguration o f acute services in Newcastle, 
and only became aware o f any governmental proposals for change (the “Larry 
document”) when the plans were published in the local newspaper following a report 
leak to the press. In short, whether or not NGH could be considered an 
“organisation”, it did not in any event have the capacity to respond to the market 
pressures for change independently o f the RHA.
7.3 The Review and Consultation Process
Public health care sector review and consultation can be defined as a process in which 
the government initiates a review o f the sector with a view to bringing about some 
form o f change, and in which stakeholder groups provide government agencies with 
feedback in the form o f written reports or verbal presentations on a specific issue or 
proposed change that may affect the stakeholders’ organisations or services, or 
specific patient groups. There appears to be no comparable model in the private 
sector.
If  this formalised feedback mechanism is unique to the public sector perhaps it is an 
attempt to show the public that the government is attempting to be transparent and
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perhaps even accountability about public spending. In the health care sector the use 
o f consultation recognises that many services or agencies have a reciprocal or 
interdependent relationship, so that changes in one organisation can often have an 
impact on the others in the same or a related sector. This is one reason why change in 
the public sector is so complex (Ashbumer et al, 1996; Kitchener and Whipp, 1996 
and Denis et al., 2001).
In the UK, the government’s nation-wide change agenda was too ambitious and the 
health care sector had become overloaded with government initiatives. Hospitals were 
applying for Trust status, community services, hospitals and government departments 
were merging and a new primary care service model was being implemented in spite 
o f all the other system change. All these initiatives were happening simultaneously 
across the health care system and each time a change was proposed a consultation 
process was initiated. Many consultation processes required input from the same 
stakeholder groups and stakeholders were often involved in as many as 15 
consultations within a two-year period.
The consultation process in the Ontario case was not as complex. Although the 
provincial government's change agenda was ambitious in that it was proposing whole- 
system change in the long term, it was much more focused on the short term and 
advocated that change proposals should be initiated at the service level. The roles o f 
the MOH and the independent review bodies and the community were clearly defined 
during this process. The MOH made a conscious effort to operate at arm's length 
from the community by appointing independent bodies to carry out the review and 
recommend service and organisational changes.
There were only three consultation processes in the Ontario case. The first was 
carried out by a local review body and was focused on system and service change 
across the local health care community in Hamilton. The second review focused 
specifically on the proposed hospital merger between two o f the main stakeholders, 
HCH and CMH. The third was a scaled-down repeat o f the first, this time carried out 
by a provincial review body. It is important to highlight that these consultations were 
all focused on changes that would directly affect the stakeholders involved in the 
consultation process, whereas many o f the English stakeholders were involved in
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consultations about services and organisations external to their immediate service 
boundaries.
7.4 The Role of the Government Agencies in the Review and Consultation 
Process
The British government (through the Department o f Health) and the Ontario 
provincial government (Ministry o f Health) were respectively responsible for 
initiating the reforms in the health care sector, and both had decided that acute care 
hospitals would be the primary target for service rationalisation. Both governments 
adopted a formalised and structured approach to introducing change. The government 
would appoint a review group drawn from the local health care community to evaluate 
the present hospital configurations and recommend restructuring options, and health 
sector stakeholders were invited to contribute to the process through written reports, 
presentations and public forums within prescribed time limits. This basic framework 
for consultation was similar in both cases. However, there were substantial 
differences between the cases with regard to the politics underlying the composition o f 
the review group and its approach to the consultation process.
The Acute Services Review group, in the English case, consisted o f district and 
regional government representatives and senior managers from the acute care 
hospitals. Thus the majority o f this group’s members were from government-based or 
funded agencies and was committed to the RH A’s change agenda. The RHA was 
actively involved in negotiations throughout the change process at both the 
governmental and service levels. The role boundaries between the RHA and the 
service providers were ambiguous. As a result, the RHA was seen to be both over­
involved and politically manipulative during this review period.
W hilst in the Ontario case, the HATF membership consisted o f a cross section o f 
independent local representatives from the community, who had no vested interest in 
any o f  the health care organisations in the community. This was a strategic decision 
on the part o f the MOH designed to separate politics from the decision-making 
process at the local service level. The HATF was appointed to evaluate local services 
and make recommendations to the provincial HSRC, an independent body with the 
power to make final decisions on restructuring. The MOH chose not to be directly
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involved in the restructuring process, and did not want to micro-manage service level 
change, which they believed should be a self-directed process.
The respective approaches taken by the review bodies in both cases differed. In 
Newcastle, the Acute Services Review began in January 1993 and the final decision o f 
the Newcastle Health Authority was announced in November 1993. The time 
allocated for public consultation was three months. The Newcastle Health Authority’s 
consultation document was 20 pages in total. It contained brochure-style general 
information, lacked important information and contained misleading statements with 
regard to the outpatient services planned for the NGH site. The CHC, noting these 
deficiencies requested an extension o f the time allowed for stakeholder responses, but 
was refused. In Hamilton, the review process began in March 1995, and the final 
document was completed and presented to the HSRC in May 1998. The time 
allocated for public consultation was eighteen months. Four consultation documents 
were produced, two by the HATF and two by the HSRC. These documents provided 
a total o f 365 pages o f detailed information and proposals. Newcastle Health 
Authority’s consultation document did not refer to the arguments against the 
Authority’s proposals (indeed, even before the consultation document was published, 
the Acute Services Review Group had already renamed itself the Implementation 
Group). The reports o f  the HATF and HSRC for the Hamilton hospitals presented a 
full analysis o f all positions taken by stakeholders.
In the Ontario case the MOH and the community worked in parallel. The provincial 
government gave the HSRC the power to restructure acute hospital services, and 
remained in charge o f the reform agenda for the duration o f the process. The 
community was responsible for proposing and implementing change at the local level. 
The only time the MOH became involved at the local service level was when a 
community decision might impact on government funding arrangements or any 
existing service agreements. The role boundaries between the MOH and the Hamilton 
community were separate and each operated autonomously. This was evident when 
the community was able to overturn a MOH decision regarding the restructuring 
proposal. This reciprocal relationship between the provincial government and the 
local health care community continued into the hospital restructuring period.
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This contrasted dramatically from the English case where the process was dominated 
by the RHA at every level. The RHA and the DHA led the Acute Services Review. 
They chose simply to overrule many o f the concerns raised by their community 
stakeholders regarding the closure o f NGH and its impact on local residents. This was 
not really about meeting the health needs o f the community; it was about government 
spending. There is clear evidence o f governmental manipulation o f the consultation 
process by the RHA and the Department o f Health. First, they undermined the power 
base o f NGH by refusing it trust status twice, for political reasons. Second, the RHA 
strengthened the RVI's hand by passing it sensitive information about the intentions o f 
NGH, and by merging Hexham General Hospital with the RVI. Third, the Secretary 
o f State, when he received the report submitted by the CHC appealing the proposed 
closure o f NGH, was already preparing a recommendation that a new trust be 
established on the NGH site to provide ambulatory care services together with 
rehabilitation and therapy services. The RHA and DHA were both key players in the 
review process and had a significant role in the restructuring process as members o f 
the Implementation Group.
In the Ontario case, the creation o f independent review bodies (HATF and HSRC) to 
implement the provincial government’s restructuring policy pre-empted any political 
bias and gave the local health care community both input and responsibility in 
restructuring decisions. This approach actually empowered the local stakeholders to 
challenge, and successfully negotiate changes to the proposals o f these review bodies.
7.5 Stakeholder Groups
Although similar stakeholders were involved in making key decisions and leading the 
change agendas in both countries; it soon became evident that the difference in the 
merger outcomes lies with the composition o f each o f the groups, the vested interests 
o f the participants, their political partisanship and their respective role in the 
community, (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 6.2).
The Acute Hospitals
During the pre-merger phase, three hospitals were involved in the Acute Services 
Review in the English case. The relationship between these hospitals was clearly
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demarcated. The RVI and the Freeman hospitals had both been awarded Trust status, 
which brought with it many financial and managerial freedoms and a degree o f 
autonomy from government control, while NGH was still a Directly Managed Unit. 
The respective power bases o f these hospitals were therefore unequal, and NG H’s 
position was compromised from the very beginning o f the Review. Encouraged by 
the RHA's invitation to prepare the report that became known as the “Larry” 
document, the RVI and Freeman hospitals formed a political alliance and conspired on 
several occasions against the NGH. In contrast, the three hospitals in the Ontario case 
were equal in terms o f financial standing and power. There was, nevertheless, the 
threat that one would be targeted for closure, and HCH and SJH decided to negotiate a 
formal alliance. This collaboration was intended to be both a cost sharing exercise 
and a way o f  avoiding closure.
An interesting difference between these hospital alliances (apart from the RHA's 
involvement in encouraging the alliance in the English case) is that the RVI and the 
Freeman participated in what can be seen as an aggressive alliance to further weaken 
an already weakened NGH, while in the Ontario case HCH and SJH formed an 
alliance to ensure their survival rather than to disadvantage CMH. This alliance was 
therefore defensive in nature. The fact that these hospitals were successful in avoiding 
closure indicates that strategic alliances or collaborations can be a useful tactic by 
stakeholders.
In each case, the hospital that had the strongest link with the University medical 
school also had the weakest relationship with the local population, yet saw itself and 
indeed was perceived by others as having more political leverage and power in the 
merger negotiations than the other hospitals. CMH and the RVI each had the 
advantage o f  being located at the same site as the local university medical school.
The role played by senior hospital management provides another interesting 
comparison. The conflict that existed between the respective CEOs o f HCH and 
CMH severely hampered their ability to address any service reconfiguration proposals 
collaboratively. The decision to merge these hospitals was made by the respective 
boards, who felt that a decision o f such magnitude was a governance issue and not one 
to be left to the CEO. This is in sharp contrast to the English case, in which the 
decision to take over NGH was initiated by the RVI’s CEO. The Ontario hospitals
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had a longer history o f professionally qualified managers and autonomy than did the 
English hospitals. The English hospital board o f trustees was not as powerful or 
experienced as its Ontario counterpart, and the real leadership and power in the 
English hospital lay with the CEO. This may well explain why the merger agenda in 
the Ontario case was board-driven, while the hospital take-over in the English case 
was CEO-driven.
The University
The Universities in both cases were perceived as powerful stakeholders and as noted 
above the hospitals that shared premises with the medical schools were ascribed 
higher status and more power because o f this association. At the start o f the merger 
process, both Universities kept a low profile and both focused primarily on issues 
pertaining to medical education and research. In the Ontario case the University was 
initially excluded from the merger discussions with the hospital boards because it was 
thought it would be accused o f prejudicing the outcome. The University in the 
English case was involved in the change process throughout the consultation period.
In the English case, the University was a member o f the RVI coalition. The 
University took the lead at the Seabum Workshop and proposed Option 6, which 
supported the government’s primary care initiative, strengthening the position o f the 
RVI and sealing the fate o f NGH (see Figure 5.3). The University insisted it was 
acting in the best interests o f all parties, but this is open to question - especially from 
the viewpoint o f NGH. In the Ontario case, the University was the leading partner in 
the AHCN group and was instrumental in opposing the closure o f SJH. The 
University kept a low profile during the merger discussions between CMH and HCH 
but when an impasse was reached between the two hospitals it was approached to act 
as a mediator. Thus the Universities in both cases were powerful politically, and 
instrumental in directing and influencing the outcome in the hospital merger and take­
over.
The Medical Profession
The medical profession took a totally different approach to change in the two cases. 
In the English case the medical community remained committed to their respective
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hospitals. The doctors from NGH fought to save the hospital from closure. The 
doctors from the RVI remained committed to the position o f the RVI. These two 
medical communities were unable to reach any professional compromise to resolve 
the conflict that existed between their respective organisations; indeed there was no 
attempt to work co-operatively during the pre-merger phase. The medical community 
as a whole was able to endorse and support only the position o f the University medical 
school, on relatively non-contentious issues pertaining to undergraduate medical 
training and research. It was only after the final decision to close NGH that the 
doctors collaborated to take a lead in the service reconfiguration process. The conflict 
between these two medical communities was later addressed during the organisational 
integration phase.
The Ontario medical community approached the merger more as an opportunity to re­
assess medical services across hospital sites and to propose and secure professional 
changes, while the English doctors saw the proposed changes as a threat to medical 
staff and patient services. The Ontario doctors worked co-operatively across hospitals 
and were the first internal stakeholder group to meet during merger discussions. Their 
goal was to finalise the medical by-laws for the new hospital. The medical groups 
recognised their own potential power in both protecting their professional interests 
and at the same time assisting in moving the merger forward. Their collective action 
across both hospitals gave them significant political and clinical power and profile 
during the development o f the new organisation. In the English case, the doctors 
(including those o f the RVI) were less optimistic about their ability to have any real 
influence on change in the new hospital, and felt that they faced a very uncertain 
future.
Community Stakeholder Groups
In both cases the consultation process involved a wide range o f community 
stakeholder groups including local government councils, health service organisations 
and different patient groups.
In the English case, the health care community was divided on whether to support the 
re-configuration o f acute care services onto the RVI site and the closure o f NGH. 
Stakeholder groups operated independently (that is, in isolation from each other) and
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were encouraged to do so by the RHA, even though many identified the same 
concerns and issues regarding the re-structuring o f acute care services across the city. 
The only attempt to co-ordinate action was that made by the CHC in respect o f 
various small community groups. It led the campaign in support o f NGH and 
ultimately appealed directly to the Secretary o f State. The RHA’s decision to close 
NGH was however a political fait accompli.
In the Ontario case, the local health care sector was united in opposition to the 
recommended closure o f SJH and re-location o f HCH. This was evident in the reports 
submitted to the HATF and the political pressure that the community brought to bear 
at the DHC public meeting. The driving force behind this united front was the 
AHCN. This powerful stakeholder group consisted o f a cross-section o f health care 
and community leaders. It was successful because it had the support o f key 
organisations across the local health care community, and through the collective 
power and solidarity o f  its members the AHCN was able to persuade other 
stakeholders that there was an alternative option to the recommendations presented by 
the HATF, with regard to acute services and to persuade the DHC to reject those 
recommendations.
7.6 Key Events in the Consultation Process
In both cases there was a key event in the consultation process that can be seen as a 
political turning point, in the sense that the event provided a platform for a highly 
visible manifestation o f  the strategic use o f power by certain actors against their 
opponents.
In the English case the two-day Seabum Workshop was the stage for what witnesses 
described as a brutal attack by the CEO o f the RVI on NGH. At this meeting the CEO 
o f  the RVI, buoyed by the support o f the RHA, used the material presented to 
discredit not only the financial viability o f NGH but also the managerial capability o f 
its leadership. This humiliation was inflicted in the presence o f other key actors, as 
leaders o f  organisations attended the workshop from both purchaser and provider 
sides o f the local health care sector. The University, which clearly supported the RVI, 
took this opportunity to propose Option 6 (transfer o f all acute services to the RVI and
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Freeman) as a solution more palatable to NGH than outright closure. There was no 
similar event in the Ontario case, where stakeholder interaction was invariably 
collaborative.
The single most significant event in the Ontario case was the re-convened public 
meeting o f the DHC at the Hamilton Convention Centre, attended by over 800 people. 
The proceedings at this meeting were so impassioned and the pressure on the Council 
members so great that they felt unable to vote for anything other than the status quo. 
In contrast, no public meeting o f this scale or influence was held in the English case, 
where no less than 19 public meetings were convened in districts within Newcastle, in 
late July and in September, with attendances ranging from 5 people to 40 people [150],
7.7 Organisational Restructuring
Following the final decision to merge, both cases focus on organisational restructuring 
and service re-configuration. The approach taken to restructuring organisational 
governance was markedly different in the cases, yet similar approaches were taken to 
establishing transitional management structures and to long-term organisational 
changes.
In the English case, there were no changes in the membership o f the board, the trust 
leadership, the senior management team or the name o f the hospital. The RVI trust 
board membership and numbers had remained the same since 1992 even though the 
size o f  the organisation had almost doubled and now incorporated services previously 
managed by two other hospitals. The Board was directly responsible to the NHS 
Executive in the Department o f Health. It comprised o f a chairman, 5 non-executives 
members and 5 RVI executive members. The Secretary o f State had appointed the 
Chairman and the non-executive members. It was observed that only one out o f the 
five non-executive members could be considered as having commercial experience 
and expertise. This meant that from a power perspective the board would have had 
little influence on the actions o f the CEO. The major outcome o f the restructuring 
initiative was that the CEO o f the RVI had led the change process and the only 
observed changes were that NGH no longer existed and a majority o f its clinical 
services would now be managed by the RVI.
219
The governance structure in the Ontario hospital was very different. The two hospital 
boards from CMH and HCH formed the Merger Transition Committee and jointly led 
the merger. After the decision to merge, the first task undertaken by the Merger 
Transition Committee was to establish a new board structure. The new hospital, 
HHSC, was set up as a corporation with membership in two categories, annual 
membership and honorary membership with membership rights, obligations and 
eligibility criteria set out in the by-laws o f the corporation. The Board o f Trustees 
would be elected at the annual meeting o f HHSC. Under transitional arrangements all 
the existing members o f CMH and HCH prior to the merger would be accepted as 
honorary members and members o f the board o f trustees would be accepted as annual 
members o f the new corporation. The first board o f trustees for the new HHSC would 
consist o f twenty-six trustees made up o f 18 newly elected trustees from the current 
boards o f both hospitals and new members from the community and the remainder 
would be ex-officio directors. The first task o f the board would be to decide on a new 
name for the hospital and to hire a new CEO with no existing connection with either 
o f the merging hospitals. These activities clearly signalled the beginning o f a new 
organisation.
The decision to call the new organisation the Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation 
was important on two counts. First, a change in name meant that this would now be 
regarded as a new organisation and not an extension o f either o f  the merging 
organisations. Second, the decision to use “corporation” instead o f “hospital” 
reflected a major shift in the underlying interpretive scheme. The term “corporation” 
was associated more with business and private sector organisations, and its use for a 
public sector hospital was a new concept.
Management Structure Re-Designed
The original middle management structure o f the RVI had changed when an interim 
organisational structure was proposed in 1994, when the RVI applied for joint trust 
status with Hexham General Hospital (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). In 1995, following 
the final decision to close NGH and to transfer clinical services to the RVI, another 
transitional management structure was established in an attempt to integrate some o f 
the remaining NGH staff into middle management (Figure 5.6). The structure was
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eventually finalised in 1997. The final organisational structure had the same senior 
management executives as the original RVI even though the organisation had 
integrated many o f the clinical services from the NGH and had almost doubled in size. 
The new organisation had expanded and delegated more responsibility to the middle 
management level o f the hospital. This final structure, from the middle management 
level down, was very similar to that o f the new Ontario hospital.
It is important to highlight that the senior management team o f the RVI did not 
change. The office o f Finance Director would now carry with it the additional title 
and role o f Deputy CEO. The CEO would now be undertaking much broader 
managerial roles and would be more externally and strategically focused while the 
Deputy CEO would be more concerned with the day to day operational issues o f the 
organisation. This change in the roles and responsibility o f these two key leaders in 
the organisation was in response to the changing political economy and the expanded 
size o f  the new organisation.
In the Ontario case, an interim senior management team was appointed from both the 
merging hospitals. All 23 senior executives would meet initially to share information, 
and from these 11 were selected to lead the hospital through the transition period 
(Figure 6.5). The organisation’s transitional structure was similar to that o f the two 
predecessor hospitals. This was a deliberate decision taken so as to minimise 
disruption to staff and patients during the restructuring phase. In 1999 a final 8 
executives were selected from the 11 to form the new management structure and to 
lead the corporation in the long term (Figure 6.6). The final organisational structure 
had half the original number o f senior executives even though the organisation had 
doubled in size with the merger (as in the English case). The organisation had fewer 
managers, but each now had larger spans o f control. Many interviewees believed that 
reducing the number o f the senior management team was the only area where any 
economies o f scale could be achieved. Most o f the benefit realised was in financial 
terms while, from a management perspective, serious problems were yet to develop.
Approach to Service Integration
When entering the restructuring phase, the hospitals in both cases were already 
undergoing re-organisation initiatives. The on-going re-development o f the RVI site
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and the re-engineering projects undertaken by both the HCH and CMH would further 
complicate the organisational integration process following merger. Health care in 
both countries was now adopting a more business-like approach and this was evident 
in their respective approaches to implementing service changes. In both cases a 
project management approach was adopted.
In the English case, a new project management department was established, which 
was responsible for the co-ordination, supervision and transfer o f acute services 
between sites. A similar department was developed in the Ontario hospital called the 
Office o f Integration. In each case the department's mandate was to set out the goals 
and objectives for the integration process and to put in place a framework by which 
service re-design and integration could be co-ordinated. The restructuring and 
integration o f services from two predecessor hospitals into a single organisation 
operating out o f several sites, while undertaking numerous re-development projects 
and downsizing staff numbers and services, was a complex process.
A New Approach to Service Delivery fo r the Hospitals
During the restructuring phase, in both cases the hospitals introduced a new patient 
care model. The design and implementation o f the program management and clinical 
directorate structure was a monumental task and posed many problems both internally 
and externally for the hospitals. This re-design initiative was costly and would take 
years to implement because many services required site re-development. The new 
patient care models had created a more decentralised management structure, which 
delegated more operational power to the program directors and managers. This new 
management structure was intended to make clinical services more responsive to the 
needs o f  patients and staff at the front line
In the English case, when the hospital services merged under the RVI there were 19 
clinical departments at the RVI and 18 at NGH. This number o f departments was 
eventually reduced and services were re-distributed between 9 clinical directorates 
(Figure 5.7). Medical consultants were now expected to take on a more managerial 
role in the newly formed clinical directorates. This was a major role shift for the 
medical profession. Many o f the NHS staff placed into management positions had no 
training or previous experience. Doctors in the Ontario hospitals were used to holding
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senior management positions and many o f the CEOs in Ontario hospitals were 
medically qualified and also held management degrees. Senior management positions 
were seen as part o f the career path for many Ontario doctors.
Both hospitals in the Ontario case were familiar with the program management model 
o f patient care, and were already in the process o f restructuring their clinical services 
at the time o f the merger. HHSC’s senior managers believed that a similar structure 
should be developed in the new organisation. The new program management model 
had 4 clinical portfolios with a total o f 18 clinical programs (Figure 6.7). Several 
problems began to emerge as soon as the process o f consolidating programs across the 
different sites was initiated. It became apparent that there was considerable inequity 
in both the size and resources available for some o f the programs. Many considered 
that the downsizing in the middle management structure had been too severe, that 
there were too many programs and that the change time frame was too short.
It was found, in both cases, that the process o f re-designing and re-allocating clinical 
services across sites was far more complex and time consuming than originally 
anticipated by both the government agencies and the senior hospital managers.
Another key observation was that the change process was far from cost effective. In 
fact in both cases the consolidation o f services across the various hospital sites 
catapulted all hospitals into spiralling debt (see Chapter 3 , Table 3.1). Change on this 
scale requires investment and slack resources to cover the extra costs o f new 
construction, renovations and site re-development. In both cases the government 
agencies also failed to anticipate the cost o f staff redundancies and severance 
packages.
7.8 A New Hospital Archetype
A new hospital archetype emerged in the Ontario case while the hospital trust in the 
English case was subjected only to system and structural adjustments which were not 
indicative o f a new organisational archetype.
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Prior to achieving trust status the RVI was managed by and accountable to the District 
Health Authority. The hospital focus was then more introspective, and lines o f 
accountability were mainly confined within its own organisational boundaries (Figure
5.1). When the RVI attained trust status it was given more independence and power 
to manage service provision, invest capital and develop new innovative services. The 
take-over o f NGH's clinical services resulted in an increase in the R V l’s provision o f 
clinical services and staffing but did not change the basic underlying values or 
functions o f the hospital. The new clinical directorate structure was developed in part 
to accommodate the services taken over from NGH. The new RVI spanned three sites 
and its size had almost doubled (Figure 5.8). There were no significant changes in the 
underlying interpretive scheme or organisational structure to indicate that a new 
hospital archetype had emerged. The researcher concludes that the new RVI should 
be considered not as a new hospital archetype but as an expanded, evolved trust 
hospital.
In the Ontario case the new HHSC spanned four sites and was double the size o f each 
o f its two predecessor hospitals. The Corporation had nominated a new Board o f 
Trustees, appointed a new CEO and selected a new senior management team. The 
focus o f change was to maintain equal representation o f both merged organisations at 
the management and clinical levels o f the new organisation. The new underlying 
interpretive scheme was more business-oriented and addressed issues pertaining to 
cost containment, efficiency and service rationalisation. These values had a major 
influence on the new hospital as it continued to develop both beyond the boundaries o f 
its local health care community and into other health care fields. The Ontario hospital 
emerged as a new organisational archetype, the multi-site networked hospital (Figure
7.1). HHSC developed a more entrepreneurial approach, as was seen with its 
collaboration agreement, organisational networking, management service contracts 
and international jo in t ventures with other health care organisations (Figure 6.9).
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This major difference between the English and the Ontario cases may be attributable 
to the fact that the Ontario hospital was already at a different stage o f development 
than the English hospital when the change process began. The Ontario hospital 
already had managerial independence from the provincial government and a higher 
integration o f health professionals in management positions. In many ways, the pre­
merger Ontario hospital was similar to the post-merger English hospital trust (Figure
6.1). This meant that the hospital was, by comparison with its English counterpart, 
strategically progressive, structurally receptive and politically ready to move toward a 
new organisational archetype.
7.9 Financial Problems Translate into Chronic Debt
Hospital restructuring in both cases resulted in huge financial debt. The government 
agencies in both cases did not just underestimate the cost, complexity or impact o f 
such massive re-organisation o f health services, they were also responsible for 
inducing debt by withdrawing financial support in breach o f  promises to reimburse the 
hospitals for the costs o f the restructuring. It was estimated by the DOH, in the 
English case, that the government would save £30m each year by reorganising the 
acute services. However, only a few months into the restructuring, several problems 
began to emerge and the RVI was facing the prospect o f  spiralling debt. There were 
additional financial pressures from the site re-development projects, the costs o f which 
had already exceeded the government's projected annual saving o f £30m. The 
disruption o f clinical services had resulted in lost revenue and backlog maintenance 
costs were increasing. The service contracting process was breaking down and as a 
result, the Trust had an unexpected reduction in its income budget. The DOH had 
completely overlooked the cost o f staff redundancies, and payouts had been grossly 
underestimated. But the biggest blow was when the government’s promise to provide 
bridging finance to the Trust was revised and downscaled from £63m to £30m. The 
only reason why the new RVI did not have a huge deficit in its first year was because 
it was able to obtain £40m through the PFI scheme.
Similar problems developed in the Ontario case. As a result o f unprecedented cuts in 
ministry funding, it had already been estimated that the hospital would face a $60m 
shortfall in its next fiscal year (1997). This loss in revenue would have to come out o f
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the hospital's operations, which meant staff lay-offs, ward and bed closures and 
waiting lists for procedures while the hospital tried to find ways to raise non-ministry 
revenue. The hospitals had calculated that annually the merger would save 
approximately $10m and the alliance with SJH would save about $16m. The MOH 
had originally estimated the restructuring initiative to cost about $83m but the HSRC 
later estimated the capital expenditure alone to be $77.2m and service re-development 
costs to be around $55m. These costs would be in addition to wage and benefits costs 
increases, drug cost increases, buying and maintaining equipment, creating a new 
integrated telephone and computer information system on all four sites and staff 
severance packages.
The provincial government had promised to release working capital for the hospital 
during the restructuring period in 1996 but the money was withheld until 1999. By 
then the hospital was already carrying a deficit o f  almost $42m and had been forced to 
close more beds, reduce elective operating room hours, outsource services and 
consolidate clinical programs further, which meant more staff redundancies. This 
funding provided only temporary relief because the new hospital was unable to sustain 
the debt and by 2000 had a record-breaking debt o f $40m.
It can be concluded that government-induced debt had been a major contributing 
factor to the financial crisis evident following the restructuring in both cases.
7.10 Merger Typology
The intent o f this typology is to summarise the outcome o f each case and to document 
the role o f key stakeholder groups, the tactics used during the merger process and the 
nature o f the emergent organisation. In Figure 7.2, the key characteristics o f the 
English and Ontario cases are compared against the key theoretical constructs o f both 
archetype and Fligstein's theories.
Archetype theory provides a basis for defining the end points o f change. This means 
that an initial evaluation o f the hospital’s organisational configuration prior to the 
merger process allowed the researcher to establish a baseline o f organisational 
functioning and structure (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 6.1). This comparison will allow
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us to analyse the development o f the new organisational form; the new multi-site 
networked hospital in the Ontario case and the evolved trust structure in the English 
case (Figure 5.8 and Figure 6.9). Fligstein’s (1990) theory about power and social 
skill will allow us to assess and describe the power dynamics, characteristics o f the 
government agencies and key stakeholders and their actions during the pre-merger 
phase o f the cases.
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Figure 7.2 M erger Typology: Power Dynamics and Archetypal Development
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The following relationships emerged in this research and are summarised below. 
These relationships are discussed in conjunction with the case material and theoretical 
constructs from the merger typology.
2 2 9
First, the behaviour o f the government agencies had a direct influence on the actions 
o f the stakeholders. The RHA defined the rules o f interaction and established the role 
boundaries between the various groups involved in the merger process. The RHA had 
an open-ended arrangement whereby it was involved directly in stakeholder activity 
throughout the entire change process. Many o f the stakeholders responded in a 
reactive manner and contested many o f the change proposals, which they felt favoured 
certain stakeholder groups over others.
In the Ontario case, the MOH had a more circumscribed role. The MOH had clearly 
defined role boundaries. Its involvement was limited to specific activities. The 
stakeholders responded in a more proactive manner and were able to work co­
operatively across the health care community. This restructuring process was 
perceived as an opportunity for self-directed change.
Second, the stakeholders’ decision to either work collectively or independently o f  each 
other would determine how they would resolve their differences. In the English case, 
the RH A’s proposal to close NGH split the health care community. The change 
process became highly politicised. In the Ontario case, the stakeholders were united 
in opposing the HATF recommendation to close SJH and the HSRC proposal to close 
St. Peter’s Hospital. The community was successful in challenging and overturning 
these proposals because they were able to set aside their own agendas and reach a 
compromise on a change proposal that would benefit the community as a whole.
Third, the politics and behaviour o f the RHA played a key role in establishing who 
would take the leading role during the merger process. The RHA deliberately 
arranged for the RVI to remain in a position o f power throughout the change process. 
This power allowed the RVI to take the leadership role during the take-over and as a 
result the ASR became a CEO-hospital-dominated process. In the Ontario case, the 
MOH had delegated decision-making power to an independent review body and the 
local communities were expected to take both the lead in and responsibility for 
recommending changes. This led to a stakeholder-dominated process. The change 
process in the Ontario case was more emergent because the final decision was 
dependent upon the input o f multiple stakeholders while the overall process in the
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English case was government prescribed because o f its autocratic manipulation by the 
RHA.
Fourth, the way in which the government defined its role and, through its agencies, 
interacted with community stakeholders determined the kind o f merger that took 
place. The hospital merger or take-over was either government-led or stakeholder- 
led. The government-mandated merger in the English case led to a hospital take-over 
while the stakeholder-initiated merger in the Ontario case led to a voluntary merger.
Fifth, the process or track o f change is an indicator o f how the organisation will 
evolve, whether a new organisational archetype will emerge or the merger will only 
result in minor structural adaptations. The English case involved only a structural 
adjustment within the existing hospital archetype. The hostile take-over did not result 
in a new organisational archetype but in an evolved trust. The hospital merger in the 
Ontario case was a successful transformation and a new hospital archetype emerged, 
the multi-site networked organisation.
This hospital merger/take-over typology supports the outcome o f this research. It 
would be interesting to see if  this merger typology or framework could be applied to 
other hospital mergers or perhaps even organisations in other organisational fields in 
either the public or private sector.
7.11 Summary
This chapter compares the English and Ontario cases. Key points are raised about the 
role o f the government and the interaction between stakeholder groups. Both cases 
indicate that the role o f the government and its agencies was instrumental in 
determining the final organisational outcome. The autocratic and politically 
manipulative behaviour o f the RHA resulted in a hostile take-over o f NGH by the 
RVI. There was no change in the existing interpretive scheme and as a result no new 
organisational archetype. In the Ontario case, the MOH delegated power to 
independent review bodies and local health care communities. The merger process 
was stakeholder-dominated and a new organisational archetype emerged. This new 
multi-site networked hospital was supported by a new interpretive scheme.
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The researcher was interested in applying and evaluating archetype theory and 
Fligstein’s work on power, to see if these approaches could be used to analyse hospital 
mergers in the public sector. It was found that each theory on its own was insufficient 
to track and explain the change dynamics throughout the merger or hospital 
restructuring period. But used in combination these theories provide a reasonably 
comprehensive analysis o f change in the hospital sector.
Creating a merger typology further tested the theoretical constructs and the data from 
the cases. This typology provides a framework, which attempts to capture the major 
findings in the research. The final chapter will identify the main outcomes o f the 





The focus o f this research study was to analyse the approach taken by government 
agencies and the role o f stakeholders during public sector hospital mergers. The two 
case studies were systematically compared: one hospital merger took place in 
Northern England and the other in the Province o f Ontario, Canada. The purpose o f 
this comparative work was essentially two-fold. The first part o f the study would 
focus on tracking the merger process over time and analysing the differences and role 
o f the actors during the merger and restructuring period. Whilst the second part o f the 
research would attempt to identify any key changes in the structure, systems and 
underlying values o f the hospital organisations and to determine whether a new 
organisational form had emerged as a result o f  the restructuring process. In the course 
o f the research investigation, it became progressively apparent that in both cases the 
role o f the government and the medical profession were key factors in hospital 
mergers.
Archetype theory was applied in combination with concepts derived from the work o f 
Neil Fligstein, and this combination was found to be useful in analysing and 
explaining the change process in hospital mergers.
This chapter sets out the main findings o f the research, identifies its limitations, and 
suggests what future research might usefully be undertaken in light o f these findings.
8.2. Research Findings
This research suggests that public sector hospital mergers can develop in very 
different ways even where, as here, the hospitals are o f similar size and importance to 
local health care provision and the perceived need for reform is similar. The 
variations revealed in this research suggest a distinction between change that is 
“stakeholder-led” and change that is “government-led” and that these merger types 
can be defined in terms o f three distinct but closely related factors:-
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(1) the government’s approach to consultation with stakeholders, in particular the
extent to which stakeholders are given the opportunity to influence and shape 
the changes decided upon or approved by the government;
(2) the power dynamics and interaction between key stakeholders during both the
consultation process and the post-merger restructuring process; and
(3) the extent o f government manipulation o f any part o f those processes.
The Ontario merger was found to be stakeholder-led and resulted in a new hospital
organisation archetype. The English merger was found to be government-led and not 
to have resulted in a new hospital organisation archetype. There is a considerable 
body o f literature indicating that change is more likely to be successful when those 
affected by it have ownership o f the change process, and this research tends to support 
that proposition in the case o f public sector hospital mergers. However, in order to 
establish whether the successful emergence o f a new hospital archetype is more likely 
in the case o f stakeholder-led change than in the case o f government-led change, more 
cases need to be studied, and especially as in this study the researcher found no 
indication o f any attempt in the English case to move the Newcastle acute hospitals 
from one archetype to another.
The research has also identified six major factors influencing the success o f the 
merger process and outcome from an organisational perspective (merger economics, 
quality o f care and patient outcomes and satisfaction are not the focus o f this study).
8.3. Government Approach to Consultation
Two very different approaches to consultation emerged in the cases. In the English 
case, the consultation process was government-dominated and was conducted between 
the government (at all levels) and the stakeholders. In the Ontario case, the process 
was based in the local community and conducted between independent review bodies 
and local stakeholder groups.
English Case
In the English case the government retained power and controlled every step o f the 
merger process. Through the RHA and the DHA there was direct government
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representation and leadership on every merger or work group committee. The review 
and consultation process was conducted over a period o f nine months only, o f which 
only three months were given for public consultation. Stakeholder groups were given 
little information, with no detailed plan regarding the proposed change, no timelines, 
and no costings or projections; and the consultation document did not address any o f 
the arguments against closure o f NGH or the community’s concerns. It is clear from 
the data collected that the holding o f numerous small public meetings was a political 
exercise on the part o f the government to appear concerned about community input 
when in fact the meetings were poorly publicised and held for the most part in the 
summer holidays. It is hardly surprising that attendance was low and political 
engagement weak.
Stakeholder groups, other than the CHC, never attempted to collaborate across the 
community. As a result, reports were submitted independently and information across 
these groups was not shared. The government through the RHA and DHA was the 
only actor who knew what issues and concerns were raised by and across the 
community. Many o f the stakeholders interviewed felt that the timeframe o f the 
consultation period was unrealistic but the DHA would not grant any extensions 
around the submission deadlines. Surprisingly, there was no feedback mechanism 
built into the consultation process. Dialogue was rare and only considered if 
requested by the stakeholder. If a stakeholder raised a concern, the reply would often 
given informally by letter to that stakeholder, and there was no indication that any o f 
the issues raised, or responses by the government, were made available to the public 
or other stakeholders. It was noted that on one occasion, the CHC asked the DHA for 
clarification and further information on important matters but the DHA was only 
prepared to give a verbal response two days before the meeting at which it would be 
voting on the very issue that the CHC had questioned. This approach on the part o f 
the RHA and DHA was typical o f the kind o f control the government exercised over 
information. The stakeholders had no clear role in this process and were not 
empowered to any significant degree.
Another significant finding was that stakeholders were expected to be involved in 
several simultaneous consultations across different services. The government’s 
overall reform agenda was too ambitious and many o f the stakeholders were involved
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in numerous consultation processes about various trust applications and community 
service mergers across the region, beyond the local community. Several interviewees 
felt this was a time consuming process and a non-productive use o f their time.
Ontario Case
In the Ontario case power was delegated by the provincial government to the 
community. The government wanted to operate at arms length during the review and 
restructuring process and this was supported by Bill 26 which in effect separated 
politics from decision-making through the appointment o f independent bodies to take 
the change process forward. The HSRC was appointed at the provincial level to look 
to the local communities for recommendations for service change. At the local 
(municipal) level the Hamilton DHC appointed an independent task force, the HATF, 
to make recommendations. The provincial government was not interested in micro 
managing service level change and expected the local communities to lead on this 
initiative. The key to this approach was that (a) the HATF was a community-based 
group that was truly (and not merely nominally) independent, and composed o f local 
people with experience relevant to health services but with no personal involvement in 
the stakeholder organisations, (b) the HATF was empowered by the DHC to evaluate 
and plan local health care services and (c) it was the responsibility o f the stakeholders 
to review the recommendations put forward by the HAFT and report back to them.
In conjunction with the HATF service review, the hospital boards o f HCH and CMH 
were evaluating whether to proceed with a merger between them. The most important 
aspect o f this consultation process was that stakeholder feedback and dialogue were a 
formal and integral part o f the process. Stakeholders' input was expected, valued and 
taken into account by both the HATF and later by the HSRC.
The stakeholders were able to unite in opposition to the final HATF report and the 
recommendation to close SJH was not followed by the DHC. At the same time, the 
decision to merge CMH and HCH was initiated by the stakeholders and supported by 
the community as a viable alternative to the hospital closure proposed by the HATF. 
This may still not have been sufficient to satisfy the HSRC, which in the course o f its 
review met with the hospital and key stakeholder groups and, after considering their
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reports, decided to take several o f their recommendations on board in its final report. 
Prior to its final report, the HSRC granted the hospitals’ request for a 30 day extension 
to the submission deadline. This shows that the change process was stakeholder- 
driven, in collaboration with the independent review bodies, and that each party was 
clear about its role and tasks.
In marked contrast to the English case, consultations related specifically to services 
and stakeholders in the local community. The stakeholders were subjected to only 
two consultations: first, by the HATF concerning system and service changes across 
the local health care community and second, by the HSRC regarding the final 
distribution and allocation o f hospital services in Hamilton, including the new HHSC. 
Stakeholders were not expected to participate in consultations concerning services 
outside their local community. Their roles and boundaries were thus more clearly 
defined than in the English case.
Hospital Restructuring
The differing approaches seen in the cases during the consultation period continued 
into the hospital restructuring phase. In the English case the hospital CEO, with the 
support o f the RHA, continued to dominate the reconfiguration o f the RVI following 
the absorption o f N G H ’s services and assets. The senior and upper management o f 
this hospital remained intact and the only changes that took place were from the 
middle management level o f the organisation down. A new model o f service delivery 
was introduced through the clinical directorate system. The main focus o f change in 
the hospital was the integration o f clinical services from the NGH.
In the Ontario case there was evidence o f a continuous commitment to stakeholder co­
operation in the post-merger restructuring phase. This had begun earlier, with the 
creation o f the M erger Transition Committee, and continued with the appointment o f 
the new HHSC Board and senior management team, even down to the appointment o f 
Clinical Directors. There was always an effort made to have equal representation 
from both merged hospitals.
237
8.4. Power and the Role of Stakeholders
In this study, the researcher found that certain tactics and stakeholder affiliations 
strengthened the power base o f key actors during the change process in both the 
consultation phase and the post-merger restructuring phase. Strategic alliances and 
collaborations were successful tactics used in the stakeholder-led approach to increase 
stakeholders’ power positions. Sharing the hospital site with the local University 
proved to be advantageous for stakeholders in both cases. The contrasting roles o f a 
powerful CEO or hospital board also had different outcomes in the cases and are 
discussed in relation to the power dynamics in both approaches.
Strategic Alliances and Collaborations between Stakeholders
The stakeholder-led approach featured strategic alliances and collaborative efforts 
throughout the Ontario case. The alliances and collaborations were used defensively, 
and for different purposes. The alliance between HCH and SJH, and the merger 
between CMH and HCH, were both used as a tactic to contain costs, reduce service 
duplication and more importantly, avoid hospital closure. The collaborations were 
primarily defined in terms o f group power and political allegiance to a cause. The 
AHCN had the support o f key organisations across the local health care community 
and as a powerful coalition; this group’s intention was to persuade other groups and 
gain community co-operation and solidarity. Through their collective power, they 
were successful in overturning the recommendations to close two hospitals (SJH and 
St. Peter’s) in Hamilton. The Medical Advisory Committee, which had the support o f 
medical groups within both HCH and CMH, used a similar tactic. Their goal was be 
first at the finish line by drafting professional by-laws before the new hospital became 
official, and in that way they were able to preserve their autonomy and make sure 
certain practice and medical service demands would be met. Their approach was a 
professional allegiance and collaboration that ensured the medical professionals across 
sites had a voice in the new hospital.
The British government-led approach contrasts starkly with the Canadian approach. 
There was no collaboration between stakeholder groups or any co-ordinated effort 
across the community. Stakeholders tended to act independently. This isolated and 
fragmented approach weakened the power position o f the community and played into
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the hands o f the RVI and Freeman hospitals. There was no evidence that the 
community was stopped from working together even though it was clear that the DHA 
did not encourage the community to come up with a community based solution and 
did not want to deal with any collective opposition. The only evidence o f any 
collaboration was the essentially aggressive alliance formed between the RVI and the 
Freeman during their secret talks with the RHA prior to the announcement o f the 
ASR. Even the medical doctors in this case did not collaborate and acted in a 
parochial manner. Their action can be regarded as institutional allegiance as opposed 
to the professional allegiance seen in the stakeholder-led approach.
The University Link
The university in both cases was perceived as a powerful stakeholder, instrumental in 
influencing the hospital merger or closure outcomes. It was found that where a 
hospital was located on the same site as the local University medical school, this 
association gave the hospital a perceived advantage over the other hospitals in the 
form o f more political leverage during the review process. Neither the RVI nor the 
M cMaster Hospital site o f CMH was targeted for closure at any stage, whilst all the 
other hospitals were at some stage considered for possible closure or downsizing.
The Hospital Board and the Role o f  the CEO
The CEO in the government-led approach was allowed to dominate the restructuring 
process, while the hospital board led the merger process in the stakeholder-led 
approach. The CEO o f the RVI took an adversarial stance with regard to NGH both at 
the Seabum Workshop and also during the restructuring o f the new RVI. The CEO ’s 
power and position was never challenged or opposed nor did he appear to compromise 
on any major decision. The RVI was clearly the “winner” in this restructuring saga 
and the NGH was the loser. The RVI survived closure, remained the largest and most 
powerful hospital in Newcastle, inherited most o f the N G H ’s clinical services, 
received a substantial proportion o f the N G H ’s assets, and secured additional service 
funding.
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In the stakeholder-led approach, the decision to take the merger proposal forward was 
taken at the board level. The alliance agreement between HCH and SJH was 
negotiated by the CEOs. When the CEO o f CMH declined to join the alliance o f 
HCH and SJH for inappropriate reasons, the CEO was viewed by the board as an 
obstacle to change and it was decided jointly by the two boards to sideline the CEOs 
from the merger decision-making process altogether. The merger transition 
committee was formed with equal representation from both hospital boards. This 
group lead the merger process and directed the form o f the new merged hospital, 
starting with the creation o f a new constitution and board.
8.5. Government Manipulation of Process
The British government through the RHA manipulated the whole review process by 
conducting secret talks with the RVI and Freeman Hospitals for four months before 
launching the ASR. This led to the “Larry” document drafted by the CEOs o f the RVI 
and the Freeman recommending closure o f the NGH. The RHA also gave the RVI 
sensitive information regarding N G H ’s intention to re-apply for trust status, and 
denied NGH trust status twice even though NGH fulfilled the usual requirements for 
such status.
The British government was single-minded in its approach to restructuring and 
appears not to have been concerned with what the community wanted. The closure o f 
NGH was determined from the outset. This was evident in the early stages o f  the 
Acute Services Review when the government recommended that the RVI merge with 
Hexham General Hospital and again at the end o f the ASR when the Secretary o f State 
rejected the CH C’s appeal against the decision to close NGH and simultaneously 
announced the creation o f the new City Trust on the NGH site. The stakeholders in 
the English case had no significant input into the merger/closure decision, and the RVI 
and Freeman Hospitals as “winners” can be regarded as having been powerful simply 
by reason o f being favoured by the State.
A number o f  stakeholders and actors accused the government o f withholding vital 
information regarding the restructuring proposals, and some o f the information that
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was provided was incorrect and misleading. Readily available, accurate and up to 
date information is vital if  key actors are to make informed decisions.
In contrast, in the Ontario case the HATF and the HSRC made sure that detailed 
information was available to the stakeholders and local community. Government 
reports, tables, service figures, detailed costing with sources and methodology 
information was included in full or fully referenced. The Task Force and Committee 
membership, roles and contact details were published as well.
8 .6. Theoretical Review: Archetype Theory and Fligstein’s Approach Re­
visited
After reviewing archetype theory and Fligstein’s work on power and the role o f actors 
(see Chapters 2 and 7), it was decided that the best way to approach hospital mergers 
would be by combining both o f  these theoretical viewpoints. Archetype theory 
provided a framework which allowed the researcher to analyse the pattern o f 
development seen in the cases and to assess whether a new type o f hospital had 
emerged, and whether it could also be considered a new and effective organisational 
pattern (an “archetype”, to use the concept from the theory). This new organisational 
form would be evaluated in terms o f the extent to which it comprised a new 
organisational structure, systems and underlying values. Hinings and Greenwood’s 
(1988) use o f organisational tracks would provide a structure for mapping and 
analysing sequential events during the merger transition period. It was found that in 
the Ontario case the evidence pointed in the direction o f  real archetypal change 
whereas in the English case, there had been no attempt to move from one hospital 
archetype to another. The RVI and Freeman had already, albeit recently, made the 
transition to the newly created NHS Trust Hospital archetype and their acquisition o f 
the NGH services and assets did not change the interpretive scheme underlying their 
existing Trust status.
Archetype theory provides a useful framework for assessing the direction and scale o f 
change, and suggests that change to a new organisational form will be effective when 
there is agreement at the level o f values concerning the adoption o f  the new 
organisational form. To this extent the analysis here has been assisted by the
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conceptual framework provided by archetype theory. However, a potential weakness 
o f archetype theory in the context o f public sector hospitals in Britain arises from the 
fact that much o f the theory is rooted in the research done by Greenwood and Hinings 
(1993) in the municipal government sector in England and Wales in the early 1970s. 
One o f the criteria underlying the choice o f that sector as the research milieu was that 
local authorities had discretion to organise as they wished, thus avoiding the problem 
o f constraint by parent companies. This criterion does not apply to the public sector 
hospital organisation. Before the Trust reforms o f 1991 such hospitals were directly 
managed by government agencies. After those reforms, hospitals with Trust status 
had to be organised as prescribed by the applicable regulations.
Further, archetype theory is judged to be inadequate in the explanation o f the causes 
o f change and the likelihood o f successful adoption o f an effective new form. 
Fligstein's perspective on power and his emphasis on the way key actors use power 
and social skill to influence and control or induce co-operation in other actors, are 
considered by the researcher to be key to understanding the outcome o f  change in both 
these cases. Fligstein’s work was therefore used to fill the perceived gaps in 
archetype theory.
Archetype Theory
The stakeholder-led approach to hospital change supported several aspects o f 
archetype theory. This approach followed a transformational track o f change and a 
new hospital archetype, the multi-site networked organisation emerged. The change 
in the hospital structure and the adoption o f new systems and models o f service 
delivery, together with a definite shift in values can be seen as the new hospital 
emerges. The structure o f the hospital changed all the way from the top (Board level) 
down to frontline service delivery. The hospital adopted a more entrepreneurial 
approach to doing business, with the development o f numerous new management and 
collaboration contracts, academic partnerships, formal affiliation arrangements and 
international service level agreements.
In the government-led approach, by contrast, there was no evidence o f 
transformational change in the system but more importantly no attempt to change the
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type o f the merged hospital (the new RVI) following its acquisition o f services and 
assets from another hospital. Thus this important public sector change scenario was 
not well addressed by archetype theory. None o f the theory’s tracks o f change, all o f 
which assume some attempt at least at transformational change, could be applied to 
the change process here. It was concluded that there had only been structural 
adjustments to the existing hospital structure and this was done primarily because o f 
the need to integrate additional clinical services that were being transferred from 
another hospital site, without any change in the underlying values and outlooks o f the 
participants. There were no changes in the composition or structure o f the board or 
senior management team, suggesting that the existing team and their beliefs and 
values were not in need o f change. The same groups o f actors remained in their 
respective positions o f leadership and power throughout the entire change process. 
The underlying values o f the hospital did not change from the shift that had already 
recently taken place with the introduction o f Trust status for the hospital sector. It was 
considered that with its expanded middle management structure and additional clinical 
services inherited from the NGH, the new RVI hospital organisation could be 
described as a structurally adjusted or evolved Trust hospital.
Prior to the study, there were reservations about the theoretical notions in archetype 
theory o f  structural coherence and organisational stability. When examining the 
outcome o f the stakeholder-led approach and in particular the emergence o f a new 
hospital archetype, the organisational coherence that had been a major goal o f the 
merging hospitals appears to have been achieved.
It is more difficult to assess the degree o f organisational stability achieved, although 
as noted at the end o f Chapter 6, despite continuing financial and other problems in 
the sector, Hamilton still has its four acute hospital sites, with a configuration o f 
programs and services substantially as approved by the HSRC in 1998 and this would 
indicate a degree o f stability within the overall organisational field comprising 
Ham ilton’s acute hospitals.
The new hospitals in both cases were beset by problems caused by financial 
mismanagement by the government, which led to varying degrees o f organisational 
instability. This is a very serious finding because it happened in both cases and does
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not appear to be linked to the approach taken to the merger or the organisational 
outcome. In the cases studied here, both the English and Ontario governments 
seriously miscalculated the costs and associated expenses o f the hospital mergers, 
restructuring tasks and the clinical re-configuration and cross site integration. Both 
governments projected substantial savings by merging, closing and restructuring o f 
health care services. However, the m ergers’ costs exceeded the projected savings 
because o f site-redevelopment costs, transfer o f acute services across sites, staffing 
redundancies and severance packages, unexpected wage increases and lost revenue 
from the disruption o f the program re-design and restructuring. The hospitals also 
experienced problems around delivering patient care because o f the costs, beds were 
closed, wards were shut, operations were cancelled and waiting list began to develop.
A startling revelation was that both the DOH in Britain and the provincial government 
in Canada defaulted on payment o f money promised to assist the hospitals with their 
additional restructuring costs. The British government promised to give the RVI 
£63m to help cover its costs, but half way through the restructuring informed the 
hospital that it would now only contribute £30m. The RVI was only able to avoid 
bankruptcy by financing some o f the restructuring projects through the PFI scheme. 
In the Ontario case, the government promised HHSC additional funds to assist with 
the restructuring and other unanticipated costs at the time o f  the merger in 1996 but 
such payment was not forthcoming until 1999. By this time, HHSC had a substantial 
(and record breaking) debt o f $3 8m. The money that finally arrived was not enough 
to pay off this debt but only provided temporary relief. These are important findings 
in both cases and whilst it is difficult to determine if  the default in payment was solely 
responsible for the financial problems experienced, it cannot be ruled out as at least a 
significant contributor to the debt. Thus organisational stability in the public sector, to 
the extent that it depends upon adequate financial support, is a factor that is not within 
the control o f  the organisation itself. The theoretical concept o f organisational 
stability may therefore be o f limited value in studies o f  public sector organisations. 
Fligstein : Power, Government and Stakeholders
Fligstein’s work on the role o f power and the ways in which the state and key 
stakeholder groups use power and social skill to influence and induce co-operation in
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other actors and drive change, inspired the researcher to look for similar patterns in 
the health care field. The researcher considered that Fligstein’s approach addressed 
areas that were underdeveloped in archetype theory.
The main focus o f this research is on power. The two main questions were: ‘who had 
the power in the cases’ and ‘how was this power used’? This research revealed that 
the change or merger process was either government-led or stakeholder-led. The 
study identified, described and analysed the behaviour o f the government in relation to 
stakeholders, the behaviour and interaction between stakeholders, and which 
stakeholder groups or actors were powerful.
The results o f the study indicate that the access to information was an important 
requirement for power. The withholding or sharing o f information had an impact on 
the stakeholders, who could be either misled or appropriately informed about certain 
government actions. Several different power tactics were used by both the 
government and stakeholders and these actions had different outcomes depending on 
whether the change process was government or stakeholder-led. In the stakeholder- 
led approach, stakeholders strengthen their power position in relation to other 
stakeholder groups or a powerful actor used strategic alliances. In the government-led 
approach this tactic was used to weaken the political position o f another actor. 
Collaboration was a tactic used only in the stakeholder-led approach. This was an 
effective tactic employed by stakeholders across the local health care community. It 
gave them the collective power to persuade the DHC and subsequently the HSRC to 
drop proposals for hospital closures. Stakeholders in both approaches found it was to 
their advantage to either partner or align themselves with a stakeholder who was at 
least if  not more powerful than themselves. This decision would not just strengthen 
their power position but saved them both from any threat o f closure.
The alliances, allegiances and collaborations in the Ontario case are good examples o f 
what Fligstein calls “social skill”, the ability o f actors to use rules and resources 
skilfully so as to induce co-operation in others. A further example to be found in this 
case was the successful effort o f the community, led in this instance by HHSC, to 
come up with a new role for St. Peter’s Hospital that contribute to the HSRC’s goal o f 
an integrated health care system and save that hospital from closure. Had the
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community not come up with this plan on its own initiative, the HSRC would have 
closed St. Peter’s. In the English case, social skill was manifested in the form of the 
tactics used by the RHA to appear not to be directly involved in the closure o f an 
acute hospital (NGH), to control the agenda behind-the-scenes, and to covertly coerce 
opponents into co-operation. These tactics were primarily o f three kinds: getting 
people to think that it was the RVI and Freeman that were in control o f the reform 
process; setting the agenda; and isolating NGH and other opponents to the RH A ’s 
plans.
There were two kinds o f power in this study which played a major role in moving the 
merger and restructuring process forward. In the government-led approach, power 
was concentrated at the actor or leadership level o f the hospital, under the authority o f 
the RHA. In the stakeholder-led approach power was dispersed between the 
stakeholders, and within the merging hospitals themselves the Boards removed power 
from the hands o f the CEO as this would have hindered co-operation with the other 
merging hospital. Overall, there were many parallels between this study and 
Fligstein’s work and conclusions. Fligstein’s theory that organisational change is 
financially motivated, politically led and manipulated by the state and other powerful 
actors is well supported by both cases, the difference ultimately lying in the way in 
which the State in one case retained and exercised its power to privilege its favoured 
actors and in the other case delegated its power to the community stakeholders and 
independent local and provincial review bodies.
8.7. Factors Influencing the Success of the M erger Process and Outcome
The researcher found that common themes began to emerge from stakeholder 
feedback about how best to survive and succeed at merging hospitals. These 
organisational factors are important and failure to consider these issues could affect 
the outcome and prevent any merger achieving its full potential. The organisational 
success factors identified are: leadership, change management, vision, human
resources, organisational culture and structure.
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Leadership
The most critical factor in implementing successful organisational change is the senior 
leadership team. This team needs to be objective, comprehensive and highly 
disciplined in assessing, planning for, and managing organisational change. 
Successful leadership calls for a willingness to grasp the complexity and ambiguity o f 
public sector change. Effective leadership also demands a capacity to be politically 
astute, address the concerns o f external stakeholder groups and the ability to serve as a 
champion o f change. Change always engenders resistance because it threatens the 
status quo and introduces uncertainty. Senior leaders must therefore be willing to 
drive the change process forward, complete the merger deal and realign the new 
organisation. Where a senior leader such as the CEO is resistant to change, the Board 
or other body to which the CEO is accountable must be willing to step in and take 
over the merger negotiations.
Change Management
Successful change management is a long-term process. Being effective is a function 
o f creating a mindset, attitude and skilfulness at managing change. M erger objectives 
need to be clear so the change process can be strategically planned and progress can 
be accurately measured. It is important to learn how to pace change. It should be a 
staged process with clear tasks and supported by staff with the least disruption to 
patients. If  change is too slow it will be painful, and if  it is too fast staff become 
overwhelmed, de-motivated and stressed. Time scales should be carefully mapped 
out, with realistic targets and completion dates. In successful merger scenarios, 
organisations use transition mechanisms to address implementation issues on an 
ongoing basis. These mechanisms include an integration team, a cross-functional 
transition team and a senior executive and Board committee. Political judgem ent and 
tactics are important for manoeuvring and manipulating the process. When bringing 
organisations together, it is a good philosophy to build on their mutual strengths and 
work together on weaknesses.
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Vision
Organisations require a sense o f direction or vision for practical purposes such as 
guiding resource allocation decisions, and giving people a sense o f purpose. When a 
hospital is acquired in a hostile take-over, almost all sense o f identity and direction 
will be lost. Yet for the strong acquirer, the transaction may represent an affirmation 
o f the hospital’s vision and direction. The uncertainties o f the transaction require that 
the original vision be clarified or significantly reformulated to galvanise the new 
organisation. When two organisations are merged, the new vision must clearly 
articulate the goals o f the combined entity which will provide a focus, logic and 
rallying point. If  the vision is to have value, it must be communicated to all 
employees and must be backed by persuasive senior management action.
Human Resource Focus
Understanding and managing people and helping them adjust to the transition is vital 
for merger success. Hospital employees will experience considerable anxiety as they 
are bombarded by information from inside and outside the hospital. The timeliness 
and accuracy o f this information can be difficult to evaluate. As a result, staff feel 
both uninformed and unimportant, and this leads to unproductive behaviour and 
increases in absenteeism. Senior management need to make regular communication a 
high priority. In addition to communication efforts, the merger management 
processes must involve as many employees as possible in identifying integration 
issues. People respond much better when they are allowed to have input into the 
transition process.
Organisational Culture
Understanding the nature o f organisational culture and its contribution to management 
processes and the work environment is critical. Culture is shaped over long periods o f 
time and can be relatively difficult to change, and mergers are usually overshadowed 
by previous organisational relationships. It is important to acknowledge that different 
cultures exist in organisations and these issues need to be addressed. Therefore it is 
important to build a new organisational identity that staff can align themselves with 
and move on from identifying with their old institution. Developing a new
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organisation entails more than just changing the organisation’s name. The new 
organisation needs to be developed slowly and deliberately by establishing common 
goals and drivers over time.
Developing a New Organisational Structure
During the transition period collaboration is important and decisions should be made 
in a timely manner. The new Board needs to come together and provide direction for 
the new organisation. It is important to have the doctors’ support if  any change 
program is to be successful. The co-locating o f people from the different 
organisations is one o f the simplest but strongest techniques for developing common 
purpose and process. Where people are located delivers powerful messages about the 
scope o f their job and how much the hospital values the actual integration o f the two 
organisations. Organisational restructuring and change are complex and costly. 
Budgets can never be overestimated. A key skill in implementing organisational 
restructuring is to learn how to manage chaos.
8.8. Limitations and Suggestion for Further Research
These findings o f this research must be seen as limited to the two cases studied, and in 
order to determine whether a stakeholder-led merger and restructuring process is more 
likely to result in a new hospital archetype than government-led one, further case 
studies are needed. It should be recognised that in the English case the government 
was working within the relatively new internal market model o f health care provision, 
and the RHA approached its Acute Services Review from the standpoint o f a 
purchaser o f services:
“The health authority has a formal role, under current national guidelines, to 
lead public consultation on major changes to local services but our prime task is 
to agree a strategy for the purchase of future services. An authority decision on 
the best way forward will represent a new purchasing strategy, setting a clear 
framework within which NHS Trusts and other providers will work”. [150:1]
There was no concern here with organisational culture or form.
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In sharp contrast, the Health Services Restructuring Commission in the Ontario case 
was more concerned with the need to integrate health services across the system and 
recognised that:
“Organisations possess distinct cultures and may have different approaches to 
the delivery of health care services. Integrating services requires fostering new 
cultures, appreciating organisational histories, and nurturing the positive 
attributes of each organisation. It is imperative that traditions of excellence be 
retained in the cultures of newly formed organisations.”
[129:4]
With the recent move away from the internal market model in the British NHS, further 
studies o f more recent English and Ontario hospital merger cases should, the 
researcher believes, provide further insight into the relationship between the roles and 
influence o f government and stakeholders and the likelihood o f organisational 
transformation. In addition, the following areas for further investigation are suggested 
as relevant:
1. W hat types o f communication strategies win support for a merger from the 
staff and the community?
2. W hat is the definition o f culture in the context o f public sector health services 
organisations?
3. W hat is the process o f cultural change and what mechanisms facilitate the 
stabilisation o f a new culture in a merger?
4. Are the issues for micro mergers o f  departments and programs within a 
hospital the same as for the main hospital merger?
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Statement on the HSRC Report by Chairman o f the Board, 
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation.
Health Services Restructuring Commission (November 27,
1997) News Release: Commission Redesigns Hamilton- 
Wentworth Health System.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (January 30, 1997) 
M inutes o f the Board o f Trustees.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (February 25, 1997) 
President & CEO ’s Report for the Board meeting on February 
27, 1997.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (March 20, 1997) 
Minutes o f the Health Services Restructuring Commission Sub- 
Committee.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (April 24, 1997) Report 
o f  the President and CEO to the Board o f  Trustees.
Hamilton-W entworth District Health Council (January 15, 1997) 

































Hamilton Academic Health Care Network (April 23, 1997) 
Submission from  the Hamilton Academic Health Care Network 
to the Health Services Restructuring Commission.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (January, 1997) 
Presentation by the Integration Task Force: Principles o f Work 
Redesign.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (February 3, 1997) 
General Principles and Ground Rules fo r  Integration.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (April, 1997) Integration 
Status Report.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (June 2, 1997) 
Measurement and Evaluation o f  the Merger/Integration Status.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (July 3, 1997) 
Integration/Re-design Communication Structure.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (August 26, 1997) 
Regional Services: Integration/Re-design Presentation.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (November 28, 1997) 
Integration/Re-design Change Model.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (December 15, 1997) 
Implementation o f  the Patient Care Model - Professional 
Practice Component.
Hamilton-W entworth District Health Council (January 19, 1998) 
Response o f  the Hamilton-Wentworth District Health Council to 
the Hamilton-W entworth Restructuring Report by the Health 
Services Restructuring Commission November 1997.
Hamilton-W entworth District Health Council (January 19, 1998) 
The 1998-1999 Annual District Service Plan.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (January 19, 1998) 
Response to the Report o f  the Hamilton-Wentworth Health 
Services Restructuring Commission.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (April 9, 1998) Fiscal 
1998/99 Operating Plan.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (April 3, 1998) A 
Supplementary Submission to the Health Services Restructuring 
Commission by St. Peter’s Hospital and Hamilton Health 
Sciences Corporation, regarding an Integrated Health System for 
Seniors and the Chedoke Centre for Health and Human 
Potential.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (April 29, 1998) 































Health Services Restructuring Commission (May 20, 1998)
News Release: Commission Finalizes Hamilton-Wentworth 
Health Services Plan.
Health Services Restructuring Commission (May 1998)
Hamilton - Wentworth Health Services Restructuring Report.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (June 30,1998) Report o f 
the Chief o f Staff to Members o f the Hamilton Health Sciences 
Corporation.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (June 30,1998) 
Administrative and Medical By-Laws.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (June 30, 1998) Report o f 
the President and CEO to the Members o f Hamilton Health 
Sciences Corporation.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (September 3,1998) 
Integration/Re-design Projects by Portfolio.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (December 4, 1998) 
Accreditation Survey Report.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (September 10,1998) 
Report to the Board o f Trustees - Nominating and Governance 
Committee.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (January 7,1999) Report 
o f the President and CEO to the Board o f Trustees.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (March 31,1999) 
Financial Statements for 1998-1999.
St. Peter’s Hospital (March 2, 1998) Principles to Guide 
Development o f  an Alliance Agreement Between Hamilton 
Health Sciences Corporation and St. Peter’s Hospital.
St. Peter’s Hospital (1997-98) St. Peter’s Annual Report to the 
Community
St. Peter’s Hospital (June, 1999) Report to the Community 1998- 
99.
Health Services Restructuring Commission (April 1998) Change 
and Transition: Planning Guidelines and Implementation 
Strategies fo r  Home Care, Long Term Care, Mental Health, 
Rehabilitation, and Sub-acute Care.
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Hospital Newsletters
Connections, Staff News Bulletin for Chedoke-McM aster Hospitals, February 28, 
1996.
The Loop, Staff Newsletter for Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation, Special 
Redesign Edition, October, 1998.
Merger Update Newsletter
Merger Update, M onthly Newsletter o f the Transition Committee o f Chedoke- 
M cMaster and Hamilton Civic Hospitals, March 1996, Issue one.
Merger Update, M onthly Newsletter o f the Transition Committee o f Chedoke- 
McMaster and Hamilton Civic Hospitals, May 1996, Issue two.
Merger Update, M onthly Newsletter o f the Transition Committee o f Chedoke- 
McMaster and Hamilton Civic Hospitals, June 1996, Issue three.
Merger Update, M onthly Newsletter o f the Transition Committee o f Chedoke- 
M cM aster and Hamilton Civic Hospitals, July 1996, Issue four.
Merger Update, M onthly Newsletter o f the Transition Committee o f Chedoke- 
McMaster and Hamilton Civic Hospitals, August 1996, Issue five.
Merger Update Staff Bylaws Newsletter
Merger Update S ta ff Bylaws, Newsletter o f  the Medical and Professional S taff Bylaw 
Committee o f the Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation, July 16, 1996, Issue one.
Merger Update S ta ff Bylaws, Newsletter o f the Medical and Professional Staff Bylaw 
Committee o f the Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation, July 30, 1996, Issue two.
Newspaper Articles
The Spectator (April 13, 1996) ‘New Hospital Plan: Henderson Gets Cancer Focus, St 
Joe’s Stays A live’.
The Spectator (May 7, 1996) ‘Closing St. Joe’s M ay be Mistake: Task Force Might 
W ithdraw Plan, Chairman Says’.
The Spectator (May 27, 1996) ‘No Hospital Closures: Health Council Expected to 
Vote to Keep 4 O pen’.
The Toronto Star (July 7, 1996) ‘Radical Surgery for Health System: Dramatic 
Change Looms as Health M inister Draws Purse Strings Tight’.
The Toronto Star (July 13, 1996) ‘W hat to do Before the Restructuring Axe Falls’.
The Globe and Mail (July 15, 1996) ‘Travelling Executioners to Seal Fate o f Ontario 
Hospitals: Decision Time / Closings W eren’t Happening, A New Commission has 
the Clout to Get the Job Done.
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